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Abstract 
Nation Queer? Discourses of Nationhood and 
Homosexuality In Times of Transformation:  
Case Studies From Poland. 
 This thesis explores the relationship between discourses of nationhood and 
homosexuality in the context of Polish “post-communist transformations” that 
have taken place over the last decade. It begins with the hypothesis that there 
must be a more complex relationship between the two discourses than a situation 
where nationhood simply and straightforwardly rejects the homosexuality. As 
such, the thesis explores possibilities for going beyond (or further into) the 
dialectics of the same/other, as a way to develop understandings about the 
relationship between the nation and homosexuality. The focus is on undercurrents 
and internal dynamics, constantly negotiating and re-working mutual 
dependencies between the two discourses. In this context, the thesis is especially 
geared to exploring the “unforeseen” (or possible), the “wilful”, “unintended” (or 
hoped for) in the two discourses.  
 The thesis is organised around three major research problems: (1) How is 
homosexuality framed by national discourse (when performed by the nation-
state)? (2) How do discourses of homosexuality relate to nationhood (in times of 
national distress)? (3) How might national/ist rhetoric be present in discourses of 
LGBT organisations? Methodologically, the thesis is grounded in a case study 
approach and discourse analysis. Overall, I argue that we may map out the 
relations between the nationhood and homosexuality through discourses of 
rejection as well as dependency, oscillating on the continuum between 
“sameness” and “otherness”. These relations are best described via the concepts 
of “dis-location”, “be-longing”, “attachment”, and “dis-identification”. 
 This research is important for at least three reasons. There is a scarcity of 
work about sexualities in Central and Eastern Europe and a need for more work in 
this area. Additionally, we have recently witnessed a rise of concern with 
“homonationalism” in queer studies. Attention to Poland is a valuable addition to 
this scholarship, which so far is about only the “West” and “Islam”. Finally, it also 
contributes to nationalism studies, where sexuality is still an under-explored topic, 
and it offers new insights for scholars interested in Polish nationalism studies.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction:  
A journey from where I stand,  
to the theory, and back again… 
The rapid changes in political and economic systems in Central and Eastern 
Europe after 1989 also brought social and cultural turmoil, resulting in significant 
shifts in national cultures. In Poland, one of the most important problems is the re-
configuration of the (new) notion of Polish nationhoodi. This is so because Polish 
national identity was tightly related to the idea of struggle for "Freedom" and 
"Liberty" (against/from Prussian and German, Russian and Soviet empires). So with 
the collapse of state communism in 1989, when "Freedom" was finally "won" (or 
so at least it was thought) the notion of Polishness has necessarily had to change (I 
explore these issues in greater depth in the Chapter 5). This “Freedom”, however, 
brought about consequences that for many could not be foreseen before the 
collapse of one regime and the arrival of another. Two such “bastard children of 
the revolution” emerging in the wake of the 1989 collapse were the feminist (non 
state-sponsored, as during the communism), and homosexual (soon after re-
labelling itself as LGBT) movements (Flam 2001). So we see that the post-1989 
creation of the “new state” of Poland was indeed not only about the political and 
economic systems of its organisation, but also opened the space for struggles and 
tussles in the creation of the “new nation” of Poland, where new social 
movements began to play a role. The extent of social movements’ participation in 
these processes is also a matter of other studies already under way (Jawłowska 
2007; Kubik 2007; Kubik and Wenzel 2007). 
 For my purpose, what is symbolically important here is this co-emergence of 
the “new Poland” with the springing up of “new communities” of homosexual 
people, who were self-organising (LGBT) and beginning to voice their group 
interests (as gays and lesbians)ii. In this thesis I trace how in these times of so-
called "post-communist transformation" nationhood relates to the "new reality", 
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and in this context, I am especially interested in how the figure of the homosexual 
becomes an important "player" in the Polish national imagination. Equally, I am 
captivated by the role that Polish nationhood plays in emerging LGBT politics, 
and in gay and lesbian communities. These interests stem partially from 
experiences of growing up as a person who systematically came to understand 
himself to be non-heterosexual; and who happened to live exactly at the moment 
of that “great change” that came in 1989, bonding my adolescence with the 
adolescent years of the “new Poland”, and those of the LGBT movement. But my 
inquisitiveness is also inspired by much later education, and the development of 
my academic interests in cultural and queer studies.  
 Another important influence has been the growing number of queer studies 
publications on nationalism and neoliberalism. This particular body of work is 
now often referred to as “homonationalism” or “sexual nationalism” studies 
(discussed in greater detail in the Chapter 4). Overall, the thesis is inter- and trans-
disciplinary in its broadly defined humanities and social scientific epistemological 
location. In the deployment of the theoretical, methodological, and analytical 
approaches, it draws on cultural studies, social anthropology, and cultural 
sociology. The thesis is grounded in queer studies, discourse studies, and relates 
to area studies (Slavonic/Polish studies) and nationalism studies. By bringing these 
disciplines and approaches together, I hope to contribute to each of them by 
examining overlooked or underexplored connections, topics or possibilities. For 
example, there is a scarcity of work about sexualities in Central and Eastern 
Europe (Stulhofer and Sandfort 2004; Kuhar and Takács 2007; Kulpa and 
Mizielinska 2011b), therefore this thesis responds to a need for better 
understandings of issues related to sexuality in this regional context, as much as to 
a need for deeper consideration of the CEE in a gender and sexuality studies 
context. Additionally, recent developments in queer studies show heated debates 
about sexuality and nationality in European, "Western", and global contexts (e.g. 
Puar 2007; Jivraj and De Jong 2011). However, as most of these works focus on 
relations between "Europe"/"West" and "Islam"/"Other", my attention to Poland 
and CEE should be a valuable addition to this element of queer studies 
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scholarship. Lastly, it also contributes to nationalism studies, where sexuality is 
still an under-explored topic of research (Pryke 1998). 
 There is, however, a third spur for this research project, one that again links 
my “personal” experiences with the “academic” endeavour. Here is the story… 
The writing of this PhD has been a long, and ongoing, peregrination for me. 
Before I introduce the key research questions examined in the thesis, let me take 
you on a journey; wander with me as I recursively recreate this passage of time, 
finishing and writing up the whole thing. Here I offer a “personal” story of how I 
came to write what you are now reading. 
 It is not uncommon today to read academic work that strikes personal notes 
of where the authors are coming from, what their social or political views are, 
especially in relation to the issues they elaborate. This shift from a purely positivist 
stance ("objective researcher") to a self-reflexive one (questioning the very 
possibility of "objectivity") dates back to the 1960s when some of the most 
important works of critical inquiry into epistemological foundations of 
contemporary knowledge(s) were written (Carr 1987; Kuhn 1996; Foucault 2002). 
Throughout the 1970s, flourishing ("new") social movements - such as feminism, 
black liberation, and lesbian and gay liberation - strongly incorporated the issue 
of "location" into their agenda and made it one of their primary objects of critique 
(Stoddard 1997). In particular, feminist debates over “standpoint theory: that 
continued during the 1980s (although the term came later) (see e.g. Harding 
1991; Harding 2004; Hekman 2004) and discussions about "situated knowledges" 
in the 1990s (e.g. Visweswaran 1994; Haraway 1997) brought "self-reflexivity", 
"situated knowledge" and the "politics of location" to my attention. These works 
have inspired my own outlook. 
 However, the practice of acknowledging one's own roots may easily slip 
into a meaningless enumeration of categories (white, homo, working class, etc.) 
and thereby lose its focus and significance. This is why I find a fragment from 
Donna Haraway's "Modest_Witness@Second_Millenium. 
FemaleMan©_Meets_OncoMouse" (1997) still so important and worth reminding 
myself of. She writes that  
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[s]trong objectivityiii insists that both the objects and the subjects of 
knowledge-making practices must be located. Location is not a listing 
of adjectives or assigning of labels such as race, sex, and class. 
Location is not the concrete to the abstract of decontextualization. 
Location is the always partial always finite, always fraught play of 
foreground and background, text and context, that constitutes critical 
inquiry. Above all, location is not self-evident or transparent (1997, 
37). 
 
Not only is it important to read, but it is as important to keep practising such 
"writing oneself into the analysis", as "we have not written ourselves in nearly 
enough" (Presser 2005, 2067). Yet even this is not enough for Lois Presser. 
Elaborating on her own methodological problems as a female researcher working 
in prison settings with men penalised for domestic violence, she rightfully notices 
that such meeting/work is an ongoing process involving negotiating positions for 
both researcher and researched. Thus, "we must go beyond simply writing 
ourselves into research interviews to writing our exchanges into them … 
[because] … relations of power between interviewer and participant become part 
of interview data" (Presser 2005, 2086). This can be easily extended to any 
research method, not only the interview. Presser’s position here resonates well 
with my purpose of examining relations (also and necessarily of power) between 
the national and homosexual subject positioning in Poland, and opens a space for 
me to consider the locations my research begins with, and how they have 
changed over the course of my research journey. Today is Friday the 02.09.2011 
and these words from the first draft of this chapter, which were written on 
Wednesday the 19.02.2009 come again to me: 
  
Why am I doing this research? Far from any grandiosity of "historical 
earthquakes", I live in London because I have chosen to do so, but the choice 
was, after all, possible thanks to the collapse of state socialism in Poland and 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), and later thanks to the European Union (EU) 
enlargement in 2004. I have been living here also because I could not get myself a 
stable income and secure basic living conditions in Warsaw. But also I have come 
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here, because I was a poof, a faggot, and I was afraid to travel back home at night 
from a club, because I looked like one. And I wanted to look like one, I wanted to 
be, and to look like, a camp queen. And it just happened that I have paid some 
painful consequences for it. Then I became too scared and too tired of being a 
flaming queen. I stopped dressing up, my tastes shifted and evolved, but the 
psychological discomfort remained. So I began dreaming about an escape to 
(what I saw as) the "land of freedom". Once again, I believed the West would 
bring a salvation. And here I am, living my dream, although this life is far from a 
dream. Working in a bar to secure a basic stable income, I am also constantly 
ordered at the bottom of the classist ladder of British society as a "Polish boy", an 
emigrant who is meant to do low paid service jobs. As one of the chatty clients 
once so sharply noted: "Perhaps one day you could get yourself some 
qualifications, perhaps even go to university?" I did not try to explain to him that I, 
who had just served him a "pint-of-lager-mate" and who was so obviously at the 
bottom of his imaginary social strata, not only had university qualifications, but 
was also on course to obtain a doctorate. And so here I am again, living my dream 
life that is, indeed, what I have always wanted to do: get the doctorate, do 
academic research, teach at a university. 
 
I am telling this story to show that these very "personal" (hi)stories are indeed 
inseparably and crucially intertwined conditions of my doing this research and 
finalising this thesis. In a way, it is a story of two worlds, of living "in-between", of 
constant identifications and dis-identifications, of trying to forget about the "past", 
and constantly being reminded about it through particular placement in the 
"present". It is as if I am "here" and "there", and yet in neither place. How does this 
all affect my research? 
 I work within “Western” (British) academia, writing about “Eastern 
European” (Polish) subjects, hence necessarily incorporating (through structural 
arrangements, but also my own decisions) the "Western gaze" to a certain 
degreeiv. Yet what has also preoccupied me in this research has been the relation 
of power and inequality between regional and cultural designations of "the West" 
and "the Rest" (Stewart Hall 1992) in contemporary currents of knowledge 
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production. I am an ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ at the same time - a positionality full 
of contradictions. Whilst this limbo position is problematic sometimes, it has also 
been a productive source of inspiration and insight. Trinh T. Minh-ha's writings 
have influenced me as I have navigated and mapped out my own subjectivities, 
mixing "personal" and the "academic" positionalities together. She writes about 
the status of post-colonial women, artists, "insiders" working in the "outside" (i.e. 
“Western”) context. Minh-ha claims that this ambiguous position in which 
subjects find themselves may in fact bring at least some degree of a discomfort to 
the dominant discourses. She writes: 
 
The moment the insider steps out from the inside she's no longer a mere 
insider. She necessarily looks in from the outside while also looking out 
from the inside. Not quite the same, not quite the other, she stands in that 
undetermined threshold place where she constantly drifts in and out. 
Undercutting the inside/outside opposition, her intervention is necessarily 
that of both not quite an insider and not quite an outsider. She is, in other 
words this inappropriate other or same who moves about with always at 
least two gestures: that of affirming 'I am like you' while persisting in her 
difference and that of reminding 'I am different' while unsettling every 
definition of otherness arrived at (Minh-ha 1990, 375). 
 
Here I have given an account of the social locations that I consciously and 
(un)willingly embody. After locating my thesis disciplinary, it is a way to locate 
myself in the research, since I recognise personal experiences and stories of 
identity, being identified, identifications and, not less importantly, dis-
identifications, as the important stimulus for this research. I now proceed to 
elaborate on the research questions and methodological approaches used to 
answer them. 
 1.1 Research questions 
Mapping out the relations between discourses of nation and homosexuality does 
have two, very broadly sketched, directions: the role of the constructed figure of 
the homosexual v  in national narratives, and (the reverse) the importance of 
nationhood in discourses of homosexuality. In recent writings that try to approach 
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these problems (e.g. Graff 2008), most of the attention is given to the former, 
somehow forgetting about the latter possibilities. In order to avoid this 
unbalanced approach, I also ask what role Polishness plays for homosexual 
subjects in Polandvi. 
 This is an important question because the (post-1989) formation of gay and 
lesbian identity and community in Poland is a direct consequence of the national 
struggle for freedom and liberty. Therefore it is important to ask about how 
homosexual subjects relate to their nationhood? How does each side respond to 
the claims of the other side? Thus the central research problem of this thesis is the 
relation between discourses of homosexuality and nationhood, analysed in the 
context of Poland, and using case studies spanning the last decade.  
 Rather than seeing their relation as fixed and stable dyads such as 
same/other, inclusion/exclusion, and so on, I am more interested in undercurrents 
and internal dynamics, constantly negotiating and re-working mutual 
dependencies of the discourses of nationhood and homosexuality. In this context, 
the thesis is especially focused on exploring the "surprising" (or not), the 
"unwilling" (or wilful), "unintended" (or hoped for), and "unforeseen" (or possible) 
in the two discourses. Such a focal point is invested in explorations of complexity 
and diversity of relations, charting out the possibilities, rather than fixing answers. 
The thesis is organised in relation to the following questions: 
! How is homosexuality framed by national discourse (when performed by 
the nation-state)?  
I am particularly interested here in how strong this relation is, and whether we 
can even hypothesise about the mutual dependency of discourses of nation and 
homosexuality? I explore the extent to which the figure of the homosexual is 
essential to the contemporary state discourses of Polish nationhood in the Chapter 
6. 
! How do homosexual subjects relate to nationhood (in times of national 
distress)? 
! How can national rhetoric be present in discourses of the LGBT 
organisations? 
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The last two questions are addressed directly in Chapters 7 and 8, respectively. 
Here we also face a (more general in nature) problem whether there is a 
possibility of sexual (or any other, for that matter) politics outside the national 
frame? In other words, can we “avoid” or “escape” the nation as a reference for 
any social activity? 
 These questions reflect my concern with the complex ways in which 
nationhood and homosexuality are related. This relation is often perceived as 
mutually exclusive, based on rejection, exclusion and denial (see e.g. Graff 2008). 
My aim is to scrutinise this presumption in the case of Poland and its cultural 
transformations in the last decade, trying to map out some of the possibilities that 
are less commonly acknowledged. As such, my work is inspired by Michel 
Foucault’s (1980; 1998; 2000), since he attempted to go beyond understandings 
of power as something only forbidding and enclosed. He demonstrated the 
potential productivity of power relations, showing how its manipulatory and 
prolific mechanisms hold potential for reinvention and (re?)creation. In a similar 
vein, I aim to see relations between discourses of nation and homosexuality, as 
tied up not only with rejection but also with resistance, subversion, contribution, 
and dependency of the manifold national and sexual subjectivities. 
 1.2 Thesis outline 
The thesis consists of nine chapters, each further divided into sub-chapters, and 
sections. Chapters 2-5 establish the theoretical, socio-political and historical 
contexts within which my analysis (Chapters 6-8) takes place. Specifically, 
Chapter 2 presents the theoretical and methodological frameworks of the thesis 
whilst the third chapter contextualises my work in relation to literature concerned 
with nationhood, national identities and nationalism, taking into consideration 
‘macro’, ‘meso’, and ‘micro’ levels of analysis. I discuss nation in the context of 
globalisation and post-colonialism, paying particular attention to location, map, 
place, and concepts of mimicry and agency. The fourth chapter offers a critical 
overview of literature concerning nationhood and (homo)sexuality.  "Critical" here 
means that I review existing writings through a prism of Central and Eastern 
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European geo-temporal, cultural and political loci, also attempting to build a 
problem-oriented framework of reference to which I can return later in the thesis 
and which informs my analytical outlook. There I discuss topics of time and 
temporality, geography, power and hegemony in the formations of national and 
sexual cultures. Chapter 4 also engages with the recent literature about 
"homonationalism" and "sexual nationalism”, showing how these studies deal 
primarily with “Western” and Western European contexts, not necessarily 
translating well (or at all) to a Central and Eastern European locale. 
 Chapter 5, "Poland: national context", provides the reader with background 
information about the formation of "traditional Polishness", i.e. the set of 
constitutive elements of what is, or could be said to be, the national identity in 
Poland.  This includes a discussion of various types of “otherness” as important 
figures against which Polish national identity was constructed before the collapse 
of state communism in 1989. I talk about traditional cultural approaches to 
sexuality and how they may remain in relation to the geographical position of 
Poland between the "West" and the "East". This, in turn invokes themes of 
martyrdom and victimhood. However, I also insist on reading Polish history as a 
history of “colonialism” – for example, as evidenced by the treatment and 
experiences of Jewish people, or eastern “borderlands” of Poland. 
 Having established the theoretical framework from within which I am 
working, the following three chapters focus on analysis. Each one revolves around 
a different case study, mapping out intertwined relations and connections 
between discourses of the nation and homosexuality in Poland. In Chapter 6 I 
analyse state discourses as represented in the resolutions of the Polish Parliament 
and in one Presidential speech. Using elements of Discourse Theory, I show how 
the figure of the homosexual is constructed as a national threat and one of the 
main new (post-1989) “others”. However, whilst framed as oppositional and 
exclusive, this chapter helps to demonstrate how the two discourses remain in a 
tight relation of dependency where the national discourse needs the figure of the 
homosexual as much as it claims to be free (or indeed, under attack) from it. 
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 In the second of the analysis chapters, “Attachments and belonging", I look 
at the aftermath of President Kaczynski's tragic death in a plane crash in April 
2010, and am concerned with understanding why gay and lesbian people 
mourned their infamously homophobic president. In examining this extraordinary 
case of national bereavement and the collective performance of grief, I point to 
complex models of attachment that position Polish homosexual subjects in a 
locus where they are able to enter the national discourse as subjects, and not only 
as abjects. This “overtaking” does not require outside recognition of the willing (if 
not wilful) subject. I also highlight the role of identification rather than identity in 
grasping the dependencies between discourses of the nation and homosexuality. 
 Finally, the penultimate chapter of the thesis is a case study of two LGBT 
campaigns. Where Chapter 7 was about the “extraordinary” (catastrophic death of 
the President), Chapter 8 traces the "ordinary" and "normal", looking at strategies 
of LGBT groups. Drawing on concepts of respectability and "banal nationalism" I 
show how the two case study campaigns weave sexual subjectivity into 
(neoliberal) cultural politics of individualisation and productivity. I show how 
"baby capitalism" and the “new reality” of post-1989 Central and Eastern Europe, 
becomes a counterpart of an emerging "sexual citizenship", deployed as an 
important strategy of LGBT groups in Poland. The final clause to this thesis, a 
summary of findings, and implications for further research are contained in the 
Conclusions chapter. 
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Chapter 2  
Theoretical and methodological framework 
 
In this chapter I discuss the theoretical and methodological framework informing 
my research, building towards the critical and analytical engagement offered in 
subsequent chapters. I begin with an overview of case study methodology and the 
rationale informing my selection of cases before going on to explain my 
understanding of discourse, differentiation between identities and identifications, 
and finally ruminating on Foucault, power/knowledge and my epistemological 
placement as the “Eastern European academic” in the global system of knowledge 
production. 
 I would like to open this chaper by drawing on Paula Saukko’s book 
“Doing Research In Cultural Studies” (2003), where she explains why her work is 
about “methodology” rather than about “methods”. She explains that while 
method is more like a tool, a technical operation, methodology combines tools 
and epistemological comitments that come with a particular approach, thus 
encomas wider field of philosophical concern. Of course, methods and 
methodologies go in pairs, and stimulate each other. However, while one method 
could be used to pursue more thatn one methodological commitment, the revers 
is not true (Saukko 2003, 8). Becaue this research is also concerned with the 
epistemological questions of ‘geographies of knowledge produciton’, and the 
relation of the ‘center’ to the ‘periphery’, the ‘universal’ to the ‘particualr’, the two 
methodological approaches adopted her are those of case studies and discourse 
analysis. 
 In proceeding with the explanation for the choice of case studies, the work 
of John Gerring (2007) is helpful. He argues:  
 
[t]he case study – of an individual, group, organization or event – rests 
implicitly on the existence of a micro-macro link in social behavior. It is a 
form of cross-level inference. Sometimes, in-depth knowledge of an 
individual example is more helpful than fleeting knowledge about a larger 
number of examples. We gain better understanding of the whole by 
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focusing on a key part (Gerring 2007, 1).  
 
In light of his words, when this approach applied to the study of nationhood and 
homosexuality, one will be able to capture the dialogic nature of the social and 
individual, macro and micro, ‘universal’/’general’ and ‘particular’/’individual’.   
 Similarly, we should ask why discourse analysis? One reason is that it is a 
methodology that is able productively to capture the interdependency between 
the macro, meso and micro levels of social coexistence. Hence it enables us to 
link and “translate” the singularity of the studied cases onto generalized 
theoretical conclusions each study seeks to advance (to different extents, 
naturally). Discourse analysis is potentially able to suggest new ways of 
overcoming the deadlock in the structure/agency debate in social sciences 
(Blommaert 2005), and is effective method of analysing nationhood (Sutherland 
2005), sexuality (A. M. Smith 1994), and identity/identification (De Fina, Schiffrin, 
and Bamberg 2006). More nuanced explanation of how I understand and 
conceptualise discourse in this thesis follows in the next section. 
 Finally, there is also a question of why to mix the (any) two (or any other 
number) of methodologies and/or methods? The answer is simple but not 
simplistic. By assembling the two methodologies together, finding their points of 
junction and divergences, paints more dense, “thick” and intricate a picture of the 
studied phenomena. It must be clear, however, that methodological synergy 
strives towards better understanding of that which never can be full 
comprehended (for it would be simplistic, not simple, to say that we can grasp the 
whole dimension of social and cultural reality as it is). This speaks to the 
epistemological grounding of this research, which in accordance with 
contemporary critical approaches in humanities and social sciences, questions the 
possibility of “total understanding”, “realism” and “objectivity” of any academic 
endeavour. This comes close to the mentioned distinction between the ‘method’ 
and ‘methodoogy’ (Saukko 2003). And similar argument is expressed by Lauren 
Berlant in her editorial to the special issue of Critical Inquiry “On the Case” 
(2007). Berlant suggests that many existing books on case studies are rather 
instrumental and technical (thus about “method” in Saukko’s definition), and not 
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enough “theoretical” (which could translate onto “methodology”), especially for 
humanists.  
 So to sumamrise the reasons for the convergence of case studies and 
discourse analysis, it is their fascination with the interplay between the grand and 
the particular, the social and the individual, the national and the homosexual, as I 
put it in this work, that is particuaraily useful for me. But what is the case study? 
This is a question troubling many authors. Indeed, the multiplication of defnititons 
and understandings of ‘case study’ has produced and array of possibilities (e.g. 
Platt 1988; Pole and Burgess 2000; Lauren Berlant 2007; Yin 2009). Particularitly 
fitted from my reserahc seems the one propsed by Berlant (2007). She defines 
‘case study’ as follows: 
 
It is an instance of something (violated law, failed informational impact). 
It is a synonym for argument, as in “making a case for.” It is a genre that 
organizes singularities into exemplary, intelligible patterns, enmeshing 
realist claims (x really is exemplary in this way) with analytic aims (if we 
make a pattern from x set of singularities we can derive y conclusions) 
and makes claims for why it should be thus (Berlant 2007, 670). 
 
Her operationalization of the case study seems to offer best methodological and 
theoretical a response to the study of ongoing multidimensional complexities, 
which I suggest are characteristic to the relationship(s) between the discourses of 
nation and homosexuality.  
 
  The choice of cases 
My arguments are highlighted and developed through an exploration of five 
cases, considered over the course of three chapters (six to eight). Each case 
exemplifies a different aspect and plurality of the relationships between discourses 
of nation and homosexuality. 
 In Chapter 6, I explore cases in relation to the question of how 
homosexuality is framed by national discourse (when performed by the nation-
state). I chose to focus on cases that related to the presidency and parliament, as 
these are key sites in which nationhood is expressed. I examine a resolution made 
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by the Polish Sejm (the lower chamber of the Parliament) in 2002 about 
“confirmation of Polish values” and the President Kaczynski's National Address 
speech (17.03.2008), as two instances of state discourses about nationhood and 
homosexuality. Here I deploy textual analysis of the parliamentary resolutions, 
and an audio-visual analysis of a television presentation. 
 The particular Parliamentary resolution I analyse is drawn on because of its 
parculiarity - a resolution on “Polish values” that is only one sentence long, and 
that was made public just before the national referendum on whether Poland 
would join the EU. Additionally, this resolution foregrounds the discourse of 
“Polish values” versus “EU moral threat” that is deployed in the President 
Kaczynski’s National Address speech.  The importance of this particular speech 
lies in the fact that it is rare for the President to directly link Poland, the UE, and 
homosexuality in a state “document” as opposed to expressing a “mere” private 
opinion on them (e.g. in an interview). Additionally, since the national address 
speeches are unusually rare in the Polish political culture, (reserved for the 
moments of the extraordinary importance like Gen. Jaruzelski’s famous speech 
introducing the martial law in 1981), Kaczynski’s 2008 speech is partially 
dedicated to the “threat” of homosexuality, and therefore seems particularly well 
suited for analysing the discourses of nation and homosexuality. 
 In Chapter 7, I seek to understand the importance of nationhood for the gay 
and lesbian community. I do so through exploring questions around lesbian and 
gay participation in the national rituals of mourning and bereavement. As a case, I 
look at the week of national bereavement that took place following the death of 
President Kaczynski in a plane crash in April 2010. This choice of case stems 
from my original surprise at discovering that lesbian and gay communities were 
partaking in national rituals of bereavement to the same extent as everyone else. 
My surprise and initial incomprehension at this dynamic informed the research 
question explored in Chapter 7: why would homosexual people mourn after the 
outspokenly homophobic president? This particular case touches directly on the 
tensions between discourses of homosexuality and discourses of Polishness and, 
as such, constitutes the locus of my analysis in this thesis. 
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 I explore the question - in part - via internet users’ posts in online 
discussions archived as commemorative articles published on lesbian and gay 
websites. However, mine is not an empirical study of the internet as such (for the 
rich methodological literature on using internet in a sociological study, see, e.g. 
Jones 1999; Dicks et al. 2005; Daniel 2011). There are at least two 
methodological issues that need to be addressed here: representativeness and 
ethics of research. I do not claim that the online posts and discussions I 
investigate are in any sense representative of the entire lesbian and gay 
community since I do not think "full representation" is possible at all (cf. Stuart 
Hall 1996), or that there is one such group as a "gay and lesbian community". I 
treat these voices more as discursive instances that contribute to the wider 
framework of discourses on homosexuality and nation. In terms of the ethics of 
using internet forums for my own research purposes (cf. The Information Society 
1996; Brownlow and O’Dell 2002), I treat online posts as texts of the public 
domain. It is so, because they are publicly available to see and reply to, by 
anyone, without any need to register or agree to any (special) terms and 
conditions. 
 There is one simple reason for my choice of internet discussions as sources 
of analytical martial. Online forums were the only “live” and available sites of 
activity and discussion during the national bereavement week, as all other social 
and cultural institutions and outlets were either shut down, suspended, or inactive 
(cf. Chapter 7). The three main gay web portals on which the discussions took 
place were gejowo.pl (oriented towards the club scene, and scene gossip), 
innastrona.pl (more ‘serious’ in character, aiming at news and community service, 
an information portal), and homiki.pl (non-commercial, as the two others, with 
clear cultural and intellectual aspirations). The analysed discussions in Chatper 7 
form article comments under the commemorative articles, and are not forums, for 
these are only availalble to logged in users, requiring membership and acceptance 
of websites terms and conditions. The article comment option does not require 
previous membership, so that every reader can post their response to the article, 
and to the previous comments. Indeed, these exchanges are resembling 
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discussions and exchanges among the commentators speaking to each other, and 
only occasionally a new voice is added in relation to the article. Posts can be 
deleted by the webmaster, but cannot be modified by the user once posted. 
Because commenting does not require login, it is hard to envisage a group profile 
beyond the information gathered from the textual analysis of the posts. For those 
who do have profile as members, the possible accumulative overview would still 
be highly problematic, as profiles are voluntary, and selectively used by registered 
members. Hence the accretive image could not be defended as accurate or 
representative. As a general observation though, it can be said that commentators 
are mostly young male adults, as this is the genral gender/age profile of the 
websites. They mostly recruit from the urban centers, and who have an easy and 
private access to the internet. This is still not as popular for the Polish households 
as it is in the UK. 
 Building on findings from Chapter 7 about the relations between the 
discourse of nation and homosexuality in “extraordinary times”, in Chapter 8 I 
examine discourses of LGBT organisations, as performed during “ordinary” times. 
Chapter 8 is therefore concerned with two campaigns that ran in Poland during 
the 2000s. One called "Let Them See Us" (2002) which was organised by the 
Campaign Against Homophobia (CAH), and the other entitled "Want Tolerance?" 
(2006) organised by Lambda Warsaw Association. I examine a range of materials 
produced by campaigners and other discursive instances. I offer a visual analysis 
of photographs and other graphic materials (posters), textual analysis of 
promotional texts from leaflets and websites set up by organisers. I also use 
mainstream newspaper articles and interviews with participants and organisers of 
the campaigns to broaden my analytical context. 
 By looking at these campaigns I hope to shed some light on how Polish 
homosexual subjects understand themselves in relation to the nation and 
Polishness. The analysis ponders the meanings that homosexual subjects ascribe 
to their identities ("gay”, “lesbian”, “Pole”), and possibly indicate ambivalences 
and tensions present in the relationship between them. This is because these 
campaigns are expressions of how LGBT organisations perceive the situation of 
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non-heterosexual people in Poland, and what they do about it. Analysis of these 
discourses of homosexuality and nation will highlight issues deemed most 
important by the LGBT organisations (hence presumably the gay and lesbian folk, 
since the organisations’ claim - much disputed, to be sure - to represent the 
community), since they were chosen as public campaigns to educate the majority 
of society. 
 2.1 Theorising discourse 
The study of a language as social phenomena has a long and well-established 
tradition. It has been approached from various disciplinary angles (e.g. 
anthropology, linguistics, literary theory, psychology, etc.), producing various 
sub-disciplines and schools (e.g. sociolinguistics, discursive psychology, linguistic 
anthropology), and operating on various levels of analysis, from micro 
(sociolinguistics), through meso (discursive psychology), to macro horizons 
(Foucauldian approach). What they all seem to have in common are three 
conceptions. The first one is: "language and interaction are best understood in 
context"; the second, "social reality is socially constructed", and finally, they all 
look "beyond the literal meanings of language” (Shaw and Bailey 2008, 4). 
 Interest in language and the sphere of the "discursive" that developed in 
academia during the 1960s grew from dissatisfaction with predominantly 
positivist epistemologies that dominated academic work at the time. The re-
evaluation of Marxism and its cultural "revival", alongside emerging cultural 
studies in the 1970s and 1980s, wider social revolts and other expressions of 
discontent with the status quo, all played their role in the formation of “critical 
studies”, of which discourse analysis is part. Discourse studies are now well 
established and rich an approach, with hundreds of books, articles, dedicated 
journals, research centres and "schools". The proliferation of work in this area 
means that there are many different understandings and uses of the concept of 
"discourse" and "discursive analysis". Mine is the following, first proposed by Jan 
Blommaert (2005, 3): 
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[d]iscourse to me comprises all forms of meaningful semiotic human 
activity seen in connection with social, cultural, and historical patterns 
and developments of use. Discourse is one of the possible names we 
can give to it, and I follow Michel Foucault in dong so. What is 
traditionally understood by language is but one manifestation of it; all 
kinds of semiotic 'flagging' performed by means of objects, attributes, 
or activities can and should also be included for they usually constitute 
the 'action' part of language-in-action. 
 
As the proposed definition clearly departs fro mteh realm of language and 
incorporates material conditions of social commnicaiton, iti s necessary now to 
introduce two approaches that have contributed to such understanding of the 
discourse. 
  Critical Discourse Analysis  
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is often treated as a "school" of study, with the 
most notable examples including the work of, among others, Norman Fairclough 
(1995), Ruth Wodak (1999), Paul Chilton (2003) and Teun van Dijk (1996). 
Inspired by Michel Foucault's philosophy and previous discursive analytical 
traditions, CDA also draws heavily on social theory (especially Anthony Giddens’ 
"theory of structuration" (Giddens 1995; 1st ed. 1986), as an attempt to overcome 
the structure-agency deadlock, and reconcile many social and theoretical 
dichotomies. The other significant factor is the strong stress put on the keyword 
"critical". CDA strong emphasis (at least in its ideal conception) on self-reflexive 
positioning of the researcher in the analytical process asks for putting researcher’s 
own beliefs and ideological perspectives upfront, rejecting false, as it is believed, 
presumptions about any “objectivity” of academic research. Indeed, the main task 
of CDA is to make visible the mechanisms of social, cultural and political 
reproduction of inequalities and discriminatory practices (Fairclough 2001; 
Wodak 1997). 
 Despite being “critical”, CDA has received its own critiques. The three 
major concerns can be seen as: (1) the vagueness of the analytical models offered, 
(2) the dominance of linguistic analysis and lack of attention to non-linguistic 
forms of discourse, (3) the lack of sufficient self-reflexivity on the part of the 
discourse analyst about her or his own powerful position in the research process 
  
[Chapter 2 - Theoretical and methodological framework] 
 
  
26 
(Blommaert 2005, 31–33; Howarth 2000, 8). Accordingly, to account for these 
shortcomings, we might wantto think notonly about power, but also about the 
conditions and the outcomes of power. Blommaert's operationalisation of Critical 
Discourse Analysis, together with advances of Dalia Gaveriely-Nuri (2012) and 
Shi-xu (2005) on “cultural discourse analysis”, whish encourage us to see 
discourse not only as linguistic phenomena, but strongly rooted in materiality of 
everyday lives, is an example of how to do it. 
 Since the foci of CDA scholars are: political discourses, ideology, racism, 
economics, gender, education, and so on, their lineage in ‘critical’ studies is 
clear.  As such, the use of the modified CDA approach to the study of nationhood 
and homosexuality will offer an excellent entry point for the case-based studies 
and anslysis in the formthcoming chapters. 
 
  Discourse Theory  
The Discourse Theory (DT) drawn on in this thesis was elaborated first by Chantal 
Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau (2001). DT is rooted in the three major traditions of 
Marxism, structuralism and hermeneutics, however reworking them for own 
purpose. So there is more stress on subjective agency, and on historicising and 
extending relations between the objects/subjects. DT is also less about 
reconstructing meanings or discovering the existence of any "hidden" truths, but 
more about preoccupation with the ways that meanings and concepts are 
produced (Howarth 2000, 10-12). Since I use some of the conceptual tools of the 
DT in later analysis (esp. Chapter 6), I will first utline the DT framework here, and 
then present the notions used later in the thesis. 
 At its most basic, "discourse" is understood there as the system of meanings 
that are responsible for creating, maintaining and ordering the identities of objects 
and subjects. In their landmark book, "Hegemony and the Socialist Strategy" 
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (2001 [1st ed. 1985]) are clear that social 
reality exists only through the set of meanings people ascribe to it, and that those 
meanings are historically, culturally and socially specific. In other words, "the 
world" is "discursive", because it has to be first conceptualised and thought of, to 
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become a social reality. “Society and social agents lack any essence, and their 
regularities merely consist of the relative and precarious forms of fixation which 
accompany the establishment of a certain order” (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, 98). 
 However, we should note that such conceptualization of social reality can 
be interpreted as “dematerialising” people’s existence. This is not so, however, as 
Mouffe and Laclau do not deny the actuality of material reality, but rather insist 
that there is no "extra-discursive" route to understand it (2001, 107-8). Material 
objects do exist, but it is only through discourse (i.e. systems of meanings) that we 
are able to comprehend them, name them, categorise them, understand them (cf. 
Hall 1992; Haraway 1997; Saukko 2003). Indeed, one of the major contribution 
of Mouffe and Laclau to the study of discourse is their suggestion that material 
reality, as well as the linguistic domain, demands consideration (2001). As 
Howarth (2000, 101-2) puts it: 
 
[discourse] theory captures the idea that all objects and actions are 
meaningful, and that their meaning is conferred by particular systems of 
significant differences [and] each of these discursive structures is a 
social and political construction, which establishes a system of 
relations between different objects and practices, while providing 
'subject positions' with which social agents can identify.  
 
I have been inspired by structuralist theorists in seeing difference as a key element 
to the consideration of language (e.g. de Saussure). However, such theorists go 
beyond structuralism since, for them, discourse as a system is conceptualized as a 
relational configuration of “floating signifiers”, and thus DT is particularly fit to 
study contingent and hegemonic relations of power in their ever changing 
formations (Sutherland 2005).  
 In the next paragraphs I will introduce concepts of “dislocation” and “social 
antagonism”, and by operationalizing them on the example of the post-1989 
Poland, I will show why DT may be particularly fit for the purpose of studying 
Polish discourses of the nation and homosexuality. I also make use of these 
concepts in the Chapter 6 when analyzing state discourses. Disclocation occurs 
when one or more evnets/accurances destabilize the present regime. In 
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consequence, there-articulation of hte exsting ‘floating signifiers’ must follow to fit 
the new discursive order. As such there is an emerging promise for the previously 
dislocated idneities to be re-rooted in the the emergin space of the sociality 
(Torfing 1999, 195). In this sense, “1989”, as a symbolic representation of the 
series of changes, is without doubt its major example. Social, cultural, and 
economic conditions of living have changed for people in Poland, as did rules 
and mechanism of the political game, centres and holders of (political, economic, 
and social) power(s). 1989 conceived as dislocation is possible because the nation 
is more an “imagined community” (Anderson 1991) rather than any remotely 
homogenous group; also because a state is to be understood as a set of practices 
or “ensemble of practices” (Finlayson and Martin 2006, 155), rather than a 
“thing”. 
 “Poland” thus denotes a set of practices of people relating to each other in a 
given group and circumstances. How these relations are (per)formed after 1989 
(and later after 2004 - the year Poland joined the EU) cannot be predicted on the 
basis of traditional indicators of national bonding/binding (“Polishness” as re-
constructed in Chapter 5). 
 One of the outcomes of dislocation is social antagonism, which is defined by 
Mouffe and Laclau as: 
 
the ‘experience’ of the limit of the social. Strictly speaking, antagonisms 
are not internal but external to society; or rather, they constitute the limits 
of society, the latter’s impossibility of fully constituting itself. [And then] 
the limit of the social must be given within the social itself as something 
subverting it, destroying its ambition to constitute a full presence. Society 
never manages fully to be society, because everything in it is penetrated 
by its limits, which prevent it from constituting itself as an objective 
reality (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, 125–7). 
 
Social antagonism occurs because sociality (i.e. discursively created identities of 
subjects) is lacking what is expelled and wasted, hence foreclosing the possibility 
of “fullness”. Social agents are unable to attain their ”whole identities”, as there is, 
accordingly, always a remainder, a bit of “waste” left behind; The Other, which 
must become an enemy. For it reminds the Self of its incompleteness, it is the one 
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to be blamed for the subject’s own “failure” in identification (Laclau and Mouffe 
2001, 125). And since the deadlock is experienced by both sides, “(…) the task of 
the discourse analyst is to describe the ways in which the identities of agents are 
blocked, and to chart the different means by which these obstacles are 
constructed in antagonistic terms by social agents” (Howarth 2000, 105). In this 
sense identities and antagonisms show the limits of a “social” (national), its 
instability and vulnerability. 
 To summarise, I want to build on the words of Claire Sutherland (2005), 
and highlight again why it is useful to draw on DT as an effective way to study 
discourses of nation and homosexuality. Firstly we should note that study of 
discourse unpacks the discourses as constracted social phenomena, so undoing 
national disocrouses as invented and performative. Secondly, discoursive analysis 
shows the process of constructing, resisiting, and subversitng the creation of 
meanings and social positionalities, thus is suited for the study of national 
rticulations of the Self and the Other (Sutherland 2005), and I would add 
rearticualtions of sexual identifications as well.  
 2.2 Identities and identifications 
It was only in the 1960s, and especially in the work of psychoanalyst Erik H. 
Erikson, that "identity" first appeared in the academic arena (Poole 1999, 44). In 
anthropology, the first wave of interest came in the 1970s (Lewellen 2003, 159), 
and a decade later the social sciences took the category of "identity" fully on-
board as an object of analysis (Satterwhite 2003). Since the 1980s, identity 
became more and more popular topic, e.g. academics working on nationalism 
and sexuality have observed that it is almost impossible to write in these areas of 
scholarship them without reference to the concept of identity (Weeks 1990; 
Blasius 1994; Poole 1999). 
 According to Richard Jenkins (R. Jenkins 1996, 4), the etymological roots 
and family group for the word identity points towards two seemingly counter-
effective elements: sameness, and difference. Many competing definitions of 
identity can be tracked down to the manifold processes happening on the 
  
[Chapter 2 - Theoretical and methodological framework] 
 
  
30 
borderline of these two elements. As Richard Mole writes, "at its simplest, identity 
seeks to convey who we are or are perceived to be and the way we, as individuals 
or groups, locate ourselves and others in the social world" (Mole 2007, 3). 
“Identity” derives from relations between ideas about sameness and difference 
and is consequently a matter of becoming, rather than a stable acquisition 
(Jenkins 1996; Weeks 1990, 88). This infuses the notion of identity with the idea 
of temporality, fluidity and processuality. Here, “identity” is redefined as a process 
(verb), rather than a thing (noun). Finally, identity provides a set of rules for moral 
and ethical conduct, establishing a prescribed life-path (Poole 1999, 70). 
 Sasha Roseneil and Julie Seymour in the opening essay for the edited 
volume "Practising Identities" (Roseneil and Seymour 1999, 3) write that  
 
[t]here are two main strands within this recent theorizing of identity: a 
social theory, and a poststructuralist cultural theory strand. (…) [The 
first one] offers an historicized narrative of the development of identity, 
which is conceptualised as self-identity, the individual's conscious 
sense of self. (…) [The latter] highlights the importance of attention to 
power in the construction of identity through difference. 
 
My own interests tend towards the second strand. However, it should be noted 
that this strand has its limitations. I remain somewhat "uneasy" about the question 
of agency and the almost total dis-empowerment of the individual and small 
minority groups, that is represented in the work of many cultural theorists 
(Roseneil and Seymour 1999a, 4) and in my analytical Chapters 6-8 I will attain to 
some possibilities of subversive and wilful agency of lesbian and gay people in 
Poland, attaining to more diversified a picture of social agency. The 
“poststructuralist cultural theory” is focused on the discursive formations and 
social positions available to social subjects (Roseneil and Seymour 1999a, 4). 
Among many, Richard Jenkins (1996) insists that the individual and collective 
dimensions of identity should be seen as two sides of the same process; they 
cannot exist without, or separately from, one another  (1996, 19-20). What is 
implied here takes us into the heart of the discussion over the structure of identity: 
whether it is a finished "thing" or rather a constant process of "identification" 
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(Jenkins 1996, 4-5). Jenkins is interested in understanding motifs and factors 
influencing our choices as individuals in the social world, i.e. processes of 
identification. This shift is crucial for my purposes, as it opens up a space for 
understanding relations between the discourses of nation and homosexuality as 
ongoing processes that take different shapes and forms at various times, according 
to changing needs, situations and responses. It has also a more personal meaning, 
helping me to understand and cope with my own everyday life.   
 The tension between identity and identification may signal an ambivalence 
underlying the very existence of "identities". As Jeffrey Weeks (1990) points out, 
identities are founded on certain values and ideologies which concern different 
spheres of our lives and underpin different roles and priorities, a dynamic often 
leading to a “clash of identities” (Weeks 1990, 89; Poole 1999, 64). The conflict 
is not only internal (between the different identities one embraces) but is also 
external (between people embodying excluding/exclusive identities) (Weeks 
1990, 90). However, disagreement can lead to social change. The outcome and 
reaction to change depends, in turn, on the broader ideological positions one 
occupies. 
 The work of Jonathan Friedman (1994) tells us that modernism is very much 
about struggling to acquire a sense of "true self" in forms of experience, 
knowledge, or e.g. entertainment. The consequence, as Friedman implies, is that 
we are no longer (were we ever?!) dealing with a process where time moves from 
"tradition" to "modernity" (or it was conceptualised so), but is multi-vectored, 
happening in both directions, independently, as well as happening in tight 
correlation and across different markers of time (Friedman 1994, 90-93). Nestor 
Canclini (1995) builds on Friedman’s work in his anthropological work in 
Mexico. Canclini proposed the term "hybrid identities" to describe the counter-
positioned strategies of identification, reactionism and misidentification. He 
developed his point with reference to the Mexican cultural practices in the era of 
globalisation. He found that processes of globalisation brought not only the 
modernisation of society (development of infrastructure, widening access to 
various sources, etc.), but also re-traditionalisation (e.g. revival of traditional 
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customs). He observed that although current global processes bring some positive 
changes, they also require "pay-back" in the form of acceptance of new social and 
cultural organisation, and a re-definition of social bonds, practices and 
perspectives (reactionism).   
 This is, however, a price people may not be prepared to accept in a 
straightforward way. Since social and cultural re-configuration is involved, the 
first attempt is to step back and protect it by means of "getting back to our roots", 
i.e. (re-)traditionalisation. In Poland, for example, the "euroscepticism" (rejection 
of EU/European values in favour of "traditional Polish" ones) most popular among 
the elderly population, may serve as an example. That is why Canclini writes that 
although tradition and modernity oppose and challenge each other, they are also 
complementary. This tension arising at the crossroads of supposedly 
contradictory, yet also harmonious positions shapes what he termed “hybrid 
identity” (1995). The vision of identities as hybrid, that is positioned in the “cross-
fire” of multi-vectorial interest positions, especially in the context of 
modernisation - traditionalisation, is useful in the Polish context. It helps to make 
sense of various, potentially contradictory discourses that developed over the last 
twenty years, discourses that are often interchangeably used by the social or 
political actors of diverse standpoints. It is also worth noting that the concept of 
hybridity gained much popularity in post-colonial studies, to which I shall turn in 
the next chapter. 
 To support the claim for hybridity and also to better understand how power 
is inscribed in the notion of identity, I refer to the work of Ross Poole. This 
Australian philosopher suggested that in order to understand any individual, we 
must realise that the very notion of "personhood" is a type of identity, no more 
important or primordial than any other (Poole 1999, 53). Drawing on the work of 
Marcel Mauss and conceptions of ancient Roman philosophy and law, Poole 
insists that becoming a person is a form of acculturation. Therefore "personhood" 
may be seen as a form of available cultural identification (like national identity), 
supported by legal jurisdictions (Poole 1999, 54). Poole underlines the 
compulsory character of identification with persona, as one is forced (by the fact 
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of being born into a particular culture) to embody cultural core rules and norms 
(see also Butler 1993; 2006a). However, as personhood does not provide the 
narrative that could lead the individual through the various roles with which one 
engages in the course of one's life, other factors come into play when finding 
one's own place (difference) in the social world (sameness). These factors may be 
gender, sexuality, race, but also friendships and other forms of belonging (Poole 
1999, 55). 
 Another important developments in the study of “identity”/”identifications” 
comes with approaches often called “post-modern”. But to start any discussion on 
post-modernism it is necessary to acknowledge, as Hollinger (1994) does, that it is 
impossible to identify any one postmodern point of view, an assertion that could 
be said to be post-modern in itself. There is a vast amount of postmodern 
literature, and literature on postmodernism, but what may be most useful for the 
study of identity is the diagnosis of social and cultural relations provided by 
Gecas and Burke (1995) (themselves elaborating on various other authors). They 
point towards the claim that in what they call “postmodern societies” real is 
blurred with imaginary, and possibilities of agency and authenticity of the self are 
questioned. Thus, "the postmodern self is characterised as decentred, relational, 
contingent, illusory, and lacking any core or essence" (Gecas and Burke 1995, 
57). Following on from this, an interesting insight about rationality is found in the 
work of Homi Bhabha. 
 In an interview given in 1990 entitled "The Third Space" (1990a), Bhabha 
brings to our attention difference and its consequences for political action. 
Discussing several of his previous texts, he points out that the "relativism" and 
"universalism" of identities are part of the same process of identification (Bhabha 
1990, 209), and that they open the space for considering "cultural difference" and 
"cultural diversity" as subjects of functional "cultural translation" (1990, 209-210). 
"Translation", though, is not used in its popular linguistic meaning, but as a trope, 
motif, and activity of displacement enabling it to relate functions and institutions 
in one culture to the institutions in other cultures. And here is the moment where 
the role of identities is not to be underestimated. From a post-modern perspective, 
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Bhabha denies identity essentialism on the grounds of the possible translation of 
cultural factors (dis-placement in/across culture), which for him proves the point 
that there is no original self, found a priori to cultural existence (1990, 211). In 
other words, the always unfinished (never entirely possible) project of the 
"Original" is nothing more than a cultural patchwork, one whose composition is 
only possible thanks to the existence of various un-classified identities – those 
hybrid elements composing "individuals". Identities, on the other hand, open the 
"third space" enabling different positions (one may occupy in their social life) to 
emerge. Processing, doing, undoing, and redoing of the "Original" displaces 
histories, and sets up new structures, initiatives, and authorities (1990, 216), 
simply because of its constant repetition and resistance to stagnation. Such a 
stance on identities and their influence on cultures enables Bhabha to reinvent the 
very possibility of social action. As he writes:  
 
I prefer to see it [fragmentation of identity] as recognition of the 
importance of the alienation of the self in the construction of forms of 
solidarity. It is only by losing the sovereignty of the self that you can gain 
the freedom of a politics that is open to the non-assimilationist claims of 
cultural difference. The crucial feature of this new awareness is that it 
doesn't need to totalise in order to legitimate political action or cultural 
practice (Bhabha 1990, 213). 
 
Bhabha shows how an essentialist notion of "I/Us" (the essentialist “sovereignty of 
the self") is not a necessary precondition for the collective action or a group 
formation (identity-based politics, like “LGBT”). Going beyond essentialist 
understanding of "identity" seems a useful step if one tries to understand the 
relationship between the discourses of nation and homosexual, (which are 
popularly perceived as "essentially exclusive”). Adopting perspectives that 
develop along the lines of Bhabha’s thinking will help me to understand cultural 
practices on the crossroads of nationhood and homosexuality that otherwise 
could be overlooked as not neatly fitting into the “totalised and supposedly fixed 
order” of “identities”. I also believe this is helpful gateway to think through 
tensions between individual and group belonging, and a minority groups’ 
possibility of agency. 
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 2.3 Power and knowledge 
One of the major issues that I have highlighted in the previous chapter and the 
earlier sections is the relationship between the production of knowledge and the 
power of knowledge. Through the course of his life, Michel Foucault developed a 
critical theory of science, which he understood as a tool for managing and 
controlling society. The oppressive nature of scientific knowledge, however, is not 
perceived primarily in terms of a negation or denial. Rather, it is the proliferation 
and multiplication of "truth(s)” about densely subjugated and categorised 
elements of any social system. “Truth” then becomes the tool and mechanism of 
maintaining and ordering social cohesion (Foucault 1980; 1998; 2000). Foucault 
developed the compound “power/knowledge” as a productive and fertile site of 
social hegemonies. He understands knowledge as "oppressive", because it is used 
for the purpose of embodying new, and sustaining already existing, power 
divisions and inequalities. As he says in the "Prison Talk" (1980) interview:  
 
Knowledge and power are integrated with one another, and there is no 
point in dreaming of a time when knowledge will cease to depend on 
power; this is just a way of reviving humanism is a utopian guise. It is not 
possible for power to be exercised without knowledge, it is impossible for 
knowledge not to engender power (Foucault 1980, 52). 
 
Knowledge becomes identified as power: those who possess the knowledge, 
possess the power of implementation and imposition of their own perspectives – 
ruling and classifying things according to individual perspective, even though the 
claim of science is to be “objective” and “neutral”.  
 The uniqueness of Foucault's philosophy, in comparison with previous 
scholarship on power, mostly within the Marxist tradition (Gramsci 1988; 
Althusser 1971; Althusser 1984), lies in the new perspectives he offered to already 
well-analysed social, cultural and philosophical dynamics. In the case of power, it 
is not only the recognition of its repressive and negative character, but the 
acknowledgment and analysis of its productive mechanisms. Foucault introduced 
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two problems into this field of study: power as the relationship between agents, 
not as the state of things; and the horizontal vector of this activity (Mills 2003). 
 The first stresses the importance of the shifting circumstances to which 
reacting agents need to accommodate, hence creating new correlations of bonds 
between them, and thus modifying the process of power. The second highlights 
the fact that power is happening not only along the vertical, top-down imposition 
line, but is also spread horizontally between otherwise "equal" agents. This means 
that power may not only be understood as set in-place, but also as the process of 
adaptation and negotiation of this setting. The most important consequence of this 
viewpoint is the recognition of flexibility and productive capacities of power. It 
may produce subjects, objects, and knowledge about them, which serves to 
maintain the relationship of power. The most visible link between power and 
knowledge is observable in the relation between the majority and minority. 
Imbalanced power hierarchies lead both sides to greater activity in the field of 
knowledge production. As Sarah Mills states in her book about Foucault:  
 
For Foucault, it is more accurate to use his newly formed compound 
'power/knowledge' to emphasise the way that these two elements depend 
on one another. Thus, where there are imbalances of power relations 
between groups of people or between institutions/states, there will be a 
production of knowledge. Because of the institutionalised imbalance in 
power relations between men and women in Western countries, Foucault 
would argue, information is produced about women (…). There are many 
books about Black people, but not about Whites. (…) In a complex 
process, this production of knowledge about economically disadvantaged 
people plays a significant role in maintaining them in this position (Mills 
2003, 69). 
 
 A Foucauldian understanding of knowledge as power may be helpful in my 
research in two ways. The first concerns the relationship between the subjects and 
objects of the research, and will help me in understanding why, for example, 
Polish LGBT organisations choose specific methods in achieving their goals. If we 
accept a Foucauldian perspective, then we see how LGBT groups create and 
promote their "own" knowledge about themselves (e.g. reclaiming history to 
"uncover" "great homosexual people"), empowering their own status as social 
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minority. The second way concerns the epistemological perspective that 
constitutes my own writing. As Sarah Mills states, the production of knowledge is 
strongly connected to the specific positions one occupies in the manifold network 
of social locations and power privileges/disadvantages. Throughout the whole of 
this thesis, I try to reflect on my own work as already positioned in those 
networks, and how it may then be seen as a tool of e.g. oppression. However, it 
offers also the space to think about the possibilities of resistance that such 
research may offer.  
 Therefore I want to suggest another dimension of this thesis, in which I hope 
to engage (although to a lesser extent then with my core research questions) with 
the problem of epistemic hegemony in the domain of knowledge production 
(Academe). In thinking through this issue, I am particularly keen on considering 
the role of the geography and the regional divisions of “Europe” that come to 
shape what is perceived as “proper knowledge”. How do specific cultural and 
national customs, habits, and traditions shape and lay the ground for the 
recognition of what is, and what not, “knowledge”? This stems, again, from my 
personal experiences of being schooled into one cultural/academic tradition (of 
Poland), and then having to confront the very different British academic system. 
But I also believe that such reflection is necessary for any more profound and 
critical engagement with the existing literature. As Binnie (2004) writes, we will 
not be able fully to comprehend the crucial similarities and differences 
concerning sexuality if scholarship does not pay more attention to geographical 
differences, and other issues of uneasy processes of globalisation. Additionally, 
many years before, Clifford and Marcus pointed towards the academic writing 
“determination” in ethnography (but it can easily be extended to any other 
discipline): 
 
Ethnographic writing is determined in at least six ways: (1) contextually (it 
draws from and creates meaningful social milieux); (2) rhetorically (it uses 
and is used by expressive conventions); (3) institutionally (one writes 
within, and against, specific traditions, disciplines, audiences); (4) 
generically (an ethnography is usually distinguishable from a novel or a 
travel account); (5) politically (the authority to present cultural realities is 
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uniquely shared and at times contested); (6) historically (all the above 
conventions and constraints are changing). These determinations govern 
the inscription of coherent ethno- graphic fictions (Clifford and Marcus 
1986, 6). 
 
 Lastly in this section of the Chapter 2, I want to write about Foucault and 
subjectification. Throughout his prolific work, one of the most developed visions 
of the self can be found in "The History of Sexuality", vol. 2 "The Use of Pleasure" 
(1992). In brief, self (personal identity) for Foucault is the way of making and 
working on oneself. In the chapter "Morality and Practice of the Self" Foucault 
distinguishes two basic pillars that morality is composed of. These are "codes of 
behaviour" and "forms of subjectification", although growing in relative 
independence from each other, yet cooperating and relating to each other (1992, 
29). The first being rules of how to behave, which are codified and merged into a 
system of jurisdiction and then law enforcement (1992, 30). This is a process 
observed during late Christianity. Contrary, with very few exceptions, such a 
process of codification was not present during the preceding period of Antiquity 
in Greece, where, according to Foucault, forms of direct subjection were more 
important. These, on the other hand, are ways of relating and perceiving one's 
own self, what feelings one has, what actions one undertakes in consequence, 
and so on. (1992, 30-31). Codes of behaviour and forms of subjectification are 
not contradictory due to the fact that both are expressions of a "moral 
code/morality", which Foucault defines as: 
 
(...) set of values and rules of action that are recommended to individuals 
through the intermediary of various prescriptive agencies such as family 
(...), educational institutions, churches, and so forth. They may be set out 
as an explicit and coherent doctrine, but also] form a complex interplay 
of elements that counterbalance and correct one another, and cancel 
each other out on certain points, thus providing for compromises and 
loopholes (1992, 25). 
 
 The operationalisation is three-fold and includes the "rule of conduct" (i.e. 
codes), conduct measured by/against this rule, and finally, instructions of how to 
conduct oneself (that is the way person ought to formulate themselves as the 
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"ethical subject"). The last mode could be seen as the way self relates to the outer 
world, constituting oneself as an individual. This process involves four elements: 
the recognition of the ethical substance, the types of subjection, the forms of 
elaboration of the self, and the moral teleology. 
 The first component relates to what is being worked on. For example, sexual 
feelings experienced by lesbians and gay men, or more specific still, a particular 
element of those feelings such as intensity or frequency. The second is the way a 
person relates to the rules and to what/whom one feels obliged to follow those 
rules. For example these could be health system representatives 
indicating/prescribing what is good/bad for individual health, or religious gurus, 
overall: authorities. The third constituent is the "ethical work that one performs on 
oneself, not only in order to bring one's conduct into compliance with a given 
rule, but to attempt to transform oneself into the ethical subject of one's 
behaviour" (Foucault 1992, 27). It could be done through participation in, for 
example, support groups, or through use of counselling services. The fourth and 
the last element is the placement of all of these actions already undertaken in a 
wider network of morality, as all actions are expected to comply with established 
ethical rules. Even more, this entails stretching and overcoming particularity and 
producing "a certain mode of being, a mode of being characteristic of the ethical 
subject" (1992, 28). 
 Foucault's vision of the self as a process of working on oneself to comply 
with ethical rules, the process he terms "forms of subjection", means that we can 
establish and produce ourselves as individuals, and possess an identity. And since 
there are multiple moral codes that may neutralise themselves leaving loopholes, 
there is potentially an unlimited number of creations a person can work out for 
themselves. Therefore, since all these are actions happening constantly, it may be 
more useful to consider them as the processes of identification rather than fixed 
identities. By discussing Michel Foucault, I hope to provide another way of 
understanding how power is internalised, shaping in consequence relations 
between subjects. Therefore, in analysing discourses of identity, identification and 
dis-identification, relations between the discourses of nation and homosexuality 
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may be problematised in multiple ways, as oppressive, revolting, or reliant, 
painting an even more complex and interesting picture. Additionally, Foucault’s 
work on subjectification may be helpful in shedding more light on practices of 
lesbian and gay people in the new (neoliberal) cultural context of the “new 
Poland”, as analysed in Chapter 8. 
 *** 
In this chapter, I have discussed the choice of materials and sources for my later 
analysis, and elaborated on various theoretical traditions, mapping out the field(s) 
in which this research is rooted. In the previous chapter, I have reflected on 
feminist works on "situated knowledge" and showed why it is important (for me) 
to be reflexive about my place and influence in the research process. This thread 
was further theorised in my discussion on power and knowledge and Michel 
Foucault’s philosophy. Since I have chosen case studies and discourse analysis as 
the major methodological forms of inquiry, I have also contextualised my 
understanding of "discourse" and “case”, and also indicated various approaches to 
the study of “identity”/“identification” that I find inspiring. 
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Chapter 3 
Theorising nationhood 
This chapter elaborates conceptually on nationhood, nation and national 
identifications, and the nation-state. Its main purpose is to further elaborate the 
conceptual framework of this thesis. As such, it is not intended as a 
comprehensive field overview – in itself almost an impossible task, considering 
the extent of the available literature. Rather, it presents a box of conceptual tools 
that will be used or referred to further in the thesis. It is also intended that the 
reader shall not find many references to the Polish context here, for that is 
introduced in the Chapter 5. To begin with, rather than writing about already very 
well established “canonical” literature form the 1970s and 1980s (Nairn 1977; 
Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm and Ranger 1984; A. D. Smith 1986; A. D. Smith 1991; 
Hobsbawm 1992; Breuilly 1993), I will focus my attention on newer threads that 
emerged during the 1990s and 2000s. However, a brief summary of “canonical” 
nationalism studies will be provided, followed by some attention to the work of 
Benedict Anderson. Having done this, I will proceed to shape my framework by 
considering relations between globalisation, nationalism, and post-colonialism. 
Special attention will be given to concepts of narration and temporality, as key 
performative aspects of national identifications. 
 A good description of early scholarship in the field was given by Anthony 
Smith (2008), an important theorist working in this area. He writes that these 
works constructed a “grand theory” of nationalism, wondering about its origins 
and motives. Preoccupied with the question of origins, the work is historical and 
sociological/political. It is not unusual for scholars to take different positions 
relating to the historical origins of nationalism. Typically these positions range 
from what is referred to as “primordialism” or “perennialism”, through “ethno-
symbolism”, to “modernism” and “post-modernism” (Spencer and Wollman 2002, 
27). Primordialists would claim the deep roots of the nation in the far past, and 
see the national as emerging from organic social organization. In the 
contemporary era, such an uncompromising view tends to be the expression of 
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(some) nationalist movements, rather than of academics working.. In the latter half 
of the nineteenth century, Ernst Renan (1990; [1882]) suggested that nationalism 
resembled religious forms of belief. Later, in the first half of the twentieth century, 
writers like Hans Kohn (1944) related nation to the state of mind; they saw the 
nation as a type of consciousness, conceiving of it as an intellectual phenomena. 
More contemporary writers concerned with nation building, who see significance 
in the role of the past and ethnic bonding, are often referred to as “ethno-
symbolists”. In the words of the most prominent representative of this school, 
Adam Smith,  
 
[f]or ethno-symbolists, what gives nationalism its power are the myths, 
memories, traditions and symbols of ethnic heritages and the ways in 
which a popular living past has been and can be rediscovered and 
reinterpreted by modern nationalist intelligentsias (A. D. Smith 1999, 9). 
 
Among many theoretical approaches to the study of nations and nationalisms, 
those who link national origins with modernism and modernization are among 
the most numerous. Benedict Anderson (1991), on the other hand, stresses the 
role of culture as the originating source of nationalism. Economic transformations 
of the industrial age are the crucial factors in the formation of nations for Ernest 
Gellner (1982) and Eric Hobsbawm (1992). Interestingly, Gellner’s position on the 
origins of nations and nationalisms develops in striking opposition to ethno-
symbolist genealogy. Rather than seeing nationalism as a product of nations and 
nationalists, he argues to the contrary:  
 
Nations as a natural, God-given way of classifying men, [as a] political 
destiny, are a myth; nationalism, which sometimes takes pre-existing 
cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often 
obliterates pre-existing cultures; that is reality (Gellner 1983, 48-49). 
 
A similar point is argued by Elie Kedourie (1993), who was also one of the most 
prominent critics of nationalism as distorted ideology/doctrine. There is also a 
distinct stress put on the role of the state as an actor (and/or destination) in the 
national/ist discourses (Breuilly 1993). 
To overall summarise the modernist studies of the nation and nationalism, 
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one finds Australian philosopher Ross Poole (1999) work, well placed here. Poole 
does not propose his own model, but extracts three most important elements that 
seem to pervade across all “modernists”. First, he highlights the importance of the 
development of the market from rural-based to urban-centred, followed by the 
shift from the agrarian to industrial organisation of social relations. Second, these 
processes coincided with the growth of the state, the development of 
administration, and the exclusive appropriation of power. The third element is the 
development of vernacular languages mixed with the spread of printing, leading 
to the creation of a new public sphere and spaces of social interaction (Poole 
1999, 146).  
 These three elements bear rather functionalist notions of nationalism and 
national identities. Social and market transformations stripped local communities 
of the sense of security created in direct communication, dismantling those 
communities and inventing new collective forms of organisation. National 
identity was the "social glue" that could hold them together (Spencer and 
Wollman 2002). Additionally, the ongoing power conflicts on the political scene 
forced states, their apparatuses, and elites to seek new solutions to persisting 
problems, as well as new modes of self-legitimisation. And again, nationalism 
paved the way for the nation-state. Finally, the spread of mass production (and 
especially the vernacular press) helped people to imagine themselves as a new, 
whole category: the nation. 
 On a more critical note, one should note that these “canonical” works pay 
less attention to ongoing processes of sustaining nation, treating it more as 
already-existing rather then “always in-becoming”. Modern nations, thus, were 
seen as a more or less uniform collective bodies, and national movements were 
perceived as striving for political entity: a state, so that nation as state is 
congealed into the nation-state in modern politics. It can also be observed that 
nationalism studies of the 1960s until the late 1980s reflected similar approach in 
understanding (national) identities as most of the identity studies literature of that 
time (see Chapter 2). For example, the formation of national identities through 
expulsion and negation of the Otherness, establishing what one is through 
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constraining what one is not (Parker et al. 1992, 5). Others were always identified 
as other nations, other ethnic groups, other political entities or states: “radical 
others”. It could also be said that the formation of national identity and 
nationhood happens almost exclusively through some sort of a conflict with the 
Other. Often the conflict is simplified as war, a hostile neighbour situation, or 
ethnic or religious slaughter. Eric Hobsbawm (1992) recognised that the “love of 
one’s own nation” far too often led to the hate of other nations; that national 
identity, especially when intertwined with ethnicity and the dialectical same/other 
dynamic, had too often proved to lead to aggression and war (the “age of 
extremes”). Furthermore, as Fox and Miller-Idriss suggest (Fox and Miller-Idriss 
2008a; 2008b), the “canonical” body of work is predominantly focused on elites 
and their struggles for power. Writings almost exclusively focus on nationalism as 
a top-down political (and eventually economic) ideology. Fox and Miller-Idriss 
(2008a, 537) rightfully claim that “people” in this scholarship, are almost 
exclusively the object of nationalist ideology, directed and influenced by elites, 
and almost never subjects or active perpetuators of nationhood. It is this lack of 
“ordinary people” in the nationhood scholarship, where Fox and Miller-Idriss 
locate their interests, calling it “everyday nationhood”. Finally, as Michael Billig 
observed in his influential book “Banal Nationalism” (1995), the “canonical” 
study of nationalism pays much attention to the spectacular arena of nationalism: 
holidays and commemorations, manifestations, wars and battles. His book then, 
by looking at the neglected point of “banality” and ordinary everyday life, 
analyses the ways in which national identities and nationalisms function from the 
opposite angle. 
 A significant book leading the way for the shift from scholarly grand 
narratives of national origins to small-scale studies of the particularisms of 
ordinary nationalism that proliferated in the 1990s, was “Imagined Communities” 
(1991) by Benedict Anderson. Although his pioneering study was first published 
in 1983, it was a decade later when Anderson’s insights were fully taken on board 
in nationalism studies. The focus of his book on discursive formations of national 
belonging and shifts in the economic organisation of Europe, the growing 
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importance of vernacular languages, and the creation of “national imaginary” sets 
Anderson apart from the aforementioned nationalism studies. It can be said that 
Anderson steps down from the macro to meso level, by paying more attention to 
the means, channels, tools and ways of dispersing national ideology that forced 
the creation of national identities and a sense of nationhood. 
 Anderson’s idea of a nation as an "imagined community" became so 
popular that it may seem to be too worn out to be meaningful. I would suggest 
that it is not necessarily so. In "Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin 
and Spread of Nationalism" (1991) "[he paves] the way for the study of national 
identity as subjective consciousness and perception with a focus on discourse, 
representations and social practices (...)" (Mole 2007, 12). For Anderson, the rise 
of nationalism was a reaction to the insecurity that followed the Enlightenment’s 
stress on “new” rationality, which occurred alongside the emergence of 
capitalism, with particular focus on vernacular print languages. The idea of an 
“imagined community” stemmed from the fact that although people will never 
have a chance to meet all other fellow nationals in reality, in their minds they 
have an image and sense (identity?) of such a huge community. The process of 
creating such an imaginarium began during the Reformation and the collapse of 
Catholicism as the dominant Christian belief, which led to the diminishing role of 
Latin to the benefit of vernacular languages, all reinforced by the invention and 
spread of printing. It was "print-capitalism" and education (or work on diminishing 
illiteracy) done by elites (intelligentsia, political leaders) that ultimately enabled 
people to imagine themselves as a whole, revolutionising communication and the 
spread of ideas (1991). The unifying role of education seems to be straightforward 
through the imposition of a canon and standardised syllabus. The role of print 
would be to overcome locality and introduce a pan-regional identity, so that 
those who will never establish personal contact could still be able to imagine 
themselves as “the same”.  
 By helping the spread of vernacular languages, and at the same time 
reducing regional dialects to one national standard, print established an arena for 
the emergence of a new sensitivity to sameness and difference, a new identity 
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developed on a national level. Anderson also gives significant attention to the 
political dimension of national identities, and goes so far as to say that emerging 
nationalism coincided with the establishment of the idea of state sovereignty, 
enabling the idea of nation-state, or "imagined political community" (Anderson 
1991, 6). He argues that “[w]hat in a positive sense, made the new communities 
imaginable was a half-fortuitous, but explosive, interaction between a system of 
production and productive relations (capitalism), a technology of communications 
(print), and the fatality of human linguistic diversity” (Anderson 1991 [1983], 46). 
 Although Anderson’s account is about the formation of a national sense of 
belonging (macro), he also searches for more particular rooting and practices that 
enabled it (meso level). He still, however, sees elites as crucial to the deployment 
of nationalism and the idea of nationhood. As Spencer and Wollman observe, 
Anderson underplays the role of “spontaneous popular nationalisms” by paying 
them significantly less attention compared with elite-driven ones (2002, 39-40). 
Another important critique concerns Anderson’s Eurocentrism. Although he does 
explore nationalisms in post-colonial countries, his perspective seems to privilege 
the European model. As Ania Loomba writes, for Anderson “(…) anti-colonial 
nationalism is itself made possible and shaped by European political and 
intellectual history. It is a ‘derivative discourse’, a Calibanistic model of revolt 
which is dependent upon the coloniser’s gift of language/ideas” (Loomba 1998, 
189). 
 Against “classical” theoretical framing of nationhood, during the 1990s and 
early 2000s, there grew a more distinctive body of literature on nationalism. It 
engages with nationhood on the micro level, with the practices of “real people”, 
where the idea of nation and reality of national identification and practices takes 
place (Patton and Sánchez-Eppler 2000, 10). As suggested, understanding of 
nationhood and nationalism exists in relationship to scholarship on identity. The 
decade of 1990s witnessed the shift in conceptualisations of identity, opening and 
proposing more flexible operationalizations (“identification”), stressing 
processuality and relationality of identifications, rather than seeing identity as a 
more or less stable acquisition. Similarly, the conceptualisations of national 
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identity began to change. More attention began to be given to how nations are 
performed and enacted, how nationhood “happens” and is talked, thought and 
acted upon. So the new approach is very much a shift from the “spectacular” to 
“banal” nationalism, and a search for “people” (Billig 1995; Thompson 2001; 
Antonsich 2009) and everyday nationhood (Eriksen 1993; Herzfeld 1997; Palmer 
1998; Lankauskas 2002; Fox 2006; Edensor 2006; Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008a). A 
discursive analytical approach develops (Wodak et al. 1999; Thompson 2001; 
Mole 2007; Millar and Wilson 2007; Galasinska and Krzyżanowski 2009), and 
along with it, the idea of nation as narrative, with a strong temporal component, 
becomes popular (Bhabha 1990b; Brennan 1990; Pease 1992; L. Kramer 1997; 
Allan and Thompson 1999; Roberts 1999). Finally, body-politics, bodily 
representations, sexuality and engendered national practices and ideologies, 
imperialism and terrorism gather attention (Cohen 1996; Sharp 1996; Anthias and 
Yuval-Davis 1989; Yuval-Davis 1997; Mayer 1999; Pryke 1998; C. Stychin 2001; 
Gabilondo 2004; Puar 2007; Kuntsman and Miyake 2008; Butler 2009). 
 The shift in nationalism studies from spectacular events and national 
commemorations, and from the question of origins of nations towards micro level 
analyses of everyday practices and modes of reproduction of nationhood, has 
produced some of the most interesting works in recent years. Although with a 
wide scope of interests and methodologies, what all these works have in 
common, is an agreement that previous studies were much too focused on elites 
and their influence over “people”, the latter seemingly transparent: present yet 
somehow usually only as objects of national pedagogy, and hardly ever as active 
perpetrators of national self. Scholars also agree that more attention needs to be 
paid to the pathways of national reproduction – ways nations are performed, 
established, imagined, enacted, engendered, told, timed and measured, 
consumed, and “unnoticed”. 
 A significant position that helped in spreading micro level studies of 
national identifications and performances was Michael Billig’s “Banal 
Nationalism” (1995). The aim of his book was to extend the work on nationalism 
to include socio-psychological aspects of quotidian life that interlock the national, 
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the psychic, the social, and the cultural together. To do so, Billig introduces the 
term “banal nationalism”, which in his words: 
 
[covers] the ideological habits which enable the established nations of the 
West to be reproduced. It is argued that these habits are not removed 
form everyday life, as some observers have supposed. Daily, the nation is 
indicated, of ‘flagged’, in the lives of its citizenry. Nationalism, far from 
being an intermittent mood in established nations, is the endemic 
condition (Billig 1995, 6). 
 
As I will argue in the next sections, remembering and forgetting are two crucial 
elements at work in national constructions of identities and selfhood. They are 
crucial elements also for Billig, and he operationalizes them with the example of 
waved and un-waved flag. “Flagging”, i.e. marking daily realities with national 
signs, becomes one the crucial theoretical figures of his argument (1995, esp. 
chapter 3). Further attention is given, for example, to sporting events and media 
representations (especially daily press), where the author traces the mundane, 
unnoticed, “forgotten” yet still deeply harboured, representations of national 
affinity. An interesting extension of Billing’s work is proposed by Catherine 
Palmer (1998) and Tim Edensor (2002; 2006). 
 Palmer (1998) recommends extending the array of platforms on which 
national everydayness is performed. The focus of her article is to introduce the 
body, food, and landscape as important arenas where identifications with 
nationhood are performed (1998). She provides a range of practices that are used 
to exemplify her claim that daily practices, understandings and habits of the body, 
food, and landscape, inform and are informed by a sense of national belonging. 
Although opening up some interesting paths of thinking about daily chores and 
nationhood, the article does not expand its rich empirical content onto more 
generalised arena of much needed theory-building. Edensor (2006) on the other 
hand, focuses his article on national time and institutional scheduling. His main 
argument is that daily rhythms’ of routine actions sustain the sense of national 
belonging. By looking at scheduling, institutional arrangements of time, collective 
synchronicities, and shared time-spaces, Edensor (2006) shows how daily 
organisation of social/cultural time is intrinsic to individual sense of national 
  
[Chapter 3 - Theorising nationhood] 
 
  
49 
belonging. 
 *** 
 Along these inspiring developments, also the macro level was 
reinvigorated thanks to the impact of post-colonial scholarship on nationalisms 
and its rejection of the predominant Eurocentrism of previous studies. Much stress 
is placed on the “coincidences” of the Enlightenment, Romanticism and 
colonialism, showing how the development of modern ideas of state, “Europe” 
and nation are intrinsic to the colonialisation of “the rest of the world” (Young 
1990; Said 1994; Guillaumin 1995; Stuart Hall et al. 1995; Chakrabarty 2007). 
Especially in the wake of Bhabha, this scholarship also introduced the idea of the 
“hybridity” of post-colonial realities and subjects. I make use of the post-colonial 
theories in trying to grasp some problems of the “post-communist transformation”. 
These approaches are derived from post-structuralist, postmodern, feminist and 
transnational perspectives, which also constitute the theoretical framework of my 
research. So far, I have presented a brief overview of nationalism studies. The 
following sections will be more problem-oriented, where I explore connections 
between nation, globalisation, and  (post)colonialism, and nation, narration and 
time. 
 3.1 Nation, globalisation and post-colonial theories 
The issue of globalisation is unquestionably one the most often discussed 
buzzwords today, both in academia and outside. The number of books and 
articles written about it is enormous. The interest in the topic, built up from 
enthusiastic, through uncertain, to more reluctant and unconvinced voices. In 
relation to nations and nationalisms, the first voices heralded the “end of history” 
and an unavoidable dispersal of state-national boundaries (Antonsich 2009, 282). 
Violent ethnic and religious conflicts in the Balkans and elsewhere in world, all 
framed as national, toned down the optimistic attitudes, producing more nuanced 
analyses of globalisation (Darling-Wolf 2008). For example, authors like John 
Tomlinson (1999) or Arjun Appadurai (1996; 2001) weave more shaded and 
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masterfully textured tapestries of power relations on global and local, national 
and regional, levels. Power, for Appadurai, is dispersed and mediated in many 
directions, intermingled in chains of dependencies, a “disjunctive flow” that 
operates locally, but which has effects of global dimension (Appadurai 2001). 
Tomlinson shows how global cultural production is digested, translated, re-
worked and changed on the local/national levels. He insists on the impossibility 
of a unidirectional (“global dominating local”) approach to understanding 
processes and relations of power, production, exchange, hegemony and 
resistance (Tomlinson 1999). This is very much a discussion about the possibility 
of agency, hegemony and resistance. Darling-Wolf condensed this dilemma in the 
following words: 
 
Recognizing the role of local agency in negotiating global influence adds 
a new dimension – often (dis)missed by political economy scholars – to 
the understating of transcultural relationships. As local identities and 
hybrid cultural forms are fashioned in relationship – and even opposition 
– to the global through involvement with increasingly abstract and 
deterritorialized imagined communities (…), the global-local nexus 
becomes a site of simultaneous resistance and domination (Darling-Wolf 
2008, 190). 
 
I share the perspective of these later works on the issue of globalisation, which is 
necessary to reflect upon when writing about social and cultural changes in the 
Poland after 1989. Only by understanding the “global” will one be able to 
understand the shapes and incarnations of the “local” in Poland, which ultimately 
took form through the adoption of  “global” Western neoliberal capitalism and 
liberal democratic regimes. 
 The issue of the global and the local is operationalized in post-colonial 
studies through the question about (respectively) the metropolis/centre and its 
relation of hegemonic subordination of the periphery/colony. The myth of a 
nation and the emergence of post-colonial struggles as national ones is an 
important thread of postcolonial scholarship. However, it also has to be noted 
that it is primarily preoccupied with the rise of nations during and after 
colonialisation. Only more recently some authors, like Brennan (1990), Chatterjee 
(1995), and Chakrabarty (2007) began to show how European nations developed 
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during the 19th century in relation to colonial conquest. Thus Mishra and Hodge 
(1991) and Hulme’s (1995) pledge for greater engagement of post-colonial 
academics with the changes in the metropolis  – pointing out that the colonialism 
was not a one-way process and that both the “periphery” and the “centre” 
changed during the colonial encounter. This call was taken up recently by Hall 
and Rose (2006). They write:  
 
we argue that empire was, in important ways, taken-for-granted as a 
natural aspect of Britain’s place in the world and its history. No one 
doubted that Great Britain was an imperial nation state, part of an empire. 
J. R. Seeley famously argued that the British ‘seemed to have conquered 
and peopled half the world in a fit of absence of mind’. (…) It is this 
‘unconscious acceptance’, whether of the burdens or benefits of empire, 
that we are in part exploring in this volume (Hall and Rose 2006, 2).  
 
Post-colonial, or post-colonial inspired works draw out attention to 
location - place, map and geography. Bill Ashcroft et al. (1995) state that “[p]lace 
and displacement are crucial features of post-colonial discourse”, and they further 
elaborate on (colonial) subjectivity conceived in relation to place. Since the 
“<place> in post-colonial societies is a complex interaction of language, history 
and environment”, Ashcroft at al. argue that in the process of re-establishing the 
connection between (colonial) subject and (its) place through language, 
independent subjectivity can be conceived (1995, 391-2). Furthermore, as much 
as some postcolonial thinkers show how, for example, cartography, travel writing, 
and discourses of exploration and discovery, were used for colonial conquest 
(Carter 1989; Huggan 1989; Crosby 1995), the same discourses most often fail to 
critically address their own construction of the “Europe”/“metropolis”. Graham 
Huggan (1989) shows how the idea of the map was deconstructed and 
appropriated by many post-colonial writers. The map becomes a locus of 
productive transformations reflecting trans-national and diversified characteristics 
of post-colonial realities and discourses. Yet still, in all this productive and 
interesting work, I would suggest that the “European metropolitan centre” of 
colonial power is homogenised to “Western Europe”. “Europe” comes to mean 
primarily France and United Kingdom, sometimes Spain, Portugal, and 
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Netherlands, rarely Denmark. And although the reasons are obvious, since these 
were the main perpetrators of colonial imperialism, one still would expect that in 
the process of deconstruction of imperialist discourses done from the margins, 
more attention might be given to their own discursive practices and construction. 
Where are the boundaries of “Europe”? Through which modalities is “Europe” 
defined? Who belongs to “Europe”, who aspires to it, and who is in power to 
impose the dominant ideas about being or not, properly “European”? Although 
these are of course grand questions that reach well beyond the scope of this 
chapter and research, some reflection needs to be given to them. As I have written 
elsewhere (Kulpa and Mizielinska 2011a), the formation of sexualities and sexual 
identities in Central and Eastern Europe remains in a tight relation to (and under 
the immense influence of) the contemporary “Western” and American hegemonic 
discourses in politics, economics and culture. Thus, without some understanding 
of how these function and what are the ongoing and shifting strategies of 
maintaining “Western” dominance, little can be understood about sexual politics 
in Poland. 
 Finally, another important contribution of post-colonial theories to recent 
scholarship on nationhood, which may potentially be useful in the Polish context, 
has to do with “mimicry”. As one of the fundamental categories of post-colonial 
analysis (commencing with the influential work of Franz Fanon “Black Skin, White 
Mask”) (2008), it inevitably evokes again the question of agency. If Anderson 
unintentionally denies agency to colonial subjects even in their national struggle 
for independence, other scholars are not as pessimistic (Chatterjee 1995; Murray 
1997). Partha Chatterjee provides an interesting line of counter-argument by 
distinguishing two manifestations of nationalist forces. The first one, studied by 
most political science and nationalism studies scholars, connects national 
sentiment and the struggles built upon it, to the ultimate goal of political 
independence and the formation of a nation-state. Here, he agrees with Anderson 
that “political nationalism” in the “Third World” was largely taken up by 
metropolis-educated elites, who then ignited political independence and state-
formation movements. However, if the first is a relation of “borrowing”, the 
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second dynamic relates to the specific cultural national movements themselves, 
which are characterised by their attempt to differentiate themselves from the 
colonial culture, and to assert, maintain and support autonomy (Chatterjee 1993, 
4–8; 1995). What is principally important here is the question of how cultural and 
national in/difference is forced or attempted? The answer that is most convincing 
to me, is that given by some feminist scholars (as well as others), who suggest that 
it is gender and women’s bodies that are (battle)fields of contention – markers of 
cultural difference (among others Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1989; McClintock 
1995; Lutz, Phoenix, and Yuval-Davis 1995; Spivak 1995; Yuval-Davis 1997). If 
men were the bearers of economic and political agency, women were assigned to 
the sphere of culture and the role of tradition-keeping. For these reasons, the 
colonial mission of bringing “civilisation” to “barbaric” indigenous people was 
targeted in the first instance, at women; conversely, the eradication of degenerate 
“native” culture was to “advance” women’s social position (Loomba 1998, 192). 
This inevitably was seen by nationalist movements as a form of invasion, and their 
own tactics to “protect” women in response were deployed. Unfortunately, these 
“protective” measures of national/indigenous culture mostly strengthened the 
patriarchal gender order. The veil worn by Muslim women, and the practice of 
Sati, burning widows with their dead husbands, serve as two examples (L. Ahmed 
1992; Spivak 1995). 
 3.2 Nation, narration, and time 
Another important concept for my understanding of nationhood, is narration. If 
Anderson’s “Imagined Communities” (1991) was the first one to examine nation 
and national identities as discursive practices, the idea of nation as a narrative 
strategy had most impact with the work of Homi Bhabha in his books “Nation and 
Narration” (1990b) and “The Location of Culture” (2004). Bhabha’s focus is on 
a/the “people” – he analyses how unsettled this category is within national/ist 
discourses (and academic writings). He claims that although “masses” are 
constantly present in rhetorical invocations, at the same time, these masses 
remain merely passive recipients of the discourses deployed by colonisers or 
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nationalist elites. “People” are presented as the “body” of the nation, enacting and 
taking part in historical events, yet at the same time “[t]hey are also a complex 
rhetorical strategy of social  reference: their claim to be representative provokes a 
crisis within the process of signification and discursive address” (Bhabha 2004, 
208). And it is this crisis of signification that preoccupies Bhabha the most. The 
aim of his well-known essay “DissemiNation: time, narrative and margins of the 
modern nation” is thus to displace the linearity of “people”, show the 
ambivalence of the concept, and its performative and pedagogical underpinnings 
(2004, 201). 
 The tension between performative and pedagogical aspects of national 
narrative of the “people”, mark this category as liminal for this very narrative, 
opening space of ambiguity and in-between-ness. This place, then, is a site of 
productive reiteration of minority discourses, contested genealogies, “people” and 
representations (Bhabha 2004, 225). Let’s now examine Bhabha’s conceptual 
toolkit. Performative and pedagogical aspects of national narrative are summoned 
in the following way: 
 
In the production of the nation as narration there is a split between the 
continuist, accumulative temporality of the pedagogical, and the 
repetitious, recursive strategy of the performative. It is through this 
process of splitting that the conceptual ambivalence of modern society 
becomes the site of writing the nation (2004, 209). 
 
The space in-between, people as a priori historical entity, “a pedagogical object”, 
and people created in the performative “now”, “people-as-becoming” is what 
Bhabha terms “the liminality of the nation (…), margins of modernity, narrative 
temporalities of splitting, ambivalence and vacillation” (2004, 211). In another 
text, Bhabha refers to another well-know figure of nation as “a modern Janus” 
(Nairn 1977) – two-faced god, forward and backwards looking, here and there, 
and so are national narratives, evoking regression and progress, rational political 
aims and irrational and emotional discourses (Bhabha 1990a, 2). However, this 
duality is also what haunts the Nation, itself as a double.  
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This turns the familiar two-faced god into a figure of prodigious doubling 
that investigates the nation-space in the process of the articulation of 
elements: where meanings may be partial because they are in medias res; 
and history may be half-made because it is in the process of being made; 
and the image of cultural authority may be ambivalent because it is 
caught, certainly, in the act of ‘composing’ its powerful image (1990a, 3). 
 
Ultimately, national narrative proves to be unstable and in a constant process of 
self-establishing. A Janus-faced nation signifies itself as “incomplete signification”, 
an impossible to achieve project. As support, he mobilises Gellner’s argument 
(1983) that nations are products of nationalisms, thus nation is a cumulative effect 
of selectively chosen and forced shreds of cultural memory, patches of habits and 
traditions, often inventions and creations (see also Hobsbawm and Ranger 1984). 
Bhabha also recalls Partha Chatterjee’s argument about the impossibility of the 
nation becoming “full”. Chatterjee (1986) argues that because any national self 
relies on its Other, complete elimination of the otherness would in fact “destroy” 
the nation. Hence the nation” is always “partial” since its reliance on the Other, 
which it sees as the “threat” of its “fullness”, not realising that its only thanks to 
the Other that the nation exists. 
 So it is here, in the national locus of “people” as the ultimate claim and 
limitation, in the nation as “incomplete signification”, that Bhabha sees the 
possibility for subaltern voices and minority discourses to emerge, where 
negotiations of distances and meanings can happen. In one of the paragraphs of 
“DissemiNation” (2004, 217-226) he then exemplifies, with the help of Fanon and 
Kristeva, how black people and racial minorities, and women effectively use the 
national ambiguity of incomplete national signification (and identification and 
dis-identification). Thus, it is also a site where non-identitarian activism may arise, 
drawing on the ambiguity of dis/identifications and its messiness (Bhabha 1990). I 
find the ideas of nation as narration, performativity and ambivalence as appealing 
and useful in writing about processes and temporal spans of Central and Eastern 
European transformations. They all, although conceived in particular framework 
of post-colonial studies, seem universal enough to use them outside this particular 
framework. As these concepts focus on processes and negotiations rather than on 
fixed status quo, they are well suited for my research. 
  
[Chapter 3 - Theorising nationhood] 
 
  
56 
 Narrating, as a process in itself and as a way of organising and sequencing 
of events, is ultimately about timing and temporal arrangement. Usually, it is done 
in a linear manner, past-present-future, inducing a sense of the accumulation of 
experiences, thus the advancement of knowledge – i.e. progress. However, 
temporalities of a nation are more complicated, where notions of time(s) are used 
in a variety of ways, the subject to reconfigurations and juxtapositions, involving 
memory, forgetting and recovery (Roberts 1999, 202). These uses of time in 
national narratives are of key importance, since the ability to impose one vision of 
past is to gather control over the future – time is ultimately a political trophy 
bringing concrete rewards. For example, the past is usually used in national 
narratives as a source of legitimacy for present national claims, although 
meanings and even chronology of events is not fixed (Roberts 1999, 201; Allan 
and Thompson 1999, 39). Thus the constant need for repetitious invocations to 
sustain and re-create the impression of stability of a past/history, in the face of its 
unfeasibility. Not surprisingly, education is so often at the heart of national 
agenda. Moreover, not only many past events and facts have different 
interpretations but indeed, the existence or not of such events or facts is called 
into question (e.g. Kurdish and Turkish perspectives on Turkish genocide of 
Kurds), sometimes being purposefully eradicated from public consciousness 
through carefully crafted practices in the process of constructing memory and the 
politics of forgetting. 
 The work of memory is an important aspect in the formations of national 
identifications (Connerton 1989; Renan 1990; Billig 1995; Goff 1996; Misztal 
2003; Zerubavel 2004). Remembering and forgetting are two sides of the same 
process, both forging selective choice from the multiplicity of the past, in order to 
establish a coherent and stable historical narrative. Remembering and forgetting 
should not only be understood as a passive mode of expulsion or appropriation, 
but should be seen as active strategies of creation. For example, practicing 
traditions as a way of remembering a national past often does not recall actual 
past habits, but invented them as such. This argument is best illustrated in the 
work of Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger in “The Invention of Tradition” 
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(1984), where they examine how many traditions are artificially produced by 
propagators of nationalist ideology, but also by colonisers and occupants. 
 Cementing the dream of past in the unifying narration of the present is 
always accompanied by the opposite process of breaking other visions into 
smaller, thus less significant pieces, repressing some accounts and amplifying 
others, inscribing and erasing (Loomba 1998, 202). The struggle to gain applause 
and recognition of a certain version of history is not a peaceful process, as Homi 
Bhabha warns. For him, the act of forgetting is the beginning of the national 
narrative, which always incorporates the forced effort to forget, an “obligation to 
forget” (2004, 230). But this obligation to forget, this forgetting to remember, is 
less about any form of historical memory if at all. In fact, for Bhabha, it is a 
totalising act of forgetting the past that establishes the national “here & now”: the 
(de)functional work of memory of the past is about the present and future of the 
nation. It is a moment when and where the “people”, the body of a nation 
emerges, as a collective “we”. In other words, forgetting constructs a discourse of 
society, performing the unification of “national will” and totalising the “many” 
into the “One” – the nation (2004, 230). As Bhabha adds later: “[b]eing obliged to 
forget becomes the basis for remembering the nation, peopling it anew, imaging 
the possibility of other contending and liberating forms of cultural identification” 
(2004, 231). I will refer to some of these ideas later the Chapter 7. 
 The scraps, shreds, bits and pieces stitched together to create a national 
patchwork are a rather fragile and thin fabric, one that is under constant threat of 
being torn apart by Other. These Others perform their work on the past anew, 
reshaping and restructuring the frail fabric, at least, constantly questioning other 
“histories”. Thus, Allan and Thompson encourage an analysis of methods and 
symbols that are used to “ward off” counter-attempts at re/con/figuration (1999, 
42). Before this can be done, however, I would like to ask some probing 
questions, which I hope will help to operationalize the theoretical approach 
established so far. 
 If one forgets to remember, or even is obliged to forget, the very first 
question we need to ask is: What is being forgotten? And what are we made to 
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forget? By whom? The signification of “what” and “who” is not to be 
underestimated, as it clears the path to understand the particular discursive 
formation of the nation and its power relations. What follows is then to ask who 
forgets what? How do different subjects of national pedagogy shape their group 
subjectivity by the choice of certain objects of national past and present? I will 
return to these question later in the Chapter 6 and 7. 
 At the same time, we also need to ask what is being remembered? Which 
events, persons, dates, “facts” are chosen as appropriate? What social and cultural 
modalities underpin those choices? How do gender, religious affiliation, 
education, sexuality, social aspirations, race, etc. intrinsically influence individual 
preferences, which then form wider groups that begin to compete in the public 
arena for recognition of their own narratives? In analysing the processes of 
remembering and forgetting anew (that is to underline the performative aspect of 
these two strategies), we should not, though, lose sight of the “present” and 
“future”, as non of the three temporal modalities exists in a vacuum of its won. 
More practical examples of how we may answer some of these questions of time 
and narration, in relation to national and homosexual discourses will be discussed 
later in the thesis, especially in Chapter 7. 
 *** 
In this chapter I have introduced nationhood studies, and through selective 
focusing on issues like globalisation, temporality, narration, post-colonialism, or 
nation as an everyday performance. By doing so, I have laid down conceptual 
rudiments for the intellectual engagement in the forthcoming chapters. The next 
one will further engage with questions of nationhood, but in the particular context 
of homo/sexuality. 
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Chapter 4 
 Nationhood and (homo)sexuality 
This chapter considers issues of nationhood (as introduced in the previous one) in 
relation to homo/sexuality. I offer a critical introduction to the current academic 
writings that focus on the relationship between nationhood and homo/sexuality, 
and show that there is a lack of work concerned with sexuality in the Central an 
Eastern European (CEE) context. I begin with an introduction of the 
gender/sexuality and nationalism literature, which sets out some of the main 
themes for further exploration. I then move on to mapping relations between 
nationhood and homosexuality by focusing on the geo-temporal dimensions of 
“modernity”, explore issues of “sexual nationalisms” and “homonationalism”, and 
propose my own conceptualisations where I feel the existing literature does not 
offer a relevant analysis of the CEE cultural context. I also discuss the link 
between geography and performativity, and homoeroticism and homosocial 
settings of nationhood. In critically engaging with these various bodies of work, 
the chapter introduces concepts and perspectives that I utilize later on in the 
thesis. 
 As highlighted before, whilst there is academic work focused on nationhood 
and academic work focused on sexuality, it is only relatively recently (from the 
1990s) that the relationship between the two has been growingly considered. This 
newer focus has been mainly conducted by feminist (-inspired) scholars, with a 
significant lack of interest from within "mainstream" literature on nationalism 
(Pryke 1998, 530). More precisely, the interest is largely on gender and 
nationalism (among others: Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1989; Chatterjee 1990; Lutz, 
Phoenix, and Yuval-Davis 1995; McClintock 1995; Yuval-Davis 1997; Mayer 
1999; Tolz and Booth 2005; Keinz 2009), with questions of sexuality left rather 
marginal or evoked implicitly in the context of gender roles (reproductive 
heterosexuality). Moreover, the gender aspect is often conflated with women and 
their subordination to men, with significantly less attention paid to the formation 
of masculinities (Nagel 1998, 243), not to mention other dissident gender 
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positions. Also many of the main works from the field of sexuality studies 
demonstrate a lack of interest in issues of nationalism (Pryke 1998, 530). This has 
been changing, however, in the recent years, with the growing number of works 
debating “queer migration” (e.g. Cant 1996; Patton and Sánchez-Eppler 2000; 
Wesling 2008; Kuntsman 2009; A. R. Evans et al. 2011), “sexual nationalisms” 
(e.g. Petzen 2004; Kuntsman 2008; Mepschen, Duyvendak, and Tonkens 2010; 
Tauqir et al. 2011), “sexual citizenship” (e.g. D. Evans 1993; Elman 1996; Lauren 
Berlant 1997; Rahman 1998; Phelan 2001) or bridging queer and post-colonial 
studies (e.g. Harper et al. 1997; Grewal and Kaplan 2001; Hawley 2001a; Hawley 
2001b; Cruz-Malavé and Manalansan 2002; Massad 2002; Holden and Ruppel 2003; 
Gopinath 2005; Spurlin 2006; Massad 2008; Leckey and Brooks 2010). 
 Whilst certain elements of national ideologies and identities are so 
obviously gendered, gender is hardly examined in "classical" literature on 
nationalism (Yuval-Davis 1997, 1). Tolz and Booth (2005) highlight this point 
with the example of Benedict Anderson's "Imagined Communities" (1991). By 
quoting several passages from this canonical text, they show how Anderson 
(unconsciously?) acknowledges gender and its role in the formation of national 
identities (e.g. through words like: camaraderie, fatherland, brotherhood, etc.), but 
fails to address this relationship openly and clearly.  
 A pioneering work in the area of gender and nationalism is that of Nira 
Yuval-Davis and Floya Anthias “Woman - Nation - State” (1989). In their opening 
chapter the editors set up the agenda for the study of intertwined relations 
between gender, race, ethnicity, statehood, and nationalism through five clusters 
(1989, 7). These denote the major, although not exclusive, ways in which women 
relate/are related to nationalist projects. Firstly, they note that women are framed 
as the biological reproducers of nations/ethnic communities. Examples of how 
this is performed range from the “encouraging” means of establishing child 
benefits in the post-war UK, through regulating the number of births in particular 
communities, to the physical extermination of other groups. Secondly, women are 
framed as not only biological reproducers of nations, but also as markers of their 
boundaries. Here examples of the prohibition of inter-racial marriages or the 
varying regulations concerning lineage are the most obvious ones. Thirdly, 
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women are seen as the transmitters of culture. Because of their “maternal duties” 
of bringing up children, women’s role of socialising young ones is inevitably that 
of acculturation and bridging the generational gap. Additionally, not only do 
women transmit cultural ideologies, they are used as symbolic signifiers and 
representations of the nations and ethnic communities. Across many cultures, 
women are used to symbolically represent nations (for example Britannia, 
Marianne, or Polonia). Finally, the editors note the role played by women in 
struggles for independence. Whilst women are deployed across a range of 
positions and duties, it remains that they are predominantly represented in 
nurturing roles where they are supporting and facilitating men (nurses, 
communication operators, etc.) (Yuval-Davis and Anthias 1989, 7-10; see also 
Yuval-Davis 1997). 
 Another important contribution to our understanding of gender and nation 
comes from the work of Anne McClintock (1995). By focusing on imperialism she 
shows relations and dependencies between national, imperial, and gender, 
ideological projects to be finely nuanced. McClintock’s observation about the 
prominence of family discourse is important to note here. She writes:  
 
The metaphoric depiction of social hierarchy as natural and familial - the 
“national family”, the global “family of nations”, the colony as a “family of 
black children ruled over by a white father” - depended in this way on the 
prior naturalising of the social subordination of women and children within 
the domestic sphere (McCintock 1995, 358). 
 
Finally, Cynthia Enloe’s work (1990) on gender in international relations opened 
up more space for considering masculinities in the working of national projects. It 
is also here where we observe the contribution of Joane Nagel (1998) to the topic. 
Noticing the significant lack of attention given to masculinities in discussions of 
gender and nation, she explores the dynamics that may remain hidden if we 
subsume “gender” only to “women” in our discussions of nationhood. She writes: 
 
By definition, nationalism is political and closely linked to the state and its 
institutions. Like the military, most state institutions have been historically 
and remain dominated by men. It is therefore no surprise that the culture 
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and ideology of hegemonic masculinity go hand in hand with the culture 
and ideology of hegemonic nationalism. Masculinity and nationalism 
articulate well with one another, and the modern form of Western 
masculinity emerged at about the same time and place as modern 
nationalism (Nagel 1998, 248-9). 
 
Nagel is influenced by the work of George Mosse (1985), who also paid a great 
deal of attention to the workings of masculinity in his explorations of nationalism 
and sexuality.  
 In this context, I welcome the work of Andrew Parker et al. who open their 
collection of essays "Nationalisms and Sexualities" (1992, 1), by writing that 
"[w]henever the power of the nation is invoked (...) we are more likely than not to 
find it couched as a love of country: an eroticized nationalism" (see also Hartsock 
1983). The authors acknowledge nationalism as one of the most powerful 
ideologies, and they also identify sexualities as equally powerful sites of discourse 
creation, circulation and exercise. These considerations – taken together with the 
general lack of literature on these subjects – provide the primary motivation for 
their book, which is also a tribute to the George L. Mosse's publication 
"Nationalism and Sexuality" (1985). If Mosse tends to impose a vision of 
nationalism and sexuality as (once constructed) more or less stable and 
monolithic, by making sexuality plural – sexualities - in the title of their book, 
Parker et al. argue that there is no "one" nationalist ideology and/or identity, nor is 
there one formation of sexuality. Therefore they take a more poststructuralist 
position, implying the need for more work on these two as they relate to one 
another. Nonetheless, Mosse's book remains a landmark exploration of the worlds 
of nationalism and sexuality. Published in the mid-1980s, Mosse’s work laid 
foundations for explorations in this area even if it is only recently that the topic 
has gathered noticeable momentum in academic scholarship. One important 
observation Mosse makes is that our modern notions of nationalism and 
"respectable" sexuality emerged at the same time, with the Enlightenment and 
growth of capitalism. Mosse scrutinises the way nationalist ideas are inflected 
with a distinctive bourgeois politics of the body and sexual behaviour, and how 
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this morality subsequently fed into the emergence of fascist nation-states in 
Europe in the early 20th century. He writes: 
 
This book is concerned with perceptions of sexuality, but also with the state 
and the nation. It seeks to trace the relationship between nationalism, the 
most powerful ideology of modern times, and respectability, a term 
indicating “decent and correct” manners and morals, as well as the proper 
attitude toward sexuality. The respectabilities we now take for granted, the 
manners, morals, and sexual attitudes normative in Europe ever since the 
emergence of modern society, have a history in which nationalism played a 
crucial role. Ideals that we may regard as immutable were novel some two 
hundred years ago, and just as modern nationalism emerged in the 
eighteenth century, so the ideal of respectability and its definition of 
sexuality fell into place at the same time (Mosse 1985, 1). 
 
 Also Sam Pryke's (1998) article attempts to theorise the link between the 
nation and sexuality in more general terms. In his work, Pryke distinguishes three 
crucial problems: national sexual stereotypes, sexuality in national conflict, and 
sex in nation-building (1998, 531). The first is about sexing Others as a threat to 
national ego (e.g. 1930s’ German stereotypes that teaching French to young girls 
will lead them into prostitution). The second problem is the use of sexuality in the 
time of war, as exemplified in interalia rape cases during Balkan War (here sexual 
violence is used as part of the weaponry of war). The third, and final problem is 
the exclusion of certain sexual practices/attitudes (such as homosexuality, 
masturbation, or pre-marital sex, and so on) from the core of national ego (Pryke 
1998, 535-41). Although these are important observations, conceptualising 
relations between nationhood and (homo)sexuality solely in these terms limits the 
potential for developing a more in depth understanding. For example, taking 
inspiration from writings on “everyday nationalism”, one is left wondering about 
times of peace as well as times of war, and about how the two discourses relate to 
each other in the context of “ordinary” life. Or, in relation to “homonationalism” 
debates (discussed later in the chapter), one can observe that nationalism is 
sometimes very inclusive of homosexuality, which complicates an understanding 
of nationalism as always framing homosexuality as a threat. 
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 During the 1990s there was an outburst of scholarship pertaining to “sexual 
citizenship” and “gay rights” (e.g. Benton 1991; Watney 1991; D. Evans 1993; 
Binnie 1997; Rahman 1998; Richardson 1998; Weeks 1998; Bell and Binnie 
2000). In the context of this work, Carl F. Styhin in “A Nation by Rights” (1998) – 
working in the discipline of legal studies - makes an interesting attempt to theorise 
nationhood and sexuality. Using four case studies (USA, South Africa, 
Canada/Quebec, and Australia) he considers:  
 
... how national identities are constituted in sexual and gendered terms,  
how groups mobilize around sexual identities and articulate their 
relationship to the national culture, and how rights discourse informs and 
constitutes both national and sexual identities (Stychin 1998, 1). 
 
The main advantage of Stychin’s work is the acute and critical eye he has for the 
growth of rights discourses, and the role that ‘rights’ has come to play in 
discourses of sexual liberation and progress. However, his work is inevitably 
limited since it is focused only on “Western”, liberally democratic states. South 
Africa is an interesting case to consider here with its particular colonial history, 
oscillating in a ubiquitous space between “West” as well as its Other. As a 
consequence, the sexual politics in the country and the region is shaped 
according to “Western” models activism, but a cultural ambivalence of “post-
colonialism” also opens up space allowing for resistance and subversion that 
would otherwise remain impossible (Spurlin 2006, 6). Additionally, since the 
‘rights’ discourse necessarily relies on the notion of citizenship within a liberal 
democratic framework (from which it takes its origins in this particular form), 
Stychin’s work is more about “civil society” and “state” than about “people” and 
“nationhood”. Nevertheless, his work helps to develop understandings of the 
experiences of sexual minorities in minorityvii “Western” democracies. However, 
there is a need for further work in this area if we want to more fully attend to the 
cultural, political, and national contexts that are not rooted in (or were only 
relatively recently introduced to) liberal democratic frameworks of statehood, 
duties and obligations defined via concepts of “citizenship” or “civil society”.   
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 4.1. Un-common times of Modernity 
However useful in considering nationalism and sexuality, the work of George 
Mosse (1985) has some limitations. He focuses on 18th and the 19th century 
social and political changes, including industrialization and a new social 
stratification in Europe (e.g. the emergence of new social classes, bourgeoisie and 
workers). On this premise, Mosse has built his theory of sexuality and nationality 
encapsulated in the idea of "respectability" and bourgeois morality. From the 
perspective of a scholar interested in the CEE, his historical study concentrating 
on a handful of western European countries (Germany and to a significantly lesser 
extent United Kingdom, France and Italy only), is interesting, but has its 
restrictions of applicability. This is to do with his rather too general use and 
understanding of “Modernism” and “modern Europe”, especially when he claims 
that "[t]o be sure, respectability eventually spread thought Europe, a bourgeois 
movement at first, it soon encompassed all classes of the population" (Mosse 
1985, 2). Mosse seems to forget that the populations and cultural make up of 
Germany (just constituting itself at the same time as one federal state we know 
today) was extremely diverse (Prussians, French, Poles, Bohemians, Italians, and 
others). Hence the social processes were likely not to develop in the same way 
across populations, hence were also spread unequally geographically. This opens 
up space for a consideration of “modernity” as the key factor in shaping relations 
between discourses of nationhood and homosexuality. The Eurocentrism and the 
supremacy of the "West" in the notion of "Europe" (that makes us presuming 
“Europe” to be first and foremost the “Western European” idea) remains also an 
important thread in the more recent scholarship in the topic. For instance, Jon 
Binnie in his path-setting “The Globalization of Sexuality” (2004) pays acute 
attention to the geographical differences in national and sexual politics. His aim is 
to theorize the links between globalization, nationalism, and sexuality in a 
comprehensive manner, by exploring how the “national” and the “global” are 
produced by the “sexual” (Binnie 2004, 2). Also the recent body of work around 
“sexual nationalisms” (e.g. El-Tayeb 2004; Puar 2007; Kuntsman and Miyake 
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2008; Mepschen, Duyvendak, and Tonkens 2010; S. Ahmed 2011; Jivraj and De 
Jong 2011; Douglas, Jivraj, and Lamble 2011)  has invested significant focus on 
questions around the topology of modernity. For example, Jasbir Puar (2007) and 
Judith Butler (2009) write about the use of sexuality discourses in the self-
proclaimed civilising mission of the "West"/Europe/USA against the ("West”-
proclaimed) "Muslim World". Butler analyses how U.S. militarism creates the 
notion of the "Arab mind" (savage) in order to pursue its own "civilising mission" 
(legitimisation of its military attacks) (2009, 126). She shows how that "Arab mind" 
is constructed as something fixed that cannot be altered, and must remain 
"uncivilised". She shows how "our" ("Western") supposed modernity (advanced, 
secular, liberal, scientific) is counter-posed to "their" ("Arab") supposed pre-
modernity (traditional, religious, non-liberal) (Butler 2009, 124-5). 
 Both writers primarily focus on the “West” and its fixation with “Islam”. 
Perhaps this is why both seem to unintentionally “recreate” (to a certain degree) 
an active/passive, “West”/”Islam” dualisms, which they seek to challenge. Joseba 
Gabilondo (2004) offers a response here (although not directed at either writer 
directly). She notices that the "Islamic World" is not a passive object of these 
"Western" discursive practices, but also actively create their own narratives 
making a certain use of the ways in which they are interpolated. Gabilondo calls 
these “pagan narratives” (2004, 238) – "pagan" as in non Judeo-Christian, but also 
"pagan" as in alternative, "from the borderlands" of the (geographical, political and 
cultural) "West", and the (temporal) "Western Modernity". According to 
Gabilondo, however different, both worlds deploy the same logic (and aesthetic) 
of the spectacularly performative (2004, 239). In their extreme, fundamentalist 
form, American Hollywood productions or media coverage of Gulf Wars on the 
one side, and the Taliban and Al-Qaeda guerrilla militancy and spread of fear, 
with the bombing of the World Trade Centre on the other, serve as the example 
(Gabilondo 2004, 238-9). Gabilondo’s work resonates with William Spurlin’s 
(2006) observation about necessary challenges faced by both queer and post-
colonial studies. These challenges have particular resonance in discussions 
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around nationhood and sexuality where the “West”/”the Rest” perspective 
dominates. He captures the core of these problems in the following words: 
 
Examining South Africa’s transition to democracy at the innovative 
conjunction of postcolonial and queer not only enables a necessary 
queering of postcolonial studies and an equally important decolonization of 
queer studies as I have just suggested, but also acknowledges and critiques, 
as I argue in chapter 1, other systems of domination and subordination that 
were implicated within the system of apartheid in addition to racism. 
Similarly, such an approach avoids a preoccupation with, or reification of, 
sexual difference alone, but is one way of bringing the politics of sexuality 
more to the forefront of critical discussion within South African struggles for 
democracy, while simultaneously bringing attention to the ways in which 
academic queer theory may be complicit in reproducing the hegemony of 
western scholarship. More important, the book’s approach, evident in its 
title, implies a reconceptualization of center-periphery relations and a 
queering of social, not just sexual, space to the extent that peripheries are 
not merely the binary opposites of centers of power (the West, the Euro- 
American axis, heteronormativity, global markets and economies, etc.) but 
can both contain new, or quite possibly similar, forms of hegemonic power 
within them, as well as sites of supplementarity that cannot be wholly 
contained under the more traditional center/peripheral, West/East split 
(Spurlin 2006, 7-8). 
 4.2 Timely geographies  
How do these debates around modernity, and the “West and the Rest” (Stewart 
Hall 1992) relate to Poland and the CEE? If, according to Frederic Jameson's 
famous book "Postmodernism or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism" (1991), 
we live in postmodern times, i.e. the times of "late capitalism", or Anthony 
Giddens' "late (high) modernity", or Zygmunt Bauman's "liquid modernity", what 
sort of modernity is lived in Central and Eastern Europe? If the West is 
characterised by "late capitalism", then CEE could be thought of as being in its 
infancy, in "early capitalism". Does such work implicitly suggest that Poland and 
the CEE are not in postmodernity? Or is the very temporal topsy-turvy twisting of 
social dynamics in Poland itself an example of postmodern jelly cream? Perhaps, 
using some of the concepts deployed by Jonathan Kemp (2009, 1–2), western 
modernity is already "posthumous" and "untimely" (rather than postmodern)? 
Because it ("late modernity") precedes itself (modernity) (thus, in a way becomes 
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"pre-modern”) in the CEE. The modernity is "old"/late, yet "new"/early for the 
people of the CEE, who only after 1989 became subjects rather than objects of the 
“Western” (capitalist) historical narrative (assuming its part therein, no longer as a 
"counter-narrative"/para-temporality of communism). But this discussion still 
presumes “modernity” to belong to the “West”. Indeed, should we not see (state) 
communism as the very bold realisation of modernism? Was not communism an 
entirely modernist project/project of modernisation (Heywood 2003)? The 
universal lineage of modernity and postmodernity/”late modernity” from the 
above mentioned texts is presumed to be particular to the history of the Western 
European industrialisation and development of capitalism since the 18th century. 
Consequently, communism is denied as equally important to the development of 
modernism. Thus we have heard claims of “the end of history” (Fukuyama 1992), 
where the CEE is consequently locked into discourses of “development”, 
“transition” and “return”. Such a framing redistributes agency, subjectivity and 
individualism unequally, re-inscribing pre-1989 (Western) hegemonic divisions of 
Europe onto “advanced West” and the “backward CEE”. Later in the chapter I will 
argue, as I do elsewhere (Kulpa 2012a), that such discourses have a profound 
impact on sexual politics in the region. 
 So far I have focused on sexualities and nationalisms as linked to the 
problems of temporality introduced in the previous chapter. There I highlighted 
how, in national narratives, time is often compounded and is definitely not linear 
but takes on a more cyclical nature (Puar 2007, xvi). Often the three main 
categories of time: past, present, and the future collapse onto each other, making 
it difficult to mark the difference between them. In many national narratives, past 
exists in the present, and only for the future. Not linear, then, time is, but 
definitely teleological. For example, the "Golden Era" of past generations is a 
common (foundational) national myth (e.g. Hobsbawm and Ranger 1984; A. D. 
Smith 1991). It is however invoked performatively, it exists only in discourse, 
because, as Jenkins (1991) insists, we cannot establish one past, one history. So 
the "past" exists only "now", only in the present time/tense; the "past" is 
nested/embedded in the "present". But the "present" in any national narrative (or 
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other political ideology for that matter) is important as long as it serves a “future” 
goal. The “present” is a way to achieve a "Golden Future", when the "Golden 
Past" will be reinstalled anew. As I show later in the thesis (cf. Chapters 6 and 7) 
this ambiguous struggle over the meaning of the past and the future in national 
discourse remains closely related to the sexual politics in Poland. 
 Works by Butler, Puar, and Gabilondo, that I mentioned earlier focus on 
examples of the "Middle East" constructed as the “West’s” radical Other, where 
the borderline between the two is presented as being rather clear-cut (at least in 
terms of how these two discourses are constructed in relation to each other). 
William Spurlin’s (2006) questioning of this centre-periphery dyad in the context 
of South Africa opens a space for me in problematizing similar relations of power 
between the “West” and the CEE. There is a rich literature about CEE as the 
Western Other (e.g. Wolff 1994; Bakic-Hayden 1995; Todorova 1997; Forrester, 
Zaborowska, and Gapova 2004; Hammond 2004; Melegh 2006; Kovačević 2008; 
Miklóssy and Korhonen 2010) which often takes up the question of the usefulness 
of post-colonial studies when theorising relations between the “West” and 
“Central and Eastern Europe” and “Balkans” (which tend to have in the “Western” 
discourses more pejorative connotations). Gerard Delanty writes:  
 
[what] was crucial in the shaping of Europe was the process by which the 
core penetrated into the periphery and semi-periphery to forge  a powerful 
system of political and economic control. The diversity of Europe was the 
product of enforced dependency and much of its unity was the expression of 
hegemonic forms of identity deriving from the core. The idea of Europe 
remained the cultural model of the western core states. A major implication 
of this view is that the eastern frontier of Europe was above all a frontier of 
exclusion rather than of inclusion; it accelerated and intensified a process by 
which Europe became the mystique of the West (Delanty 1995, 48). 
 
Here, Delanty summarises here how the “West”/”Europe” essentializes itself at the 
expense of the “East.” However, what the literature about CEE brings forward is 
the particular place it has occupied and the role it has played in these “Western” 
self-essentializing discourses. Not as easily ostracised as the “East” (such as the 
colonised cultures of the “Far and Middle East”) due to its geopolitical location, 
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yet equally not within the self-proclaimed and self-contained and de facto 
western “Europe,” “CEE” is an ambiguous location (Todorova 1997, 17). Fluidity 
of borders, their porous character “is one of the most important traits of East-West 
slopes” (Melegh 2006, 36). “CEE” is rendered hence as a sort of transitional space 
between the “real East” and the “real West.” Using the words of Larry Wolff 
(1994, 13) “Eastern Europe was located not as the antidote of civilization, not 
down in the depths of barbarism, but rather on the developmental scale that 
measured the distance between civilization and barbarism”. Drawing on these 
writings, I have developed the concept of leveraged pedagogy (Kulpa 2012a) 
specifically focusing on sexuality and discourses of “homophobia” and “gay 
(human) rights” which in my opinion are the “latest” additions to discursive 
relations between the “West” and the “CEE”. My argument (which I return to later 
in this chapter) is that after the 2004 EU-enlargement, EU/Western Europe re-
invented itself; “West” was reinscribed into the core notion of “Europe” through 
the projection of “homophobia” onto “CEE” whilst the West portrayed itself as 
progressive in terms of sexual diversity and liberation. Indeed, such 
understandings of temporalities ("advancement" and "backwardness") and 
geographies ("West" and "East") play a crucial role in further discussions over the 
discourses of nation and homosexuality in Poland, a country traditionally seen as 
"torn apart" between the Occident and Orient (Walicki 1994a; also cf. Chapter 5).  
 4.3 Nationalising sexuality 
One of my arguments in this chapter is that the nationhood relies on a 
heteronormative framework of relations, thus it is most often understood to reject 
non-normative sexualities (e.g. Lauren Berlant and Freeman 1992; Hanna 1996; 
Lambevski 1999; Conrad 2001; Fischer 2007). But nationhood may also be an 
inclusive force, willing to accommodate (to a degree and under conditions, that 
is) and "swallow" – to use Bauman's metaphor (1997) - its constitutive Other (e.g. 
homosexual subjects). For example French Canadian Quebecois nationalism (C. 
Stychin 1997; Dickinson 1999), post-apartheid nationalism of South Africa (Posel 
2005; Spurlin 2006), or nationalisms of the USA, UK and the NL (Puar 2007; 
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Kuntsman and Miyake 2008; Mepschen, Duyvendak, and Tonkens 2010). This 
“opening” was possible, amongst other reasons, thanks to the changing position 
of lesbian and gay people in relation to the capitalist market; a shift from being 
figures of death to become figures of life (Puar 2007, xii; though this argument 
remains contestable, not only geographically, but also within the aforementioned 
national contexts). This “buying into” the mainstream, however, is said to 
privilege a particular sub-section of homosexual subjects, namely those who are 
white, middle class and financially secure, male, and ethnically ‘native’ (D. Evans 
1993; Duggan 2002; 2004). Considering class at the crossroads of nationhood 
and homo/sexuality takes us back to the argument made by Mosse (1985). The 
link between respected sexuality, aberrant homosexuality, and class and 
capitalism, is however, tightly weaved into Western European history, privileging 
the grand narrative of "Europe". However, for somebody interested in non-western 
European cultural logics of nationhood and homosexuality, the link might seem 
less pervasive. Although all societies are stratified, their histories of capitalism are 
significantly different, or social divisions fall within a remit of different indicators 
(than what is for instance understood to be class indicators), hence shaping 
different social relations. This finds support in writings of Jon Binnie (2004), who 
insists that when studying sexual politics in modern days of globalisation, 
researchers need to be particularly aware of trans-national power relations and 
local differences and particularisms. So explicitly locating studies of sexuality in a 
particular geographical location, may also help us to understand the workings of 
national sentiments. Geographical borders maintain (literal and metaphorical) 
boundaries of the nation-state, which – as I have been arguing - can be seen as 
tied up with the discourse of Self/Other. These geographical boundaries ward off 
an abject Other, as much as they foreclose a particular nation-state on its 
neighbours – other nations. But as much as boundaries zone off the Other (and 
influence everyday lives of individuals, for example in the global context of 
migration), they also enclose the constitutive Others within the body of the nation. 
Indeed, the point to make is that being within the national boundary does not 
ensure that individuals/groups straightforwardly belong to the nation (even if one 
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is a citizen of the state), as there is much of othering going on within the borders 
of nations. Often portrayed as foreign and alien in nationalist conservative 
discourse (Hayes 2000, 10; also cf. Chapter 6), homosexual subjects are amongst 
those who are othered within the borders of the nations in which they live. 
 For example, Polish LGBT groups have been called "eurosodomites" by 
counter-demonstrators (recruited mainly from the League of Polish Families Party 
and the All Polish Youth organisation) during the annual “gay pride” event.  This 
captures the resentment towards the EU, blaming it as the source of supposed 
moral downfall, Sodom and Gomorrah, polluting Polish national culture. In the 
following chapters I try to develop a more complex analysis, where homosexual 
subjects are not only objects, but are also wilful actors upon the question of 
national belonging. It seems that they embrace nationhood to prove their 
belonging to the society (nation), thus gain the legitimisation of their life. "We are 
the Same/One", is used to show the "normality" (here associated with the 
socially/nationally accepted norms) of a lesbian and gay person, often played out 
as conformity to stereotypes of gender (e.g. Blasius 1994; Blasius and Phelan 
1997; Rimmerman, Wald, and Wilcox 2000). In a sense it is about how 
place/space is translated into identity/identifications; how the modern 
geographical delimitation of a particular nation-state gives rise to the national and 
sexual "imagined communities". It is about how those geographical boundaries 
ward off radical Others (nations) and entrap others within its own body, somehow 
setting up a trap for itself, forcing national self to face those internal Others (e.g. 
homosexual subjects) at some point. Of course, as showed in the previous 
chapters, they are also necessary Others for the national self to emerge. This leads 
Jarrod Hayes to the following conclusion: 
 
[o]ne cannot exclude someone from the Nation unless she is already 
there. (...) If there must be such an effort to exclude the queer from the 
Nation (...) and show she is an outsider trying to invade, the queer must 
always be inside already; that is, in some ways, the Nation is always 
already queer (Hayes 2000, 15-16). 
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 There is another gate into the discussion over national and sexual 
identifications. In the Chapter 3 I have suggested that the nation exists as long as it 
is being constantly evoked in the discursive and material practices of everyday 
lives (Billig 1995; Palmer 1998; Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008b). Nationalism then, is 
a process of calling a nation into being, and of bringing the "imagined 
community" into life and into mass imaginary through discourse. In that sense, 
nationalism always precedes the nation, the nation becomes existent after the 
nationalist call (interpellation?), a point already made by Ernest Gellner (1983). 
 Now, taking inspiration from Bhabha's writings about the nation as a 
performative act (2004), let me recall Judith Butler's concept of the performative, 
as another possible perspective on the relation of the two. It may be, perhaps, an 
obvious statement, but I still would like to make it: the nation and nationalism 
work similarly to gender and sex, a matter Butler elaborated on in "Gender 
Trouble" (Butler 2006a [1990]), "Bodies That Matter" (1993) and many other texts. 
As much as the notion of gender and sex is achieved thanks to the constant 
repetitive acts performing their phantasmatic existence, so is the imagined 
community of the nation also constituted performatively. Butler works on the 
examples of drag queens, analysing how they subvert the hegemonic ideas of 
gender and sex, by detaching masculinity from man and femininity from woman. 
What I would like to suggest here, is that drag queens do not only act out any 
women, any femininity; the show always incorporates a reference, and 
impersonation (to varying degrees) of a famous and iconic woman (in a specific 
cultural context), if only indicated by song choices from their repertoire. Of 
course there are also “international icons” (e.g. Lisa Minnelli, Madonna), but here 
we should be aware of the conflation of “American” or “British”, with “English 
spoken”, with “international”. And in this, as I can tell from my own experiences 
of observing drag queen shows in different national cultural contexts, the 
audience usually gets the most invigorated and reacts most strongly to songs with 
a specific (to their nation) cultural reference. In other words not when any gender, 
but when “national gender” is performed. For instance, when Polish drag queens 
perform songs of Polish singer Violetta Villas, Czech singer Halina Vondrackova, 
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or Russian singer Alla Pugacova - all “superstars” of the communist period - there 
is a particular sense of community one feels, especially if there are “other 
people”, like friends from abroad, to whom one needs to explain what is 
particular to Polish culture about these particular singers and songs. The feeling 
proves to be rather un-translatable in any other than “post-communist” cultural 
contexts. These singers occupy the imagined space of “Poland” and evoke 
nostalgia of the “communist past”. The “communist nostalgia”, dressed up and 
performed through the embodiment of iconic singers of communism, is what 
“nationalise” these performances of a culturally (CEE) specific gender. And even if 
some singers come from other CEE countries, they partake as “Polish” because 
culture of “communist Poland” (as much as any other “communist country”) 
except of own national tradition was strongly infused with the “international 
communist culture”. Shaped by each of the “soviet block” countries, this cultural 
production of “international communism” now forms an undistinguishable part of 
each country’s national history. 
 As I have demonstrated at the beginning of this chapter, nationhood 
inseparably clings on to gender. Here I would like to take this argument a little 
further in a reveres gesture. If nations and national representations depend on 
particular gender politics, would it not be safe to presume that ideas about 
nationhood leave some marks on the constructions and notion of “gender” itself? 
Can we say then that gender necessarily (although, of course, to varying and 
flexible degrees) is “nationalised”? In our everyday performative acts of gender, 
we also always already act the nationally specific cultural regimes of gender. It 
does not necessarily mean that these national embodiments are radically different 
from each other; conversely it is perhaps their striking similarities, common 
features, motifs, tropes and icons, across the geographical (and temporal) 
boundaries of nation-states, that is most gripping (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1989; 
Lutz, Phoenix, and Yuval-Davis 1995). So if we agree that gender does not exist 
outside the specificity of a culture (nation), so we need to think in a similar way 
about homo/sexuality. Since sexuality relies on normative gender that we can say 
is part of national cultures, so we also always already think and do “nationalised 
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homo/sexuality”. It appears then, that in the contemporary socio-cultural divisions 
and diversities marked by the national and state borders delineating "locality" and 
"specificity" (not unproblematic, of course), there is always an inescapable grain 
of nationhood present in any formation of homosexuality. To demonstrate, I offer 
the example of “gaydar” – the supposed ability to sense and recognise other 
homosexual people without any prior knowledge of them. And as much as it is 
not too seriously treated a “group myth”, it still holds a prominent place in 
defining “lesbian and gay culture” (in Poland and perhaps also elsewhere). But as 
any lesbian or gay person who has ever travelled to another country knows, 
“gaydar” sensibility quickly proves “dysfunctional” abroad. I learned this when I 
moved to London, observing that either most of the men in London were gay, or 
there was something wrong with my “gaydar” (i.e. presumption of “what a gay 
man is”: how he looks, behaves, speaks, styles his hair and so on). Already 
academically trained, hence rather suspicious of any wishful optimism, I realised 
that “gaydar” is my culturally specific (that is national) Polish imprint of the ways 
in which male homosexuality is performed. Of course as with the “international 
icons” for drag queens, there is also an international “typology circuit” (e.g. 
“butch dyke”, “screaming queens”) of which one could learn by travelling abroad 
(or via all sorts of media nowadays). This partial internationalisation of 
homosexual iconography is perhaps the best example of the stronghold of 
national cultures in influencing the formations of sexuality and sexual politics. So 
rather than interpreting the nation as inescapable (in a pessimistic gesture), one 
perhaps could look at “local” creative and subversive interpretations, especially 
by those on its margins. Such an attempt at multiplying understandings and 
alterative readings will be explored in Chapters 7 and 8.  
 Let me return now to the opening paragraphs of this section. In recent years 
two terms, which I see as useful to consider when thinking through the 
relationship between discourses of nationhood and homosexuality, have gained 
increasing popularity in sexuality studies - "homonormativity" and 
"homonationalism". There is no doubt that nationalism is, in most cases, a 
practice, which grows out and feeds back into heteronormativity through its stress 
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on the primacy of the “normal” and the “national”, and the value assignation to 
masculinity, heterosexual family and procreation (Nagel 1998; Peterson 1999; 
Mizielinska 2001). Heteronormativity as a concept gained popularity after its use 
in Michael Warner's influential book "Fear of a Queer Planet" (1993). Now it 
seems in queer, sexuality and gender studies, to be one of those taken-for-granted 
concepts. Without entering nuanced discussions over its meaning, I will use it 
here after Katherine Ludwin's operationalization (2011). For Ludwin, 
heteronormativity is about: "privileging of heterosexuality over all other 
sexualities"; it is "defining a ‘normal way of life'"; it involves a "re-inscription of 
essentialist identity categories"; and it operates "as part of a broader matrix of 
socially mediating systems" (Ludwin 2011, 50). Heteronormativity is facilitated 
and manoeuvred on a number of structural levels, most importantly institutional 
and in everyday practices (Ludwin 2011, 51). Recent writings in queer studies, 
however, focus much attention on "homonormativity". What would it be? 
According to Lisa Duggan (2002), who significantly helped to popularise the term: 
 
[t]he new neoliberal sexual politics (...) might be termed the new 
homonormativity – it is a politics that does not contest dominant 
heteronormative assumptions and institutions but upholds and sustains 
them while promising the possibility of a demobilized gay constituency 
and a privatized, depoliticized gay culture anchored in domesticity and 
consumption (Duggan 2002, 179). 
 
It is clear that the terms do not share much with each other on the conceptual 
level, and the similarity is only verbatim. This is strengthened by Duggan's 
statement that "there is no structure for gay life, no matter how conservative or 
normalizing, that might compare with the institutions promoting and sustaining 
heterosexual coupling" (2002, 191, footnote 9). Also Berlant and Warner have 
stressed the impossibility of a "homonormativity" that would function as 
"heteronormativity" does. They write: 
 
Heteronormativity is thus a concept distinct from heterosexuality. One 
of the most conspicuous differences is that it has no parallel, unlike 
heterosexuality, which organizes homosexuality as its opposite. 
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Because homosexuality can never have the invisible, tacit, society-
founding rightness that heterosexuality has, it would not be possible to 
speak of "homonormativity" in the same sense (Laura Berlant and 
Warner 1998, 548, footnote 2).  
 
In all this, I would argue that even though theoretically it is clearly distinct from 
heteronormativity, it is nonetheless a rather confusing term. This is what 
occasionally happens in the writing of e.g. Jasbir Puar (2007), when the text 
seems to flow beyond the intentions (I would imagine) of the author, and 
occasionally leads the reader astray of the author's intended meanings. For 
example, when she defines "homonationalism" as a moment when "certain 
homosexual bodies signify homonormative nationalism" (Puar 2007, 10). Being 
aware of the limited scope of her referent, Puar points out that writing on 
"homonationalism" is not to disavow existing violence and discrimination, nor to 
imply the cohesion and evenness of the very concept (Puar 2007, 10). However, 
her persistent use and the way of invoking "homonormativity" creates that 
impression, suggesting an overarching and uniform contemporary “mainstream 
LGBT” politics. Consequently not much space is left for alternatives (within and 
beyond “mainstream”), hence homonormativity is after all, being understood like 
heteronormativity. Surly it is not her point, yet still, when one reads 
 
[c]oncomitantly, multicultural (and homonormative) subjects reorient 
their loyalty to the nation through market privileges, a 
remasculinisation that Heidi Nast terms "market virility", that 
masquerade as forms of belonging to the nation and mediate the 
humiliation of waiting for national love (Puar 2007, 26-27) 
 
one keeps wondering why Puar uses derogatory language such as "masquerading" 
and "humiliation", in this context? One could ask what is so necessarily wrong 
with a desire to be recognised as a part of the national community, to build one's 
own identification in relation to/with fellow nationals ("to be subject"), rather than 
(voluntarily or not) against them ("to be abject/object")? Of course, Puar is 
absolutely right that it becomes wrong when the belonging of some minority 
subjects is used to foreclose and ward off other minorities (notably minority ethnic 
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individuals and communities, especially Muslim). However, in “waiting for 
national love” and in the will to belong, there is nothing necessarily wrong in the 
first place. Unless, of course we accept the rather narrow understanding of 
nationhood as always already negative and bad in formation. It seems to me that 
Puar at times falls into that trap, and projects a rather restricted perspective on 
nationalism as something almost exclusively pervasive, militant and exclusionary. 
Even though she boldly presents us with the U.S. case of recent reorientations of 
nationalist internal dynamics to include (or rather swallow) those who were 
previously "repulsive" (i.e. homosexual abjects, now subjects) − her own style of 
writing and those occasional "slippages" as in the quote above, indicate some 
uninvited contradiction and tensions on the topic. I suggest some of these 
“uninvited tensions” stem from the problematic notion of “homonormativity”. 
Even if supposedly sharply and clearly defined, it will retain the surplus of 
meaning, overflowing the author's intended signification (thus possibly meaning 
more, or being interpreted by a reader differently). In consequence, 
“homonormativity” may be read as the "gay equivalent" of "heteronormativity". 
Also "homonationalism" raises constant questions about the meaning of the term 
itself, in what context it relates to, and who is the subject and object of the 
homonationalist practice/discourses. For this reason, I prefer not to use it in 
relation to my own work, and propose to talk about a "heteronormativity" (rather 
than "homonormativity") of LGBT politics. This way, we actually capture the 
practice that is at stake and avoid unintentionally implying that homonormativity 
is like heteronormativity. This is my standing in Chapter 8, where I analyse the 
LGBT campaign “Let Them See Us”. It should also be stressed after Puar herself, 
that her case study only concerns the USA, and thus the analysis and theoretical 
conceptualisations may not translate straightforwardly onto other (in this case 
CEE/Polish) cultural contexts. I will show this in Chapter 7, when I analyse 
questions of belonging and attachment in “queer mourning after the homophobic 
president”. But also in the very content of “homonormativity” and 
“homonationalism”, there are some important geo-temporal distinctions worth 
highlighting. Both concepts are tightly related, and the “new homonormativity” is 
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not only an outcome of the neoliberal cultural politics (Duggan 2002, 2003), but 
also an active ingredient of “homonationalism”, which is defined by Jasbir Puar, 
as: 
 
[a] way in how queer subjects are relating to nation-states, particularly 
the United States, from being figures of death (i.e. the AIDS epidemic) 
to becoming tied to ideas of life and productivity (i.e. gay marriage and 
families). The politics of recognition and incorporation entail that 
certain - but certainly not most - homosexual, gay, and queer bodies 
may be the temporary recipients of the “measures of benevolence” that 
are afforded by liberal discourses of multicultural tolerance and 
diversity. This benevolence toward sexual others is contingent upon 
ever-narrowing parameters of white racial privilege, consumption 
capabilities, gender and kinship normativity, and bodily integrity (Puar 
2007, xii). 
 
In the Polish context, there is no “mainstreaming” of LGBT politics through, for 
example, the normalising gesture of “homoinclusivness” (although there are 
normative undercurrents present and deployed by the LGBT organisations 
themselves). Since Poland is not a multi-ethnic country (Polish citizenship - 
99,7% of population; Polish national-ethnic cultural belonging - 93,7%; other 
ethnic belonging declared by 3,6%, of which 2,1% declared double Polish and 
non-Polish ethnic identification, and only 1,5% ‘exclusively’ non-Polish) (GUS 
2012), questions concerning multiculturalism and racism cannot be directly 
transposed into Polish context. And the “traditionally Polish” anti-Semitism plays 
a rather different role in this configuration (cf. Chapter 5). Whilst they may desire 
norms of “social respectability” and “good citizenship” by embracing neoliberal 
values, gay and lesbian people in Poland are certainly not (yet) the “consumers of 
privilege” in the same way as their “mainstream gay and lesbian” counterparts in 
some Western countries arguably are (D. Evans 1993; Chasin 2000; Duggan 
2004). 
 Additionally literature examining the dynamics of homosexual subject’s 
belonging to the nation-state in Western contexts (mainly the UK and USA) often 
differentiates between “mainstream LGBT” and “alternative queer” politics. The 
former are understood to comply with the nationalist discourses, while the latter 
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are arguably more critical and sceptic about such “homoinclusion”. However, this 
does not seem to have much to do with the young LGBT movements in the CEE, 
where it is impossible to talk about “waves” of development (Kulpa and 
Mizielinska 2011a). (Not to mention that the situation is also more complex in 
those “Western” contexts, which makes such classifications highly problematic to 
begin with.) As I will argue in the Chapters 6-8, homosexual subjects are not 
straightforwardly objectified as “marionettes” of the carefully orchestrated 
national politics (that “swallows” them for own purposes and turns against e.g. 
migrant communities). Instead, I will show that they are exerting agency and 
wilful subversion towards the national discourses, that sexual politics in Poland 
cannot be deemed as “depoliticised” and “domesticated”. These observations 
clearly show differences between the “West” (if one accepts Puar and other’s 
argument about the “West” in the first place, that is) and CEE/Poland in respect of 
relations between the national and sexual discourses, and indicate a welcomed 
contribution of my project into the queer scholarship. The tensions and 
problematic nature of “homonationalism” in relation to the CEE/Polish context 
have led me to offer an alternative concept - leveraged pedagogy - which I 
mentioned earlier in the chapter. 
 Judith Butler's "Frames of War" (2009) analyses how the "West" and "Europe" 
are discursively framed as privileged spheres of "modernity", "where sexual 
radicalism can and does take place. Often, but not always, the further claim is 
made that such a privileged site of radical freedom must be protected against the 
putative orthodoxies associated with new immigrant communities" (2009, 102). 
She then illustrates this with the case of the Netherlands whose recent 
immigration policy confronts certain immigrants (notably those from the "Middle 
East") with images of homosexual couples. Their reactions and attitudes to these 
pictures is one of the measurements of their "progress" and stage of modernity, 
and hence acceptability for entry. For the same reason, immigrants from Europe or 
the USA do not have to take the same test, as presumably they are always already 
modern (enough) (Butler 2009, 105). As mentioned above, these are the 
discursive practices framing "Arabs", the "Middle East", and "Islam" as "pre-
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modern" and "barbaric" and in need of "civilising", even with the use of force and 
armed invasion, and at the price of annihilation. 
 Looking at this from the CEE perspective, I would also add leveraged 
pedagogy (Kulpa 2012a) as another strategy of "protecting" and "promoting" 
"Western modernity". As discussed earlier, CEE has always figured in the 
"Western/"European" imagination as one of its Others. In contrast with the "Middle 
East", which is perceived as radically Other, CEE has - at least from the collapse of 
the "Iron Curtain" - became an object of western "leveraged pedagogy" ("is being 
taken care of") rather than subject to any "civilising (annihilating) mission". So the 
deployment of this sexual discourse by the “West” in relation to the CEE differs to 
that of “homonationalism” in that the two geographical loci are not framed as two 
irreversible extremes. Leveraged pedagogy would be, at its simplest, a hegemonic 
relation of the “West/Europe” towards the CEE, in which the CEE is represented as 
“post-communist”, “in transition” (i.e. not liberal, yet, enough), and last but not 
least: “homophobic”. Leveraged pedagogy works as a condemnation but also as a 
“promise of redemption”, because of the geographical location and proximity to 
the self-proclaimed Universality of Western Europe. It is especially striking in 
relations between EU member states. On one hand there are European offers of 
“maternal” hospitality made to newly formed CEE states, with "invitations to 
reform", to return to the womb of Europe and the "European family" (i.e. to join 
the European Union). It is a discourse of "common values", "shared history", "same 
Judeo-Christian roots", "security" and "cooperation" that we find in all major EU 
founding documents, the 2008 Lisbon Treaty being most recent. On the other 
hand there are “paternal” requests and demands represented by laws and 
regulations, stipulating privileges and rewards to the adaptation to “European 
norms” (manifested in e.g. the indisputability of “directives”, or the less severe 
inductivity of “recommendations”). The dynamic of conditioning is a general 
working mechanism that regulates relations between the EU and all member 
states, but it is a development of a particular discourse of "homophobia in CEE" 
and the EU engagement in the promotion of “gay rights” that sets the relation 
between the “West/Europe” and the CEE as different to that of the “West” and the 
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“Islam”. I suggest that the CEE is somehow “European enough” to be “taken care 
of”, but “not yet Western” to be allowed into the “First World” club. Here I want 
to stress that I do not want to deny homophobia in the CEE or anywhere else, but 
to highlight that I am talking about a particular “Western/European” framing of 
homophobia in CEE that relegates “the problem/homophobia” to the CEE, 
implicitly re-creating the “Western” core of Europe as secular, progressive, and 
supportive of “human (gay) rights”. To sustain this model as superior (self-
essentializing of the “West” as liberal), the CEE is rendered as permanently “post-
communist”, “catching up”, and on an uneven slope of “progressive 
distance/proximity” from the peak of “West/Europe” ideal (Melegh 2006). I argue 
that whereas this dependency could be traced back to discourses concerning 
various spheres of life, politics, culture and economics, in the field of “European 
values” it is the “gay (human) rights” that became ostensibly marked as a litmus 
test of “CEE progress” towards “West/Europe” values. My argument resonates with 
what others (e.g. Puar 2006; Haritaworn 2009) have written, that one of the main 
indicators of this “progress” or rather “backwardness” is homophobia, which is 
constructed as an innate, organic feature of CEE societies.  
 4.4 Homoeroticism, homosociality, and nationhood 
Before drawing the chapter to a close, I return to the work of George Mosse 
(1985). He pays a great deal of attention to the intricacies of sexuality, 
industrialisation, new class formations, the rise of nationalism and fascism as 
political ideologies, all much centred around masculinity and relations between 
men. It was Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick (1985; 1990), however, who significantly 
contributed to theorisation and popularisation of the term “homosociality” that 
captures these dynamics. Since then, we have witnessed a proliferation of the 
publications on the topic (e.g. Segal 1990; Allen 1999; Dean 2000; Peterson 
1999; Hayes 2000; Heineman 2002). In "Between Men" (1985) Kosofsky 
Sedgwick elaborates on 19th century English culture. More specifically, to use her 
own words from “Epistemology of the Closet” (1990), she writes of "the oppressive 
effects on women and men of a cultural system in which male-male desire 
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became widely intelligible primarily by being routed thorough triangular relations 
involving a woman" (Sedgwick 1990, 15). Similar observations are made by V. 
Spike Peterson (1999) in relation to the nation and heterosexism. In her account, 
nationalist ideologies are heterosexist in that they foster fraternity and male 
homosocial bonding, and sexuality becomes more broadly mapped into political 
behaviour and institutional organisation. At the same time, national narratives 
about the importance of future generations and reproductive time impose 
heterosexual family as the loci of attention (Edelman 2004). This, in turn, helps the 
prohibition and discouragement of homosexual practices (Peterson 1999). Similar 
observations about the homosocial cultures of Maghreb (specifically Morocco, 
Algeria, Tunisia) and the post-colonial rise of national movements are made by 
Jarrod Hayes in his compelling book on Maghrebian literature: "Queer Nations. 
Marginal Sexualities in the Maghreb" (2000). Hayes also shows how the rise of 
nationalism in these three countries severely restricted and devalued homosexual 
practices, common among Maghrebian men, and lifted up by patriarchal Islamic 
visions of gender roles, while still maintaining high levels of homosociality (Hayes 
2000, especially Introduction and Part One). 
 Many other writers (e.g. Boellstroff 2005; Inglis 2005; Fischer 2007) show 
that the more homosocial a national culture is, the fiercer the rejection of 
homosexuality (homophobia). But how is the tension produced by the 
contradictory vectorial orientations dealt with in those male homosocial settings? 
To answer this question, I want to bring back the concepts of “desire” and the 
“erotic” which were addressed by Sedgwick, but are not as popular as one could 
imagine in the other literature. 
 It should be noted that the rejection of homosexual desire by the homosocial 
culture of national institutions does not necessarily mean a rejection of sexuality 
per se. Contrary, I would suggest that the stronger the rejection of homosexuality, 
the stronger the perpetuation of the heterosexual fantasy. What is strikingly 
important, however, is the fact that fantasising and acting upon heterosexuality is 
sometimes enacted by groups of men in homosocial settings, and done by, for, 
and through other men – i.e. it is homoerotic. 
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 The rejection of homosexuality as an aberration and potential threat is 
enacted by national institutions (e.g. Parliament, as in the case studied in the 
Chapter 6) by groups of men. Similarly, heterosexual acts (and fantasies) are group 
acts in homosocial settings; although performed “solo” they are “in assistance” of 
others. For instance, watching pornography together, exchanging and 
commenting on it, group wanking, telling stories of (hetero)sexual conquers and 
(hetero)sexual adventures, up to the extreme of homophobic group rape of a 
"sissy". These are examples of the ways that heterosexual fantasy is perpetuated by 
men for male pleasure, within enclosed male homosocial circles. They are about 
showing off, competing, and (hyper) masculinising. The more a man needs to 
prove himself as not "queer" in the eyes of other men, the more "straight" and 
"masculine" he thinks he needs to be for the acclamation of other men. Straight 
men play out what gay men describe as the "butch" or "daddy" (always "top" and 
"active" though) types. And as much as this type of masculinity, when enacted in 
gay men's cultures, is a form of performing attractiveness for other (gay) men, so it 
is as well, I would argue, a form of attractiveness performed by (supposedly) 
straight men for other (supposedly) straight men in the settings of the homosocial 
institutions important to nationhood (sports teams, army, prisons, and alike). 
Following others mentioned above, I would suggest that there is an undercurrent 
of homoerotic desire when homosocial national institutions reinforce anti-
homosexual attitudes by perpetuating heterosexual fantasy and practice, but 
solely for the pleasure and confirmation of (supposedly straight) men. The 
"embodied presence" of homoeroticism is a medium of dealing with the tension 
created by "absently present" homosexuality, a moment when the men's desire for 
other men forecloses the possibility of articulation in the act of sexual encounter. 
 I believe we can also make this mechanism a more metaphorical condition 
of relations between nationalists and the nation, taking place on (at least) three 
levels. Firstly, we can recognise that national movements perpetuate homosocial 
bonding at the expense of women who are discursively and materially 
subordinated (Yuval-Davis 1997; Nagel 19998; Peterson 1999). Secondly, 
national discourses reject homosexuality as a threatening Other to the national 
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body (Hayes 2000). And thirdly, national discourses could be labelled 
homoerotic, for they are about the love of one's country. Let me explain the last 
point. Since the country/nation is represented as female (Yuval-Davis 1997), 
nationalists (predominantly male, cf. Nagel 1998) perpetuate a heterosexual 
fantasy of the nation, envisaging their relationship to be that of a happily married 
life, and the nation as a family (McClintock 1995). The idea of a nation remains 
male-dominated, male-perpetuated, male-performed, male-cantered and most 
importantly, male-for-male acted out homoerotic nationhood. 
 4.5 Summary 
This forth chapter has further set out the framework of my research, highlighting 
gaps and “blind spots” in the existing literature, where I hope to contribute in 
return. I envisage this input in the form of bringing the CEE into focus. Whilst I 
find existing literature on nationhood and homo/sexuality engaging and inspiring, 
it is clear that researches focused on areas outside of "Western" geo-cultural and 
geo-temporal contexts are left with many opportunities for further research. "The 
Rest", to use Stuart Hall's expression (1992), especially Central and Eastern Europe 
is clearly under-theorised. In providing an overview of writing and thinking in 
nationhood and sexuality area, I have also offered my own conceptualisations, for 
instance those conceding homoeroticism in the homosocial institutions; the 
preference of heteronormativity over homonormativity; leveraged pedagogy. 
Having outlined the theoretical relations between nationhood and 
homo/sexuality, it is time now to move to Chapter 5, where I provide the reader 
with further context, focusing on Poland’s historical and cultural formations of 
nationhood, gender, and sexuality. 
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Chapter 5 
Poland: national context 
This chapter is intended to provide some necessary (for understanding the analysis 
in the Chapters 6 to 8) background information about the Polish culture and 
history. I equip the reader with insights into logic of the Polish nationhood until 
the 1989 (which I call “Traditional Polishness”), suggesting that the “post-1989” 
reality requires re-constitution of the Polish nationhood and the notion of the 
national identity. It is in this rapture symbolised by the year 1989, between the 
realties of the lost sovereignty, war occupation, and state communism (pre-1989), 
and the (post-1989) neoliberal capitalism and liberal democratic state regime - 
where I see the tensions giving rise to the intensified relationship between the 
discourses of nationhood and homosexuality.  
 Let me first try to summarise motifs and characteristics of Polish nationhood 
as they are presented in the existing literature about the topic. Although each 
author stresses different factors, the core of Polish nationhood seems to point 
towards the following, at times somewhat contradictory, aspects: (1) the strong 
influence of religious values on the notion of Polishness, and the dominant role of 
the Catholic Church (Chrypinski 1989; Genevieve Zubrzycki 2007); (2) related to 
this, Polish Anti-Semitism (Michlic 2006); (3) the significance of hostile relations 
with Russians and Germans (Kostrzewa 1990; Auer 2004); (4) the exclusionary 
character of Polish nationalism, fuelled by a sense of inferiority (in relation to 
Germany/the “West”) and superiority (over Russia/the “East”) in relation to 
neighbour countries (Lipski 1990; Szrett 1990; Nycz 2002); (5) Romanticism, 
martyrdom and victimhood (Janion 2000; Zieliński 2002); (6) the multi-ethnic and 
multi-religious composition of Polish society until WWII, compared with its 
almost uniquely homogenous character after WWII (Romaniszyn 2005); (7) the 
unresolved tension between Romantic idealism and Positivist pragmatism (Bodio 
1999); (8) the exclusively heterosexual dimension of national roles (Hauser 1995; 
Siemieńska 2000; Graff 2009); (9) and more recently, a crisis of values and 
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underpinnings of Polishness in the changing social, political, cultural and 
economic circumstances after 1989 (Krzemiński 2001; Jakubowska 2002). 
 Of course, this list does not claim to represent all the issues that may have 
formed/influenced the development of Polish national identity. National 
identifications are far too complex phenomena and processes to enclose them in 
the simple list; we need to take into account each historical period, political 
situation, social belonging, among other factors, that shape and shift the content 
of “national identity” constantly. Perhaps it is even impossible to talk about 
“Polish national identity” at all, because of the constant movement of constitutive 
elements and adaptations of ideas, their selection and (over)valorisation, and 
temporary absences, all varying at different times. So this elicitation is only meant 
to help in exploring issues of homo/sexuality and nationhood, here and in the 
following chapters. This one is organised along themes and tropes previously 
introduced in Chapters 3 and 4, and here contextualised and attuned to the 
specific Polish cultural dimension. I believe all the issues listed above and 
introduced earlier in the thesis point towards the tension between the community 
and the individual, the nation and its others, the public and the private, past and 
present and future. 
 5.1 Poland in the 19th century!
The 18th and 19th centuries are widely recognised as significant periods in the 
European history of social ideas (e.g. Feyerabend 1993; Crotty 1998; Kukla 2000). 
It is therefore important to realise that when in the Western Europe modern 
political ideologies (such as liberalism, nationalism, socialism) developed, Poland 
did not exist. Indeed, one of the often-discussed reasons for the collapse of the 
Polish state by the end of the 18th century was its inability to respond to shifting 
modes of production (i.e. from feudal and agrarian to industrial and urban-based) 
and social re-configurations (emerging new social stratifications and values), 
resulting in the general backwardness of Poland in comparison with western 
countries (Kochanowicz 2006). Prussian (and later German) imperial politics in 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) coincided with the birth of nationalism as the 
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political ideology, and the beginnings of German “blood and soil” nationalism in 
particular (which under the banner of unifying the German people served as one 
of the justifications of expansionism) (Berman 1998). Conversely, Polish 
nationalism is, I would tentatively suggest, more of an outcome of the threat and 
reaction to the imperial politics of neighbour countries. “Polish nationalism” was 
an elite-driven movement to include the masses of a thus far politically and 
socially deprived society (which constituted 9/10 of the pre-1795 Poland) (L. 
Johnson 1996, 110) So although nationalism was not a response to shifting social 
stratifications following industrial revolution and mass migrations of people from 
traditionally bonded rural communities to new, alienating urban settings, Gellner 
(1983) was right when writing that it is often a nationalism of elites that creates 
the nation of people. 
 The differences in historical development of the Polish and Western 
European nation-states may be illustrated with reference to George Mosse’s 
“Nationalism and Sexuality” (1985). As I suggested in the Chapter 4, Mosse’s lack 
of recognition of the cultural and geo-social composition of 19th century 
“Germany” makes him claim too easily that the spread of the bourgeoisie across 
“Germany” was followed by the spread of ideas of respectability and “proper 
sexuality”. This would mean that “Polish” parts of “Germany” were part of these 
processes. After the incorporation of significant parts of Central and Eastern 
European countries, the ethnic make up of “Germany” was very diverse, with 
different official (and native German) attitudes towards various (other) ethnic 
groups inhabiting these territories. I would suggest that in the cases of 
incorporated lands, the spread of “respectable sexuality/morality” may not have 
taken place, or at least be severely restricted, through e.g. the lands being the 
subject to other policies. For example, on the Polish territories it was the specific 
cultural politics of “Germanization”, aimed at the eradication of Polishness, rather 
than designed to incorporate Poles and their Polishness into (“native”) “German” 
society. What we are dealing with here, is thus a need to historicise the idea of 
“Europe” with particular cultural interest in different and not necessarily 
overlapping (geo)political boundaries. 
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 Here we should also acknowledge that three different countries (Russia, 
Prussia, Austria) deployed different techniques of “de-Polonization” and 
incorporation. Therefore, stepping down from the grand narrative of Polish 
nationalism to meso and micro levels of actual practices of nationalism, seems a 
logical continuation of this analysis. Bendict Anderson’s idea of “imagined 
community” (1991) may become especially useful in the Polish case (of 123 years 
of state non-existence between 1795-1918). For a population without a state 
(which was/is seen as the basis of national sovereignty), of old feudal tenures and 
dependencies, under the pressure of three culturally different (nation-)states - 
Poland as an “imagined community” is perhaps the only, or at least the best, way 
to describe and think about it. It is especially relevant because it was the literature 
of the 19th century Romanticism and Positivism that began to be mass printed and 
widely distributed - and thus had an immense impact on the shape of Polish 
national ideologies (Walicki 1994b). But the role and workings of imagination in 
discussion of Polish nationalism are multiple.  
 The dream of a free Poland was first realised after the First World War in 
1918. Withheld by the Nazi occupation during World War II, freedom came 
about once again in 1945 for the second time. Once there was a Polish state there 
was supposedly no need to dream about freedom or fighting for it. However, the 
national desire for freedom was soon re-animated, because the “free Poland” was 
founded under the influence of the USSR, which was easily to portrayed as 
another version of Poland’s “old enemy” (Russia). Thus, Russian/USSR influence 
over the region was quickly re-conceptualised as another imperial subordination. 
Let me suggest here, in a tentative and hypothetical manner that if during the 123 
years of partition, Poles were “imagining Poland”, after the WWII, they were 
“imagining free Poland”. “Imagined (national) community” (Poland) became the 
“imagined (promise of true) democracy” (free Poland); “imagined democracy” is 
also a temporal category, indicating “democracy to come…” after communism. 
But does the national narrative of “imagined democracy” conceive the shape of 
the future? Here again Polish Romanticism with its idealism steps in, and meets its 
longstanding adversary, the Positivist pragmatic idea of “organic work” and “small 
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steps” (Bodio 1999; Auer 2004, 61). Tadeusz Bodio in his book “Between 
Romanticism and pragmatism” (1999) undertakes the task of analysing how the 
two 19th c. cultural trends in Polish culture are in constant battle over the 
influence and the meaning of Polishness under various historical circumstances. 
He shows how the idealised vs. pragmatic approach to the national question, 
aside from the “East”/”West” division, was of crucial importance for shaping post-
1989 “psychopolitical” climate and Polish society, “the Polish nation” (Bodio 
1999). Bodio shows how the two philosophical traditions and cultural trends 
influenced contemporary attitudes and choices about how to reconcile values, 
norms and beliefs with pragmatic solutions; how to live between the ideal of 
“imagined democracy” and “everyday democracy” (of e.g. voting and trust into 
political elites), between the “market economy” and neoliberal capitalism of full 
shops, but empty wallets.  
 This brings me back to the literature on “everyday nationalism”, introduced 
in Chapter 3 (e.g. Palmer 1998; Caldwell 2002; Edensor 2002; Fox and Miller-
Idriss 2008a), which helps to understand how the “private” sphere was/is 
important in the transmission of national values and identifications, with all its 
idealisms and practicalities. The role of family (and especially women in it) as an 
individual and social unit of conversion of values into everyday practices and 
performances is especially important here (Yuval-Davis 1997). Poland was no 
different in this respect. Daily routines of life were/are dependent social status and 
location and access to material and symbolic capital. These dynamics continue to 
be woven into the public and political fabric of social and cultural life - that is 
nationhood. Below I show how gender became harnessed within the private 
sphere to serve a “higher national good” and the public/political fight for 
independence. The same can be said about sexuality through the paradigm of 
heteronormativity of gender formations. 
 5.2 National and individual!
Genevieve Zubrzycki (2007) in the opening of her article about symbolic 
representations of the nation in Poland, writes that 
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[t]he most common and pervasive Polish myth is that of Poland’s 
intrinsic Catholicity: Polonia semper fidelis (Poland always faithful), the 
bulwark of Christendom defending Europe against the infidel (however 
defined); the Christ of nations, martyred for the sins of the world and 
resurrected for the world’s salvation; a nation whose identity is 
conserved and guarded by its defender, the Roman Catholic Church, 
and shielded by its Queen, the miraculous Black Madonna, Our Lady 
of Czestochowa; a nation that has given the world a pope and rid of the 
Western world of Communism (Zubrzycki 2007, 131). 
 
However imagined or un/true this may be, as in case of any myth, it is hard to 
deny that these are indeed all-pervasive perceptions of Polishness and 
Catholicism. The Catholic Church is important in Polish history, if only because, 
as Auer (2004, 68-9) writes: 
 
(…) [The Catholic Church] had been seen as the only reliable intuition 
supporting the cause of the Polish nation for almost 200 years (since 
1795). Roman Catholicism distinguished a nation occupied by German 
Protestants, then Russians who were Orthodox, and later controlled by 
communists who were atheists. 
 
Catholicism not only came to signify, pars pro toto, Polishness during years of 
partition/occupation, but also the Church as the widespread institution, served as 
the alternative/underground state. It helped to link people together, to spread 
elites’ ideas to the masses, and it offered a relatively safe space of resource 
mobilisation for those who were ready to rebel against governments. However, as 
Porter argues (referred to in Auer 2004, 188), the Church’s role is much more 
ambivalent than usually assumed. For example, during the 19th century it seems 
that the Church did not much care about the partition and political annihilation of 
the Polish state. So perhaps it would be reasonable to distinguish between 
Catholicism as institution (the Catholic Church) and as religiosity (religious 
practices and beliefs of people). This would help to understand why for example 
during 19th century, although the institution was rather tame and indifferent to 
partitioning, religiosity still played a significant role in the formation and practice 
of national identification. This distinction may also become useful later, when 
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discussing post-1989 changes, as the division of Catholicism into institution and 
belief/worldview comes to play an even more interesting roleviii.  
 The situation changed significantly during communism, when the Catholic 
Church became actively engaged with politics and anti-government opposition 
(Auer 2004, 68-70). It was possible because the Church in Poland enjoyed 
significant independence from the communist state. Although the communist 
governments tried to reduce the Church’s influence and keep the clerics under 
control, the institution was never the subject of severe restrictions (Chrypinski 
1989, 257) (as e.g. it was in Russia or Romania). If during the partition period in 
the 19th century it was religiosity rather the institution of the Church that kept and 
bound Poles together - during communism, the two got merged, and perhaps 
even reversed. In the 19th century when the institution of the Church remained 
indifferent, it was religious belief and religious practice that helped to maintain 
the common identification, thus fostering the sense of unity and community that 
could eventually become what we today call nation/ality. During the communist 
period, it was the Church as its antinomy (tradition vs. novelty of communism, 
known vs. unknown of future) that rose to prominence. Taking part in the 
religious celebrations and events came to symbolise an anti-communist stance 
and opposition to official governmental politics. At that time partaking in religious 
rituals was a form of political activity and a civic act manifesting one’s 
disapproval of the dominant political system. Of course it is not to argue that 
spirituality and religiosity were abandoned; conversely, I want to highlight here 
that it was the politicisation of religious practice that ultimately elevated the 
Catholic Church to the status-symbol of political opposition. As Zubrzycki writes 
(2007, 140), the cross came to symbolise not only Poland, but free Poland. Taking 
part in Church practices (independently of one’s own beliefs) was to express one’s 
opposition to communist government, perceived as the occupying force (see also: 
Heynold quoted in Wagner 2003, 203). This process of politicizing religious 
practice could be seen as a leeway into subduing the individual to the collective 
as personal spiritual practice became institutionalised as an expression of group 
politics. Indeed,, after 1989, according to Zubrzycki there was a conservative re-
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appropriation of collective values and a powerful dismay of individualism and 
secularism as “traitors” to Polish sovereignty – now the nation’s most cherished 
treasure. 
 In particular, Solidarity - the independent worker’s union that evolved into a 
social movement, and later served as the base for the governing political elites - 
benefited from this Church-nation liaison. As Osa (1997) argues: 
 
The Church was crucial in the emergence and activation of the movement 
across social boundaries. Pastoral mobilization that began with the Great 
Novena of the Millenium preceded and laid the foundation for the political 
breakthrough and social action of the Solidarity era. Religious activists 
developed (cooptable) social networks, provided organizational resources, 
elaborated master frames, and created and action repertoire for strategic 
opposition (Osa 1997, 365).  
 
The Church marched into politics together with one of the most powerful 
members of this movement, Lech Walesa. He wore a broach of the Madonna 
pinned to the chest pocket of his jacket, as a visual, metaphorical but also very 
material manifestation of Catholicism being rooted in the new elites. Even more, 
the symbolic identification of Catholicism and political opposition were not only 
significant to that one person, but were accepted as collective and uniting 
emblems. Lech Walesa acknowledges this publicly: “during their memorable 
strike in 1980, the first thing the Gdansk workers did was to affix a cross, an 
image of the Virgin Mary, and a portrait of John Paul II to the gates of the 
shipyards. They became the symbols of victory” (Lech Walesa quoted in: Osa 
1997, 362). The power of symbolism and symbolic politics of nationalism lead 
some scholars in nationalism studies to pursue the argument of the religious 
substitution by nationhood (e.g. Llobera 1994; Greenfeld 1995; Marvin and Ingle 
1996; Friedland 2003). However, the Polish case seems to have its own narrative 
in this respect, which led Zubrzycki to conclude that 
 
Liah Greenfeld (1995) suggested that the treatment of nationalism as a 
modern religion stems from the fact that nationalism is a form of 
consciousness that sacralises the secular, hence the temptation to treat it as a 
religion, albeit a civil religion. Although this is useful, it does not go far 
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enough. The Polish case point to a different and overlooked process. 
Because of Poland’s peculiar political history, it was not political institutions 
and symbols that were sacralised and became the object of religious 
devotion (following the French revolutionary model), but religious symbols 
that were first secularized, and then resacralized as national (Zybrzycki 
2007, 149). 
 
With an attempt to establish (neo)liberal (i.e. secular) democracy after 1989, this 
ménage a trois: state, Church, political elites, would soon become rather 
problematic. Something unfortunate, ironic, and paradoxical happened to the 
Poles on their way to liberation. Although fighting in the name of freedom and 
liberty, the help and indispensible role of the Catholic Church in the process 
somehow erased plurality from the notion of liberty, offering a vision of freedom 
defined under collectivist terms (that is not that distinct from the values of rather 
oppressive state communism). Respect of individuality was lost somewhere in the 
transition from oppression to ‘freedom’, and from the state’s lost sovereignty and 
its epiphany after the 1989. As Bielasiak (2010, 45) observed: 
 
Thus, while the ideals of pluralist democracy were openly acknowledged, 
there were evident obstacles in reconciling the legacy of solidarities with the 
divisive nature of pluralist politics. Instead, the visionary world of Solidarity 
was carried forth into the liberated public space, which continued to be 
infused with a language of common purpose. The country’s transformation 
was a universal good that was difficult to reconcile with “particularities” that 
served specific economic or social groups. As a result, values formed during 
the communist period carried forth into the new era, as cleavages based on 
the communist–anti-communist and religious–secular identities tended to 
prevail over divisions based on socioeconomic interests. 
 
 Summarising this section, I want to stress that the discussion about religion 
and the Catholic Church may help us understand the current underpinning of 
collective discourses, where the notion of the nation seems to be more valued 
than that of the individual - a situation that directly shapes relation between the 
discourses of nationhood and homosexuality. 
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5.3 Polish cultural constructions of gender and 
sexuality 
In the Chapter 4 I have written that it is important to understand how gender is 
(ab)used in the national/ist discourses and practices. Agnieszka Graff (2009, 133) 
summarising the rich literature in this filed, which I have also introduced in the 
Chapter 4, recapitulates that gender and sexuality are important elements of 
nationalist exclusionary discourses, subjugating women as passive “bearers of 
culture”, and men as active “warriors”. Additionally, in the Polish case we need 
to consider the impact of the 19th c. Romanticism, not only for the Polish 
nationalism, but also for the stabilisation and conservation of Polish attitudes to 
gender and sexuality (Janion 2000). This thought inspired Malgorzata Radkiewicz 
(2005), who analyses Polish contemporary cinema, to show how these 
conceptions of gender and sexuality formed in the 19th century are tenacious in 
the modern Polish audio-visual culture. One of the most persisting images is 
Polonia and Polish Mother/Mother the Poleix. 
 There is a rich literature about the Polish gendered national imagination and 
representation of women (among others Hauser 1995; Siemieńska 2000; Janion 
1996; Ritz, Binswanger, and Scheide 2000; Graff 2001; Ritz et al. 2001; 
Ostrowska 2004; A. Kramer 2005; Janion 2007). All authors agree that the 
personification of Poland as Polania, and cultural image of Polish Mother/Mother 
the Pole embrace a conservative perspective on gender. For example, women’s 
role was to give birth to children (boys preferred), rear them and keep tradition 
alive, making the site of heterosexual family a nest of Polishness. Men, 
conversely, meant to fight for national freedom, ready to sacrifice their lives and 
their personal happiness (Walczewska 1999). In some strange (if not curiously 
twisted) way, the patriotic obligation to put the interest of the country above the 
personal, to make patriotism, a love of nation, a higher form of Love, made 
Poland not only a Mother, but also made Polonia a Lover (of her own sons) at the 
same time (since Polonia is represented as a young women in adoration by young 
man/soldier). Some kind of queer menagerie emerges here, some incestuous 
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prohibition is somehow brought upfront. “Konrad Wallenrod” (1991), an epic 
poem by Adam Mickiewicz (and icon of Polish Romanticism and patriotism) 
serves as an excellent example here. In this story, a young man leaves his wife 
and family, abandons personal happiness, and answers the call of Ultimate Love 
of the Country. Individual happiness in Mickiewicz’s canonical text of Polish 
nationalism must be sacrificed (as much as the “concrete” and “bodily” wife and 
children) for the “greater sake” of national freedom, symbolism and idealism. 
Some feminist thinkers in Poland also see in this gesture of choosing the idealism 
of patriotism over the realism of domestic life, one root of contemporary 
conservative disregard of women’s right to control their bodies and access to 
abortion (Szczuka 2004). Nonetheless the myth of Polish Mother/Mother the Pole 
strongly resonates with Polish religiosity, and especially with the cult of the Virgin 
Mary. Since the 19th century Motherhood has been framed by the ideal of Holy 
Mother as the holy activity, thus imposing the model of sacrificial holiness on 
women - a heroic mother of sons dying for their fatherland (or should we say 
motherland instead?). In consequence, Ostrowska (2004) uses the concept of 
“fantasmata” (originally developed by Maria Janion across her prolific oeuvre) to 
describe the Polish Mother/Mother the Pole, because “the oscillation of the Polish 
Mother/Mother the Pole between a myth and stereotype do not allow locating this 
symbolic figure neither in reality, nor in imaginary” (Ostrowska 2004, 218). There 
are numerous works of literature and other art forms where one is presented with 
such historical and cultural imaginary concerning gender roles. Among them, 
Vlastimil Hofman’s painting “Madonna with a Child and St. John" (1909) may 
serve as a good exemplex. On the painting we see the Virgin Mary, the Holy 
Mother dressed up in Polish peasant’s clothes, sitting with two boys in the middle 
of a field. The landscape is not characteristic of any particular place, and thus 
perhaps can also be said to be rather typical of the countryside in Poland. 
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Figure 1: Vlastimil Hofman, "Madonna with a Child and St. John" (1909). 
 
The Holy Mother is represented as the beautiful Polish woman, and she is the 
symbol of holiness; gender roles and duties are once again re-inscribed on the 
female body through the equation of motherhood with sacredness. The 
consequences are ubiquitous and perhaps paradoxical. As Ewa Hauser (1995, 89) 
writes:  
 
(…) in today’s Poland the equation of Heavenly and Polish Mother 
continues as a model of double service for women to follow. This 
double service entails service to her family and, through the family, to 
Poland. Fulfilling this double service guarantees the woman a “double 
satisfaction” which she can obtain within the “domestic” sphere to 
which the Heavenly Servant-Mother of God destined her. Only through 
this service can a Polish woman attain an equivalent, though 
subordinate rank with the Polish male patriot. The Polish woman 
becomes the model of female patriotism through her role as a mother 
and by a systematic denial of her sexuality.  
 
So far, what I have presented about the Polish constructions of gender and nation 
are not different to examples found in many other cultures (among others Anthias 
and Yuval-Davis 1989; Chatterjee 1990; McClintock 1995; Lutz, Phoenix, and 
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Yuval-Davis 1995; Sharp 1996; Kaplan, Alarcón, and Moallem 1999), with one 
significant addition of religious figure of Virgin Mary. As the consequence, we 
observe not only the scarification of women, but also the nationalisation of the 
holy figure. Both conflate in the symbolic representation of the Polish nation. 
 How gender is intertwined into relation between the collectivity of a Polish 
nation and individualism of a person, can also be observed in a case of forgetting 
about women. The framing of gender along passive-active, domestic-public lines 
has erased the memory of real women taking part in real combat against different 
oppressors. This erasure occurs even (or perhaps especially) from the most 
important, nationally sacred moments in Polish history. Keeping in mind the 
significance of memory and forgetting in the construction of national narratives 
(introduced in the Chapter 3) two, I now turn again to Radkiewicz (2005). She 
shows how, for example the image of women during WWII was narrowed to 
nurses, telephone operators, and other types of supporters, despite well 
documented accounts of women fighting also in “active men’s roles” (soldiers, 
leaders, masterminds, etc.). 
 Another example is the history of the resistance movements in Poland, from 
which women are successively (and successfully) disaffiliated. For instance the 
Solidarity movement, which between 1980 and 1989 consisted of ten million 
people (Castle and Taras 2002, 56). Half of them were women, but the Solidarity 
is exclusively presented as a history of a couple of men. As two historical-
sociological books about the topic show (Kondratowicz 2001; Penn 2005), it was 
often women who directly influenced crucial events from Solidarity’s history of 
struggle with the communist government. However, none of them is remembered 
or praised for their work in the movement, nor none made a political career out of 
this engagement, as their male colleagues did. So again, we see how the 
individual histories are dissolved in the narrative of the collective, and gender 
divisions remain in place. These two examples help the argument that if we begin 
with the examination of “failed remembering”, we may understand the politics of 
opposition and denial to feminism and lesbian and gay issues in contemporary 
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Poland. This also shed light on reasons why these groups demand inclusion into 
national imaginary and national narratives and discourses. 
 Let’s move to another issue centred around the norms of the “ordinary” with 
the following three examples drawn from my own experiences. I was raised in the 
Polish countryside in a school where supposedly there were no Others, where the 
national is silently expressed in a pattern of choices made by young children 
rather than by any other official of pompous manifestation. If a boy was a 
dedicated football fan, he could have been perceived as worth making friends 
with. But if he were rather clumsy, then he would risk becoming the group’s 
clown. But if, as it was in my case, he liked reading books – an activity 
supposedly not liked by boys and favoured by girls, so at least all teachers were 
telling us time and again – this boy would risk being bullied as the Other. 
Eventually, I was bullied as “sissy” for failing what had been seen as the norm of 
male adolescence. The second example is also the recollection from my junior 
years in the countryside school. There was a girl, the daughter of Jehovah 
Witnesses parents, and she also was the Other. Nobody in the school wanted to 
talk, play or be friends with her, because she was different (and thus somehow 
worse, somehow evil). (Difference being not attending the Church, i.e. the 
Catholic Church). Of course these were the attitudes of our parents and families, 
who were socialising us to believe that the girl who was not Catholic and the boy 
who did not played football but read books instead, that they were the odd ones 
out. Or the third instance: a woman in her forties, living in a countryside, who 
would have had her hair done regularly, not with permanent (hair treatment) 
though, but cut short, “boyish”-styled.  This woman was one of the few that used 
to come in visit to our house. She was a friend of my mother, who herself was 
rather independent woman and did not care (that) much about other people’s 
opinion (which by many in our village was seen as undesirable and suspicious 
quality of “female character”). People were avoiding making acquaintance with 
that woman, because she was called a “loose woman” for failing the rural 
standards of mature femininity. 
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 What these three recollections have in common is a story of some 
eccentricity and failure in maintaining and fulfilling certain unspoken rules of 
“proper” gender and sexuality expression, or of a “proper” morality and values 
system. What we observe is a individual non-conformity to collectively accepted 
patterns of behaviour, which are site-specific. Social norms change from rural to 
urban setting, from western to eastern border, from one generation to another, etc. 
But as Michael Billig (1995) suggests in the opening pages of his book, it will be 
beneficial to frame these specificities as national, not only as society-specific or 
culture-specific (a labelling more common among social scientists) (Billig 1995, 8-
9; see also Binnie 2004, 12). Billig insists on the national as a term that captures 
the universal and the particular, the general and the specific dimensions, 
something that adjectives societal or cultural (as too broad) are not able to 
capture. He also shows the pervasive character of the national influencing 
political, economic, social and cultural spheres of our everyday lives. It is a 
category to which other identities are often subdued (although this needs to be 
contextualised each time) due to the powerful and dominating force of national 
discourse. But it is important to remember that the national although discursively 
powerful, is in tight relation to other identify forming factors, as we learn from the 
intersectionality debates introduced in the Chapter 2. “National” then helps us to 
understand gender and sexuality not only as culturally marked sites of social 
behaviour, but as discursively framed and politically useful ideological instances 
of power and domination, resistance and struggle, negotiation and re-
configuration. 
 So far I gave examples of how Catholicism and traditional formations of 
gender relate to collectivity and its predominance in Polish culture. I showed how 
religious and cultural norms suppress e.g. gender as the individual and personal 
expression, overlooking real people with symbolic (national) duties and 
representations. Therefore, I suggest that community (rather than individuality) 
was of greater importance in the construction of Polishness. Understanding the 
primacy of collectivity in Polish nationhood and its pre-1989 political ideologies 
is crucial in comprehending the post-1989 social shift. If we agree that liberal 
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democracy and neoliberal capitalism as political and economic regimes rely on 
individualism and Western liberal and secularised political ideological models of 
polity and “sovereignty” (Heywood 2003), the inevitable clash and tension 
between the rooted traditional approaches and the new political and economic 
realities seems almost inevitable. It is in these tensions where I would 
(hypothetically for now) locate and embed the restlessness and strain between the 
discourse of nationhood and homosexuality. 
 The above discussion of gender in the Polish context shows in my opinion 
an unspoken (and one could say: queer) presence of erotic tension between male 
hero/soldier, fatherland personified as Polonia (becoming motherland?), an 
idealised and seductive woman, and an absently present real woman, perhaps 
soldier’s wife, pushed aside in the shadows of symbolic Mother Poland. Polonia 
figures as a mother, a national body whose sons are obliged to defend the 
country’s chastity against the aggressor (a de-sexualised mother-son relation). But 
the personification of Polonia is at the same time excessively sexualised and 
erotic, often represented as a young and fleshy woman. Hers is a seductive 
“follow me” call, which the soldier is not able to/should not refuse (a lover-lover 
relation). We find examples in the paintings of the prominent Polish painter Jacek 
Malczewski (1854-1929). 
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Figure 2: Jacek Malczewski, "Polonia" (1914) 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Jacek Malczewski, "Polonia" (1914) 
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In Figure 2 we see Polonia as a young woman, rather dominating the frame of 
representation, with a calm if somewhat “uninterested” facial expression.  She is a 
woman that a man (Pole) cannot refuse - he submits to her, kneeling in front of 
her. At the same time, it is not just a ritual kneeling in awaiting of – for example - 
a blessing, there is some queer erotic tension in this painting. The man seems to 
be kissing the womb of Polonia, the sacred origin; it looks like he might be 
pleasing her with cunnilingus. However, Polonia as depicted in Maczewski’s 
painting seems rather indifferent to the man’s act of submission and pleasing. It is 
as if it was expected of him, as if it was his duty. Yet again we could read into this 
paining the relation of a mistress and slave, domination and submission, and 
pronounce it queer. But this is not the point. What is important is Malczewski’s 
ability to capture the tautness and edginess of meanings in all their abundance; he 
enables a possibility of multiple (if queer) readings of the relationship between 
sexuality and gender, nationhood, and their discourses and representations. 
 In the next painting (Figure 3) we see a different, yet similar, scenario. Here 
we see Polonia not as a proud and domineering woman, but as the flirtatious and 
irresistible one. In this male fantasy depiction, Polonia plays a game of 
unavailable and ashamed girl (crossed hands symbolising “oh no, how could I 
ever…”). But at the same time, she is coquettish: she has got her dress lifted up 
above the knee, so that a leg is shown, she smiles in turning her head towards the 
boy behind, as if she was telling “Yes, do follow me…”. Polonia allures the boy, 
who seems unable to refuse the temptation. It is again the face, his not hers this 
time, that suggests that. The boy’s facial expression is rather blunt, he seems to be 
“unpresent”, as if he was almost unconsciously animated by her call to follow. In 
both paintings Polonia in depicted in a sexualised way, and represented as a 
lover. Yet at the same time, Polonia was/is figured as a Mother Poland in the 
national imaginary. She is The Holy Mother/Mother of those Polish sons who will 
go and fight for her, and also the young woman who seduces them in an incestial 
lure of idealised Love. She is the one to which the love and respect of “real” 
women will be sacrificed. What is outside the frame is the taken-for-grantedness 
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of the heterosexual family where real women and men, marry and procreate, to 
secure the survival of the hindered nation (a wife-husband relation). 
 So when we think about nationhood and sexuality (in Poland and perhaps 
elsewhere as well), this is appearing as perhaps a little odd ménage a trois, a love 
affair between women, men (both symbolic and real) and the country/nation. This 
triangulation of desire which is much at the expense of women redirects my 
attention to the issue of homosociality, introduced in Chapter 4. There is a 
particularly intense relation between homoeroticism, homosexuality, 
homosociality and homophobia in the national discourses. National homosocial 
bonding of men is founded on homophobic exclusion and stigmatisation. 
However, although homosexuality is stigmatised and despised, homoerotic 
tension is never absent from the most heterosexual settings and imaginaries of 
nationhood. Iza Kowalczyk, a prominent feminist art theoretician, in the article 
entry “National eroticism” (2010) presents a series of Vlastimil Hofman’s 
paintings, stating that there is something unsettling in his patriotic depictions of 
(naked) men/soldiers and Polonia.  
 
 
Figure 4: Vlastimil Hofman, "Polonia and Polish Soldier", ca. 1915 
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Kowalczyk concludes that although eroticism in the patriotic depictions of 
national anthems may not be shocking (perhaps because we are so used to it, 
thanks to its widespread occurrence?), a “national homoeroticism” is at least 
surprising (Kowalczyk 2010). Vlastimil Hofman’s “Polonia and Polish Soldier” (ca. 
1915) is a good example here. A half-naked, porcelain-pale Polonia is looking at 
the naked Polish soldier. He is a well suntanned, small built man and we are 
presented with a view of him from behind, while Polonia seems to look at his 
torso and crotch. The depiction is surprising, because as we know, thanks to the 
feminist critique of visual culture (e.g. Erens 1990; Smelik 1998; Petro 2002), the 
gaze of the onlooker is framed as predominantly male and possessive. Thus 
depictions of naked women are taken for granted in contemporary 
heteronormative cultures we live in, while representations of male nudity, 
inevitably eroticising the male body, and forcing a homoerotic gaze on the 
onlooker, is seen as disquieting and provoking. Additionally, the soldier’s posture 
is rather stereotypically effeminate. While bending the left hand, he puts the right 
one on his hip; slightly bending the right leg, he makes his hip to delicately move 
to the left. And although we do not know what his eyes are looking at, we notice 
that his head is straight looking in the direction of Polonia’s face.  We could say 
then that he does not seem to be interested in her semi-naked body, that her 
erotic allure does not influences him. Hofman’s painting of this erotic, libidinal 
connection between Poland and her sons/lovers, redirects us to (if not forces us to 
acknowledge) the homosocial and homoerotic restlessness of national discourses. 
Additionally, the “national homoeroticism” is seasoned in Hofman’s painting with 
a touch of religious symbolism (not surprising perhaps, if we consider what I have 
written earlier in the chapter about the inevitable connection between 
Catholicism and Polishness). Polonia holds in her hands some sort of crosier 
depicting a Black Madonna, and the Soldier holds an orb that resembles globus 
cruciger - choices of insignia that read as significant. The Black Madonna Of 
Chestochowa is a popular and easily recognisable symbol of Polish Catholicism 
and of the Polish fight for independence (from the times of the Polish - Swedish 
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wars in the 17th century; it is an image much popularised by Polish writer Henryk 
Sienkiewicz in his “Trilogy” works). The globus cruciger is a symbol of royal 
sovereignty and power. Thus both insignias hint at Poland’s lost sovereignty and 
re-inscribe the motif of national fight into the eroticised/erotic (if a little queer) 
depiction of Polish nationhood. Homoeroticism silently haunts those patriotic 
portrayals of an already unsettled menagerie. Parker et al. in their introduction to 
“Nationalisms and Sexualities” (1992, 6-7) write that  
 
[i]n the rhetorical system(…) women are predictably enshrined as The 
Mother, a “trope of ideal femininity, a fantasmatic female that secures 
male-male arrangements and an all make history”. This idealisation of 
motherhood by the virile fraternity would seem to entail the exclusion 
of all nonreproductively-oriented sexualities from the discourse of the 
nation. 
 
However, this appears to be non-achievable effort, and the homoeroticism seems 
never to be completely eradicated. Moreover, Janion (2007) indicates additional 
twist in the Polish case: a state non-existence, hence the popular representation of 
Polonia as a dead body. However, the dead body of the Mother Poland is most 
often shown as young Polonia, as a dead lover (2007, 272-273). Therefore, Janion 
concludes, Mother-Poland-Fatherland-Polonia is predominantly a tanatic figure. 
In some queer way, Hofman’s (but also Malczewski’s) depictions of Polonia 
although aiming at ideal, pure love of country, turn somehow to be seasoned with 
incestuous, forbidden extra-marital, and homoerotic, deathly spices of (Polish) 
national ghosts and worst nightmares. We deal here with the Otherness in 
multiple embodiments (or in-corpo/real-isations) and re-configurations, with 
porous and possibly unstable associations ascribed to its meanings. Once again 
the work of Jarred Hayes (2000) comes to mind, when he writes: 
 
[o]ne cannot exclude someone from the Nation unless she is already 
there. (…) If there must be such an effort to exclude the queer from the 
Nation (…) and show she is an outsider trying to invade, the queer must 
always be inside already; that is, in some ways, the Nation is always 
already queer (Hayes 2000, 15-16). 
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Perhaps this is why silence around sexuality became the predominant form of 
discourse in Polish culture (Ritz 2002). German Ritz points to cultural differences 
between Poland and Western Europe and America, where “sexual revolution” 
bears marks of urban cultures (sexuality as a Western middle-class commodity). 
Polish society did not follow the same social processes of modernisation as 
present in Western societies. Ritz claims that Polish modernism is mostly 
connected to the post-WWII socialist project of socialist realism (socrealism) - the 
building of a new country and new society - until then “issues of gender and 
discrimination were shaded by the general claims of nation and ideology” (Ritz 
2002, 53). Perhaps now is the place to discuss gender and sexuality during the 
communist period in more detail. 
 Further in his book, Ritz continues: “[r]eal socialism as ideology and specific 
political pragmatics was suspicious of any form of otherness; therefore here sexual 
emancipation is a black spot on the map of [Polish] culture. There was no room 
for sexual otherness” (2002, 54). Primacy was again given to the collective body 
of the citizenry, and heterosexuality was present as an implicit rule (reproduction 
as the key duty on the way to re-build the country/nation after the war). There is 
an extensive literature about women and gender relations during and after 
communism (e.g. Funk and Mueller 1993; Domsch and Ladwig 2000; Gal and 
Kligman 2000; Jahnert and et al. 2001; Frunza and Vacarescu 2004; J. E. Johnson 
and Robinson 2007; Kay 2007). All authors highlight that although communist 
governments tried to re-model traditions of genders, their roles, constructions and 
understanding, the project only partially succeeded. Certain advances were 
achieved in Poland, like availability of abortion, an increase in childcare facilities 
and a greater influx of women into “professional” workspaces. Nonetheless, 
communist “state feminism” fell short of the liberation idea(lism) (Domsch and 
Ladwig 2000; Siemieńska 2000; Goscilo and Holmgren 2006). It overloaded 
women with a double burden of domestic and professional careers, the political 
domain remained exclusively male-oriented; compulsory heterosexuality and the 
nation-building project of socialist realism were far from sexual liberation. 
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 In terms of policies towards homosexuality, there was no space for sexual 
otherness in communist Poland (but of course it does not deny its existence in 
informal, or “underground” spaces). However, unlike – for example - 
Russia/USSR, it was not criminalised either, (Healey 2001; Baer 2002; 2009). 
Particularly interesting in this context may be fact that the so called ”sodomy 
laws” were never part of Polish penal codes, which they were in so many other 
countries (in the “West” and elsewhere). However, this should not be attributed to 
greater tolerance and acceptance of homosexuality in Poland (see also Szulc 
2011). Lack of “sodomy laws” in Polish penal codes is the effect of the troubled 
history of the (non-)existing Polish state, rather than of anything else. After 1795, 
that is during the partition period, specific laws of the occupying countries 
(which, like Prussia, had sodomy laws in force) were operating on the territory of 
(non-existing) Poland. In 1932 a final unification of all legal systems on the new 
territory of the Second Polish Republic was undertaken. The new Polish penal 
code introduced at the time did not contain any type of “sodomy law” 
interpellations. The absence of legal punishment of homosexuality in the new 
territory of Poland was an effect of more general political choices of the interwar 
period, not the effect of public discussion or a reflection of public opinion. Rather 
than trying to patch up all three legal systems into one single system after 
independence, it was decided to scrap them and use the Napoleonic Code as the 
foregrounding base of the new Polish legal system. And since there was nothing 
about homosexuality (sodomy) in that code, homosexuality was never penalized 
in Poland.  
 Such a state of affairs concerning homosexuality persisted during the 
communist period (Kurpios 2003; 2010). In trying to understand why this was so, 
especially in relation to (for example) Russia/USSR where, after the initial 
relaxation in the early Bolshevik years, homosexuality was re-criminalised under 
Stalin’s rule (Healey 2012), we should perhaps look for the reasons in the 
particularities of Polish communist governance. In no difference to other Western 
European and Northern American countries, homosexuality in Poland was the 
subject of criminological and psychological studies during the 1960s until 1980s. 
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Such studies in Communist Poland (and other Central and Eastern European 
countries) presented homosexuality as a social pathology from the “West” 
threatening the young, healthy, socialist “new order”. But of course the reverse 
analogy was also to be found on the other side of the wall. For example, in the 
United States during the so-called McCarthy era, homosexuality was equated with 
communism and hunted down as a threat to the national security (and “Western” 
order) (Blasius and Phelan 1997). Not much is known about the life of non-
heterosexual people in Poland after the WWII until 1989 though (Kliszczynski 
2001; Kurpios 2003; 2010; Szulc 2011). One of the very few documented (if in a 
scattered and rather elusive manner) “events” of the period was the so-called 
Action Hyacinth - a milita’s (communist police) surveillance operation to infiltrate 
male homosexual communities in larger towns and cities, executed between 1985 
and 1987. This operation came to public attention for the fist time in 2004 and 
again in 2007. It gathered some mainstream media attention, when some of the 
Warsaw-based LGBT activists tried to find out what had happened to 
approximately 12,000 “pink files” gathered during the Hyacinth operation (for 
more details see the following articles: Polska Agencja Prasowa 2004; 
Boguszewicz 2007; Stachowiak 2007; innastrona.pl 2007; Tomasik 2009). The 
general lack of information about non-heterosexual lives in Poland before 1989 
should, among other factors, be attributed to the fact that academic scholarship in 
Poland in the field of gender and sexuality is still relatively young and has grown 
since that time (especially in comparison to the “Western” Anglo-American 
history). There is also the structure and organisation of academia, and its relative 
conservatism. Finally, one should not forget about research funding which is 
impacted by state economic circumstances as research is often state funded 
(directly or indirectly); in times of “transformation” there is often a general 
pauperisation of society, deployment of economic austerity measures, and 
consequently less money for humanities and socio-cultural research. Huge 
disparities in the exchange value of money between Central and Eastern European 
countries and “Western” countries, also means that there is a severe restriction in 
terms of cross-fertilisation of theories and exchange of ideas (facilitated by e.g. 
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electronic access to journals, or the possibility to buy books). Perhaps it is due to 
these factors that most scholars in Poland tend to adopt the role of translators and 
intermediates between English-speaking scholarship and a Polish-speaking 
audience. They tend to introduce the concepts of the predominantly Anglo-
American research, but what is noteworthy is the attention given by many authors 
to the possibilities and constraints of cultural translation. Hence, as Mizielinska 
and I have pointed out elsewhere, gender and sexuality studies in Poland and CEE 
did not develop in a linear-accumulative manner as did earlier in American and 
British academe (Kulpa and Mizielinska 2011a; see also: Basiuk, Ferens, and 
Sikora 2002; Ferens, Basiuk, and Sikora 2006; Mizielinska 2006; 2010). It is 
worth highlighting here my contribution to sexuality studies in/about Poland and 
Central and Eastern Europe, since a survey of existing research concerning 
homosexuality and nationhood shows that there has been no in-depth debate in 
Polish (nor in the English-speaking) academic circles about the important 
relationship between Polish nationalism and homosexuality. 
 5.4 Mapping the Other: Poland between the “West” 
and the “East” 
As I argued in Chapter 2, every process of identity building is a relationship 
between the Self and the Other. In Chapter 3, I indicated that national identity is 
no different since nations also need their Others to constitute themselves in 
relation to. These could be “radical Others” remaining outside the borders, such 
as neighbour nations; or “constitutive Others”, remaining within the body of 
nation, but perceived as constitutively alien. In the Polish case, I explain these in 
attitudes towards Germans, Russians and Jews, through Poland’s unique location 
between the “East” and the “West”. Drawing maps and fixing locations are crucial 
practices in establishing and maintaining power hierarchies and possibilities for 
collective agency (Huggan 1989). For example, I analyse elsewhere how the use 
of the “West” and the “Central and Eastern Europe” may serve to impede or distort 
the current (im)balance between more dominant “West” and less privileged “East” 
(Kulpa 2012b; 2012a; Kulpa and Mizielinska 2011a). According to many 
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scholars, in the context of Polish nationhood, the geographical location of the 
centre, between Germany and Russia, “West” and “East”, was of a special 
importance (Kostrzewa 1990; Walicki 1994a; Jedlicki 1999; Janion 2007). This 
was sharply summarised by Polish satirist Andrzej Mleczko with the following 
cartoon: 
 
Figure 5: Copyright by Andrzej Mleczko. 
 
The image shows us God ordering the world. When it comes to Poland, God says 
(in a somewhat cheeky and playful manner, judging from his facial expression):  
“Let us make fun of Poles, and locate them between Germany and Russia”. I 
consider this to be sharp and accurate summary of Polish resentment towards its 
neighbours. Throughout the centuries Poles struggled to find their own way 
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between oriental and occidental cultural influences; Poles feel inferior to the 
“West”, and superior to the “East” (Lipski 1990, 59; Szrett 1990, 37–38). Jan Jozef 
Lipski (1990), a well-known Polish intellectual, critiques this duality of the “Polish 
soul”, calling it grotesque and pitiful (1990, 60). In recognition that there is no us 
without them, Jozef Szrett states that “[i]t is in our interest to liberate ourselves 
[Poles] from oppression by others, and at the same time liberate ourselves form 
resentments and complexes” (1990, 38). This, in turn, would enable the re-
evaluation of national identity. Lipski postulates even more, and writes that 
“[p]atriotism is not only respect and love for tradition; it is also the relentless 
selection and discarding of elements in this tradition, and an obligation to this 
intellectual task” (1990, 54). That means not only leaving the past and complexes 
behind, as Szrett suggests, but actively dealing with own ghosts of this past, facing 
the challenge of the Other by the recognition of the Other within ourselves. I will 
return to this last point in Chapter 7, where I will engage again with the Polish 
national identifications from the perspective of attachment and belonging. 
 5.4.1 Martyrs and victims - memory and Polish nation!
To suggest the linkage between everyday lives and the narrative constructedness 
of national identities is to talk about a “place” and “space” as both occupying the 
spheres of the “real” and the “imagined”. Research about Poland and “post-
communism” clearly indicate place (geographical as much as imagined) and time 
as foundational dimensions. Allan and Thompson (1999) and Bhabha (2004) 
effectively argue that “time-space” are inextricable from each other, and that one 
of the more interesting processes of creating/imagining the nationhood, “the 
people”, is to translate one onto the other. In Bhabha’s own words:  
 
[t]he difference of space returns as the Sameness of time, turning 
Territory into Tradition, turning the People into One. The liminal point 
of this ideological displacement is the turning of the differentiated 
spatial boundary, the ‘outside’, into the authenticating ‘inward’ time of 
Tradition (2004, 213). 
 
Perhaps now is the time to explore Polish nationalism and its attitude to 
Otherness through such temporal categories of narration. As mentioned above, 
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19th c. Romanticism is the period when Polish nationalism is conceived, and this 
is very much thanks to Romantic literature (Janion 2000). Writings of the bards of 
the period, Adam Mickiewicz, Juliusz Slowacki, Zygmunt Krasinski and Cyprian 
Kamil Norwid, were the vessels of narrating the nation, setting themselves the task 
of “waking up the people’s soul”. They have created and helped to transmit the 
memory of “Poland” for the so-called Great Emigration of Polish noblemen fleeing 
out of the country after the failed November Insurrection of 1830-1831. The 
Romantic love of folk stories, myths, fairytales and legends inspired poets “to go 
between the people” with the mission of writing down their stories. But as we 
know today, this often led to “improving” and thus in fact, to creating new 
narrations, rather than just simply writing the existing ones down (Witkowska 
1997; Janion and Żmigrodzka 2001). Therefore the work of Polish Romantic bards 
is another good case of what Hobsbawm and Rangers call “inventing traditions” 
(1984). 
 What I want to focus on now, is a process that could be understood as 
“othering selfhood” - how Polish martyrological narration constructs Poland as 
the good, sacred and sacrificed Other against the backdrop of other, supposedly 
rotten, evil and corrupted countries (notably Germany and Russia). It was the idea 
that Poland, as the Christ of the Nations, was predestined to be sacrificed 
(portioned by Russia, Prussia and Austria), in order to free the Peoples of Europe 
for the self-determined prophecy of national sovereignty (Walicki 2006). As 
indicated earlier, the Messianic ideology reinforced the primacy of the collective 
over the individual. This took various shapes, mainly the form of fighting with a 
(real of imagined) oppressor. How one would define it – whether as an invader, 
occupier or political opposition, is not so important. The stress was on the duty to 
give up one’s personal life and happiness in the name of The Polish Nation 
(Janion 2000, 24). It was also about a fight for independence and struggle for 
survival, cultural as much as political. Martyrology propagates the narration of 
injustice and victimhood in the national ego (Zieliński 2002, 18). Finally, it can be 
argued that thanks to this martyrological feature of national ideology,  
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[t]he defining feature of a nation thus conceived was not ethnicity, but 
the historic mission that this nation was supposed to fulfil. As Brian 
Porter argued, “the Polish nationalists of the nineteenth century enacted 
the nation rather than embodying it (…) (Auer 2004, 61).  
 
This would suggest and support the claim that nation and nationalism are 
performative ideas/practices, relying on the action, process, and relation, rather 
than on any supposedly fixed and stable attachments (cf. Chapter 3). So to 
summarise, Polish martyrological discourses of the 19th century shows us not 
only the interesting process of “inward othering” (constructing Polish national self 
as the “better Other” of the oppressor countries), but also provide another 
example of the domination of collective over the individual. 
  5.4.2 Poland as colonizer!
Finally, Polish relations with its neighbouring Others should be studied not only 
from the perspective of victim but also that of oppressor. To do so, the use of post-
colonial theories in Polish context is a fascinating academic enterprise, opening 
many new possibilities of scholarship (Janion 2007). The ethnic diversity of The 
Commonwealth of the Poland and Lithuania of the pre-partition period (until 
1795) and the Second Polish Republic (1918-1939) was significant. As Krystyna 
Romaniszyn states: “[t]he ethnic mosaic comprised Ukrainians, Jews, 
Belarussians, Germans, plus smaller numbers of Lithuanians, Russians, Slovaks, 
Czechs, Tatars, Roma, and folk populations identifying themselves as 
‘indigenous’” (2005, 160). Overall, minorities constituted more than 30 per cent 
of the total population of the interwar population (Dylągowa 2000, 143–144). 
Consequently, “Polish culture” was a melange of these multiethnic, multilingual, 
multi-religious roots, bonded together by the civic political idea(lism)s of unity 
(Walicki 1997, 233). A melange not always of own good will. What I want to 
stress in these paragraphs, is that Poland was not only the object of a colonial 
dominance (by three aggressors partitioning its territory; and later by USSR after 
WWII) as it is most commonly conceived - but also a fact that Poland was a 
coloniser itself. Figure 7 represents “Polish” territory changes from before and 
after WWII. 
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Figure 6: Poland after WW II (Image source: Wikipediaxi) 
 
The salmon-coloured western territories are called in Polish “ziemie odzyskane” - 
“restored/regained lands”, whereas the grey ones - “ziemie utracone” - “lost 
lands”. The “lost lands” are today’s Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania. Polish past 
orientalising and colonising attitudes towards these lands are not only well 
documented (see: Janion 2007 for a particularly acute and detailed overview of 
literature about Polish attitudes towards "Kresy"/ziemie utracone"), but also 
present in contemporary language. In the standard expression, like “to go to 
Germany” (“jechać do Niemiec”), a preposition ‘do’ - ‘to’ is used. However, 
when the same sentence refers to one of the “lost lands”, a different preposition of 
place is used: ‘na’ (“jechać na Ukrainę/Białoruś/Litwę”). It implies possessiveness 
and is used in an action when a subject does something to/on an object that is in 
their possession - a connotation that is not present in the standard ‘do’ 
preposition. It is also common to talk about Poland while discussing The 
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Commonwealth of the Kingdom of Poland and Grand Duchy of Lithuania - a two-
nation state between 1569-1795. It is best exemplified when referring to the 
already mentioned Romantic poet Adam Mickiewicz. Although he was born, 
lived, and self-described as Lithuanian, he is referred to as Pole. Equally telling is 
the treatment of his canonical “Master Thaddeus, or the Last Lithuanian Foray: A 
Nobleman's Tale from the Years of 1811 and 1812 in Twelve Books of Verse” 
(2006), an epic poem, fragments of which every child has to learn by heart in the 
Polish primary school. The work has Lithuania (and not Poland) in the title, and 
begins with three references to Lithuania from the very start: 
 
Lithuania, my country! You are as good health: 
How much one should prize you, he only can tell 
Who has lost you. Your beauty and splendour I view 
And describe here today, for I long after you. 
 
Holy Virgin who shelters our bright Częstochowa 
And shines in Ostra Brama! You, who yet watch over 
The castled Nowogródek's folk faithful and mild; (…)  
(Mickiewicz 2006). 
 
Yet still, Lithuania is scrupulously erased and denied sovereignty, constantly being 
subsumed under the category of Poland and Polishness. Taking inspiration form 
post-colonial writings, and doing this by looking at one of the examples of the 
Polish imperialism, I tried to give another example of othering present in the 
Polish culture. The final one - Polish relations to Jewish people, follows. 
  5.4.3 Poles and Jews - forgotten past!
The Jewish minority before WWII consisted of approx. one-third of the 30% of the 
population considered as ethnic minority (Dylagowa 2000, 143-44). However, 
the position of Jewish people seemed to be more “problematic” then that of any 
other minority group. They represented an Otherness that is/was more radical 
(involving cultural, ethnic and religious difference) as definitive of their 
community. They were an ethnic group without their own state until 1948, and 
not without controversy ever since, remaining for many years the largest minority 
within the national borders. However, the Jewish community was also extensively 
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assimilated, blurring the clear-cut difference between “being Polish” and “not-
being Polish”. Anti-Semitism as the key element of Polish nationalism came into 
significance with the building of the Second Republic during the interwar period 
(Auer 2004, 62). The figure of Roman Dmowski is a particularly clear example of 
this link. As a leader of Endecja (National Democracy), an important (nationalist) 
party, he expressed extreme forms of xenophobia and anti-Semitism in his work to 
re-build (“pure”) Polish nation-state (Auer 2004, 63). It is safe to state then, that in 
the process of building national identity, anti-Semitism played a (shamefully) 
important role, not without the support from the Catholic Church (Chrypinski 
1989; Blobaum 2005; Geneviève Zubrzycki 2006). Unfortunately, anti-Semitism 
seems to be a persistent trait of Polishness until present dayxii. 
 The accounts of Polish-Jewish relations bear as well, and unfortunately, a 
mark of competitiveness over victimhood. The anti-Semitic trait is visible in Polish 
national claims for martyrological suffering as the Christ of Nations. An attempt to 
establish the “hierarchy of suffering” (Roszkowski quoted in Auer 2004, 67) is 
analyzed by Zubrzycki, who looked at the 1998 events around mounting 
Christian crosses at the site of the Nazi death camp in Auschwitz. These 
expressions of “Polish jealousy over the Shoah” try to diminish the significance of 
the suffering of Jewish people, and elevate their own perceived harm. However 
grotesque it may seem, this attitude also has fatal consequences. 
 What seems to play the most important role in the relations between two 
peoples is not only fear (and hate) but also memory and its lack. Forgetting, as 
discussed in the Chapter 3, plays a crucial role in the formation of national self. In 
Poland, it is forgetting about Polish crimes against Jewish people: forgetting about 
the extent of Polish collaboration with the Nazis during WWII, or the mass 
killings of the Jewish population in Jedwabne (Gross 2001; 2006; Jankowski 2002) 
which serve as horrific examples. The best illustration of this “intended forgetting” 
are the responses to Jan T. Gross’s uncompromising work about Polish-Jewish 
relations. The amount of hateful rejections, accusations, and controversies that 
swamped Polish public opinion after the publication of “Neighbours” (2001) and 
“Fear” (2006) indicates that any attempt to break the silence and talk about Polish 
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anti-Semitism after WWII provokes stormy rage (Jankowski 2002; Polonsky and 
Michlic 2004; Gross 2007). This just confirms how strongly the topic remains 
taboo, and how important it is to expose those blind spots in the national 
memory. 
 Finally, there are recently new analyses of Polish anti-Semitism in the 
context of homophobia. Some writers (Umińska 2006; Ostolski 2007; Graff 2008) 
point towards the fact that there is a parallel between Jews and gay people in their 
sacrificial role served up on the altar of Polish national anxieties. These authors 
claim that homophobia is the 21st century anti-Semitism. The metaphor may be 
useful, if hopefully exaggerated. However, even though issues of homophobia 
and anti-Semitism in Polish context may seem similar, rooted in xenophobia, they 
still encompass many different problems, and thus must not be taken without 
criticism and careful re-assessment.  
 5.5 Conclusions!
In this chapter, I have introduced the cultural and historical context necessary for 
understanding the analytical engagement in the next three chapters. I have 
signalled the dominance of the collectivity in the formation of Traditional 
Polishness, when looking at the role of the Catholic Church, and the cultural 
formations of gender and sexuality. Also various ways of producing Otherness in 
national discourses and practices were scrutinised. From the aggressive “outer 
Others” (Germany and Russia), through threatening “inner Others” (Jews), to 
Others as subject of conquer (neighbouring eastern borderlands, today’s 
Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine), to producing martyrological Other Self in the 
figure of Poland as the victimised Christ of Nations. I suggest that these figures 
may be of importance when analysing the relationship between national self and 
Otherness (especially homosexuality) after 1989. 
 It seems to me that the categories of memory, remembering, and forgetting 
play particular role in conceptualising the Polish nationhood. The operating 
mechanisms of national memory are not only visible at a macro level of e.g. 
Polish-Jewish relations (forgetting), but also at micro level of memory replication 
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(remembering). One of the most important sites of memory transmission is the 
institution of the (extended) family. It was this micro-location and diffusion of 
cultural values between three or more generations that played a crucial role in the 
formation of Polish cultural memory. Literary texts - a work of imagination, during 
123 years of political non-existence, became containers of memory, which were 
redistributed among family members, unfolding their extended conjugations, 
spreading in communities. But these works of Romantic imagination not only 
substituted for the lack of the “real”, they have actually become seen as “the real”. 
 So another conclusion about Polish nationhood we may draw is that as time 
goes by, and the boundaries between the discursive creation and material reality, 
between the imagined of the nation and the real of its state, get blurred and 
distorted; the past of the “real” and the present of the “imagined” become one in 
national memory. The performative technologies of nationhood produce their 
own aporias, making the object of national craving, the “real” of the nation, 
impossible to distinguish from the “imagined” of one’s own desire. 
Undistinguishable as triple siblings, national past, present, and future collapse 
into one, performative geo-temporal The Nation. It is the act when memory/past 
become hope/future. 
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Chapter 6 
State discourses 
The contemporary relation(ship)s between the discourses of nation and 
homosexuality are without doubt a manifold and complex. In the previous 
chapter I indicated the important role played by the nation-state and the role of 
Otherness in the historical and cultural formation of Polishness. Furthermore, the 
prevailing importance of the state in discussions about nationhood became 
apparent. But this national obsession with the state is hardly unique to Poland, 
since it is one of the major features of any national ideology (Breuilly 1993). A 
state is a spatially and geographically delimitated unit that actually, yet 
symbolically, demarcates the nation(s), providing boundaries, thus helping to 
constitute a national identity. In a sense, it could be said that a state is the 
materialisation of a nation, of the "imagined community" of "people". 
Consequently, "nation-state" is one of the most taken-for-granted compounds, 
suggesting an intrinsic connection between the two elements. Still, we should be 
reluctant in substituting one with another; since they are not synonymous, the 
presumed equivalency is more than problematic (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1989, 
3). 
 The main focus of this chapter is centred on the following question: How is 
homosexuality framed by national discourse, as performed by the nation-state? Of 
the plethora of examples that could be used to answer it, I have chosen (former 
president of Poland) Lech Kaczynski's National Address speech (17.03.2008) 
(Prezydent RP 2008), contextualised in resolutions of the Polish Sejm (lower 
chamber of the Parliament) (2003; 2006). The Sejm and the office of the president 
are two major state institutions, hence serve here as (non-exclusive) examples of 
state practices/discourses. It is noteworthy that the nation and the figure of the 
homosexual are mediated in these state discourses in tight relation to the 
European Union (EU). There may be several reasons for this. Firstly, because the 
EU is an institutional actor that plays a significant role in Polish international and 
domestic politics. Secondly, because although it operates on and through the state 
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level, it develops discursive practices and policies operating in the sphere of 
ideologies and values, hence necessarily impacting on the culture and sphere of 
the nationhood. Thirdly, because the EU specifically addresses issues of gender 
and (homo)sexuality in its politics that have a direct impact on the individual 
member-states. In the following paragraphs I will argue that homosexuality and 
nationhood are relational and co-dependant discourses almost to the point where 
one seems impossible without the other (Other). I stress the interplay of gender, 
maps, geography, and sovereignty as organising principles of this relation(ship). 
 6.1 Polish Parliament's resolutions from 2003 and 2006  
In recent Polish history, not only the year 1989 but also that of 2004 stand as 
significant. That 2004 year could be read as the final answer to the centuries-long 
national debate (and anxiety) shown in the previous chapter about Poland 
belonging to the “West” (or alternatively, the “East”). But at the moment of its 
inclusion into the “West”, the EU enlargement could also be read as problematic 
from the point of view of the newly "regained" state's sovereignty. It has to be 
remembered that since 1999, Poland as a so called “candidate country”, was 
obliged to adjust its laws to those set in EU’s Acquis Communautaire which 
represents a body of existing and constantly adjusting regulations, which set up 
the supposed core of the EU. As we can deduct from the following definition, its 
reach has the potential to go well beyond – and in many cases does go beyond - 
the sphere of international affairs, impacting on home affairs, social and cultural 
life. We read:  
 
Acquis communautaire: 
This is a French term meaning, essentially, 'the EU as it is' – in other words, 
the rights and obligations that EU countries share. The 'acquis' includes all 
the EU's treaties and laws, declarations and resolutions, international 
agreements on EU affairs and the judgments given by the Court of Justice. It 
also includes action that EU governments take together in the area of 'justice 
and home affairs' and on the Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
'Accepting the acquis' therefore means taking the EU as you find it. 
Candidate countries have to accept the 'acquis' before they can join the EU, 
and make EU law part of their own national legislationxiii. 
  
[Chapter 6 - State discourse] 
 
  
122 
 
Although it may seem that the EU stance on issues relating to national cultures 
and traditions is that of non-intervention, the picture is more complicated. For 
example, although EU regulatory bodies have no intention of regulating across all 
member states (e.g. women’s rights to safe and informed abortion), there are 
nevertheless certain policies that do intervene into national social values. For 
example, EU Directives on: equal treatment with the focus on gender 
(2006/54/EC), on the racial equality (2000/48/EC), and on equal treatment in 
employment and occupation, with a focus on religion, belief, sexuality, disability 
and age (2000/78/EC). In this light, it is perhaps not surprising that attitudes 
towards the EU in Poland, especially from the more conservative sides, have been 
mixed and sceptical (as they were and are in many other countries, of course). 
The 2003 Polish Sejm resolution "about the sovereignty of Polish law in the 
subject of morality and culture" is an example of just such uneasiness arising. The 
fact that it is probably the shortest ever parliamentary resolution - it consists only 
of one sentence - also highlights the importance of the fear and uncertainness 
experienced by Polish MPs, who felt the need to have such a resolution passed. It 
reads: 
 
Heading towards the integration with other European countries within 
the structures of the European Union, and in the face of the referendum 
about Polish membership in the Union, the Sejm of the Republic of 
Poland declares that Polish law concerning the moral order of the 
social life, the dignity of the family, marriage and upbringing, and the 
protection of life - is [and shall be] by no means restricted by the 
international regulations (Sejm RP 2003). 
 
In its declarative character, the resolution has no binding legal effects and remains 
a rhetorical tool. The pre-accession resolution tells us about the presence of the 
fear, a sense of possible clash and tensions, arising between the Polish (nation-) 
state and the supra-national organisation, in the matter of values and attitudes. 
Specifically, we learn that the "moral order of social life, the dignity of the family, 
marriage and upbringing, and the protection of life" might be under siege by the 
forces coming with, from, and as, the EU. To decode this bundle of references, 
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one needs to keep in mind a particular vocabulary developed in Poland, in 
relation to the body, sex, gender, and sexuality. This is the religiously influenced 
and morally charged language of "values", which according to many scholars was 
and continues to be one of the major obstacles in advancing certain gender-
related reforms and policies (Graff 2001; A.-M. C. Kramer 2003; Goscilo and 
Holmgren 2006). The early 1990s "abortion debate" that resulted in passing a very 
severe anti-abortion law in 1993 also shaped the public language in a distinct 
way. So in public debates the following words are veiled, or not seen to be in use: 
'pregnancy termination', 'abortion', 'foetus', 'sperm and egg', 'sexuality', 
'reproductive rights', or 'women'. Instead the expressions used were/are: 'killing 
of unborn children', 'genocide' and 'murdering the unborn'; 'unborn children'; 
'life'; 'creation of life'; 'motherhood'; 'blessed with a gift of giving life'/'mothers' 
vs. 'murderesses'. Such discourse is not only essentially and characteristically 
conservative, but it is virtually spread across the whole range of political 
ideologies, actors, and other instances, from Right to Left (Graff 2001; Kramer 
2003; Szczuka 2004). In such a context, the resolution's passage about the "moral 
order of social life, the dignity of the family, marriage and upbringing, and the 
protection of life" is in fact an expression of fear of non-Catholic/non-religious 
values and ethical orders, in particular of attitudes to homosexuality and same-sex 
relationships, as well as women's rights to reproductive control. 
 Additionally, Agnieszka Graff (2009), in her analysis of the major Polish 
weeklies from the period of around EU enlargement (Spring 2004), notices 
intensified "gender talk". She concludes:  
 
My argument about this material was that the conservative discourse 
about gender was linked to anxiety about national identity, an anxiety 
caused by the European Union accession. (…) I argue that the obsessive 
"gender talk" of this period is best understood as displaced narrative 
about national identity; an effort to contain ambivalence about change 
and construct a notion of Polishness stable enough to accommodate, or 
perhaps even outweigh, European Union accession (Graff 2009, 140–
141). 
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The 2003 Sejm's resolution is therefore an example of wider social, cultural and 
political anxieties about the "new era" in Polish history. Recalling arguments from 
the previous chapter, the significance of the historical, cultural, political, and 
geographical location "in-between" the "East" and the "West" as one of the major 
components of the Polish national mythology, the joining of a pan-European (but 
significantly “Western”), supranational organisation with a clear agenda of 
becoming (one of) the most powerful institutions in the contemporary world, must 
have necessarily given rise to anxieties. Interestingly, these anxieties about 
"sovereignty of the state and nation" are formulated around issues of bodies, 
gender, and sexuality, rather than, as one might expect, the military, economy, or 
governance. This of course provides further arguments suggesting that the process 
of "gendering the nation", outlined in the previous chapter, is not only 
symptomatic of the pre-1989 period in the Polish history, but also persists after 
that date. In this chapter, I want to argue that we can also observe a process of 
"sexualisation of the nation", and that "homosexuality" is becoming one of the key 
figures in the national imagination. 
 In the 2003 resolution, the sovereignty of the Polish state was expressed 
through its cultural and moral integrity, which would be one of continuing to 
express its difference and independence from the EU. Therefore, the state's 
sovereignty was articulated through categories of national culture and nationality 
rather than state institutions and citizenship. Here in the nation-state compound 
the nation is translated into and through the state, and where the state is identical 
with the nation. This is further observable in the Sejm's resolution from 
23.06.2006 - a direct response to the European Parliament's (EP) resolution about 
the "rise of racism and homophobia in Europe" (European Parliament 2006). One 
of the main aims of this resolution was to give attention to Poland and Polish state 
officials' practices of homophobia. The Polish state was severely criticised, and 
the resolution was widely discussed in the Polish media. 
 In the first paragraph, Sejm "expresses its indignation and outrage" at the EP 
resolution because of its "untrue and harmful accusations". In the second one, it is 
stated that Poland is concerned about intolerance, although "Poland expects 
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however that such activities [monitoring of intolerance] will include all examples 
of breaking human rights, including breaching the right to life, religious freedom, 
and public morality". In the next paragraph, "the instances of intolerance" are 
dismissed as "absolutely marginal", and the Polish Sejm describes the EP 
comparison between the "insignificant accidents of intolerance" in Poland and 
examples of "grave crimes and murders of a racist nature" from other EU countries 
as "a completly inadequate, and unjustifiable". In these first paragraphs the Polish 
Sejm invokes Poland as under attack, and discriminated against by the EP. In the 
next paragraphs, the Polish Sejm directly refers to an anti-Semitic incident with 
the Chief Rabbi of Poland (one of the examples used in the EP resolution), 
dismissing it as yet again “marginal”; and in the same paragraph also to the 
"homophobia", albeit in a rather bizarre way. The resolution states: "the Sejm of 
the Republic of Poland, while identifying with the Judeo-Christian moral heritage 
of Europe, cannot accept the use in the European Union documents of such 
terminology as <homophobia>". It is the only reference to the major EP critique 
towards Poland and the Polish government. It does not challenge EP 
"accusations", but only makes a vague remark about the use of vocabulary and 
religious tradition. It also seems rather odd: rather than directly rejecting 
homophobia as non-existent or marginal (as in the case of anti-Semitism or 
intolerance in general) the Polish Sejm refuses the vocabulary to talk about it, thus 
the very epistemological framing of “homophobia as the problem”. It is, as if the 
problem existed, but its conceptualisation and ethical valour was inappropriately 
given. However, since the Sejm devalues homosexuality, therefore the rejection of 
homophobia as vocabulary/ethical issue could be seen as even more profound act 
of rejection. There is not denial of the problems existence, because the very 
conditions of the problem and the definition of the problem is non-existent for the 
Polish MPs. Here, one could also wonder what it tells us about the role of 
homosexuality and homophobia in Polish culture, if they are not only denied, but 
somehow more profoundly denied their epistemological grounds of existence. 
Especially in comparison with intolerance and anti-Semitism, which are not 
subject to such practices (at least not in this particular document). Finally, the last 
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paragraph of the Sejm's resolution changes the tone of the document. It is 
highlighted that "Poland is traditionally a state that values and uses the idea of 
solidarity, protects the rights, and supports the development of all religious and 
national minorities". Hence, "[we] call upon the European Parliament to 
recognise, and to actively promote of the Polish tradition of tolerance and multi-
ethnicity, as a Polish contribution to the European catalogue of values" (Sejm RP 
2006). 
 As a result although the resolution is an official reply to the EP document it 
is not strictly formulated as such. It reads more like an expression of frustration 
voiced from the position of being under supposedly unjust attack. But such voiced 
sentiments are also markers of wider and perhaps deeper-rooted aggravation than 
dissatisfaction with just one document of the EP parliament. Taking into account 
the already mentioned Polish national obsession with its own position between 
the "East" and the "West" - I suggest that Polish resolutions could be an expression 
of national sentiments and reactions to on-going processes to the so-called "post-
communist transformation". The EP's discursive questioning of the Polish/Central 
and East European adherence to the EU-ropean standards of tolerance triggered 
the most brittle strings of the Polish national identity. That is - the anger at the 
“West” to once again deny Poland its belonging to the cultures of the Occident. 
But also, and much in contradiction to the previous one - the EU is eliciting fears 
of another subordination, of breaching the freshly "gained" independence of the 
Polish state and nation. 
 However, this Polish resolution is not only a reaction to the EP's 
proclamations, but a strategy for fighting over the definition of "Europe". This is 
rather ironic, given Polish anti-Semitism, and references to the Judeo-Christian 
heritage of Polish and European culture (i.e. evoking a religious and not secular 
catalogue of values) and seems, in my opinion, to be an act of fighting back for 
"our Europe", and a way of opposing the EU's hegemonic re-appropriation of 
"Europe" as a "Western” (secular) EU project. In doing so, it is necessary to recall 
again the myth of Polish Messianism, the Romantic idea of Poland as the "Christ 
of Nations", which I discussed in the previous chapter. Both resolutions attempt to 
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present Poland as a possible victim of imperialism, and make an effort to frame 
"the Polish tradition" as the Antemurale Christianitatis, another well-discussed 
trope of the Polish national megalomania (Miłosz 1983, 117). Doing so, however, 
is both an act of national importance, and also of European significance, since the 
battle is not only about the notion of Polishness, but also about that of 
Europeanness. The words of the last paragraph of the second resolution recalling 
Poland as "a state that values and uses the idea of solidarity, protects the rights, 
and supports the development of all religious and national minorities" is a 
reference to the popular idea in Poland of a "Golden Age of Polish Culture" (16th 
century), when Poland, compared to other European countries, was at the 
forefront of social tolerance to various minorities (Wyrozumski, Zgórniak, and 
Grodziski 1998). These references however, are evident more to a person 
familiarised to and schooled to the Polish educational curriculum and national 
myths, rather than to the intended addressee (European citizenry). Hence futile as 
they must necessarily be, they signal recurring tensions between the national and 
the supranational; the ambivalences of Poland and its situation in the new post-
1989 world of globalised “Western” liberal values, and its prospects for the future. 
Let me now move on to the second example - the President's National Address 
speech. 
 6.2 The Constitutive Other - Nation as an empty 
signifier in Lech Kaczynski’s National Address  
 
It is useful to begin with a brief outline of the political scene in the given time 
frame. In the period 2003-2008 covered by the analysis, two parliamentary 
elections were held, four governments were formed, and one presidential election 
occurred. In September 2005, Law And Justice (leaders: twin brothers Jaroslaw 
and Lech Kaczynski, forming government, conservative, Euro-sceptic, nationalist, 
outspokenly religious) and Civic Platform (leader: Donald Tusk, neoconservative, 
pro-European) won the most seats in the parliament. They did not manage to form 
a coalition and Law And Justice allied (in May 2006) with two smaller parties 
(Self-defence and League of Polish Families, both nationalist, populist, anti-EU, 
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but with significant 19,4% support). In October 2005, a month after parliamentary 
elections, Donald Tusk (Civic Platform) and Lech Kaczynski (Law And Justice) 
contended for the seat of the president. Although in the first round Tusk won over 
Kaczynski, in the final round, it was Kaczynski who won presidency, defeating 
Tusk once again. In July 2006 a third change of government occurred, and 
Jaroslaw Kaczynski became the PM, although he had declared previously that he 
would not take the seat should his brother win the presidency. In October 2007 (2 
years before the end of term of office) new elections were held as a response to 
parliamentary crisis. This time Civic Platform won with a significant increase in 
votes, and Donald Tusk became the PM. The League of Polish Families and Self-
Defence lost the most, not achieving the required min. 5% threshold to enter the 
Sejm.  
 
  6.2.1 Social imaginary - the myth of the nation  
In the first part of his National Address (17.03.2008), Lech Kaczynski builds a 
common referential ground, a mode of "imagining community", with which his 
audience could relate and identify. This is achieved by invoking the myth of a 
"Strong Independent Poland". First of all, Kaczynski calls for the image of a 
threatened, but eventually victorious, nation. In the first sentences he suggests that 
Poland was under pressure from more powerful countries within the EU, but 
thanks to the assertive, firm and tough attitude of the Polish government, Poland 
has succeeded in securing all that is good for the national legal reforms; reforms 
that could otherwise compromise and undermine the role and position of Poland 
in the EU. Although pressured to yield and submit to the will of other states, the 
Polish government achieved its goals, securing the independence of Poland. 
Then, the list of achievements is given: a voting system that gives more authority 
to the Polish vote; a stronger power of veto; the rule of “energy solidarity” 
between EU countries; and finally, the primacy of national law above the EU. The 
choice of examples not only illustrates the invoked imaginary, but also the actual 
visual and audio clips accompanying words in the opening part of the Kaczynski's 
speech follow the same narrative.  
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 The construction of the speech resembles that of news: a meticulously 
scripted and staged live show incorporating other pre-recorded material. Firstly, 
from the beginning we hear a well-known (at least for middle and older 
generations) leitmotiv from the 1970s Polish television series "Polskie Drogi" 
("Polish Roads"). The series is set in the late months of WWII and narrates stories 
of Polish soldiers and civilians fighting against Nazi troops. Secondly, the listing 
of Polish achievements is accompanied by clips: of president Kaczynski being 
congratulated by Angela Merkel, the Chancellor of German government; two 
officials trying to persuade Kaczynski to do something, and his sharp and decisive 
gesture of "No, I do not agree"; or a moment from the ceremonial photo shoot of 
the EU officials, after which one of them steps forward to Kaczynski and 
congratulates him. The audio-visual narrative, together with a spoken word, make 
a clear and unmistakable invocation of a well known trope in the Polish national 
imaginary, that of oppressed Poland fighting for independence. Plus, they 
introduce the image of the president and government as strong and unflinching 
instances of the national will. This is directly addressed in the next instance, when 
President Kaczynski states "[i]t pays to be unequivocal in the defence of the Polish 
interest". He then mentions 67 billion Euros as an important trophy, because 
"Poland is emerging from civilisation's collapse, after years of communism". Here 
again a note of victimhood is played out: the current weak position of Poland is 
the fault of "communism" (i.e. Russia and the “West”, and the post-WWII world 
order of Yalta agreements), hence successful EU negotiations, billions of Euros 
and good legal arrangements are becoming even more important, bringing added 
glory to the Polish president and government.  
 Overall, the opening part of the former president Kaczynski's National 
Address can be understood as building  "common ground" for and between the 
audiences. It invokes well-known tropes of the national ideology, re-imagines 
community, and re-establishes Polishness as a category "ponad 
podziałami"/"above divisions" - a category that presumably unites the  "imagined 
community" of Poles into the nation. This is the moment when the music fades 
away, and the second part of the speech commences. 
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 6.2.2 Strategies of equivalence - Germans and homosexuals 
In the second block of the speech, viewers are presented with a simplified yet 
menacing message: the EU can destroy Polish culture (thus the Polish nation) if 
special protective steps are not taken against such a threat. What is the secret 
weapon used to invoke fears of national destruction? A unique mixture of old and 
new reservations: the worst nightmare of "Traditional Polishness" - Germans, and 
an emerging "new" menace: homosexuals. All this is hidden under the cover of 
"human rights" as codified in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (2007). Let's 
unpack this. 
 Firstly, we note that by the end of the first part of the speech, the camera 
zooms into the figure of the president, visually making him more dominant in the 
frame. Then, we notice the music is silenced, so the words "But not everything in 
the EU must be good for Poland" sound more terrifying, forcing a spirit of 
importance and aggravation onto the viewers' reception of the speech. What 
follows, is a rather graphic (quite literally!) illustration and exemplification to the 
mindfully tactical tension built so far.  
 
According to experts, with unpredictable decisions of the European 
Tribunal of Justice, some regulations of the so-called Charter of the 
Fundamental Rights may lead to German claims against Polish citizens, 
demanding restitution or compensation for property [land] left in the 
northern and western territories, which were granted to Poland after the 
WWII. 
 
The first menace is Germans wanting to take over Polish lands. On the visual side, 
the spectator watches Angela Merkel chatting, and greeting (congratulating?) Erika 
Steinbach - the chair of the Federation of Expellees, the map of Germany from the 
1939, and finally, the bucolic, picturesque countryside, with lakes, trees, and 
greenery. It has to be explained that Erika Steinbach became a highly 
controversial figure in Poland (and Germany) for her work in the Federation of 
Expellees and insinuations that the post-war expulsion (or re-location, depending 
on the point of view) of Germans from the contemporary western and northern 
parts of Poland was at least questionable. This was instantaneously picked up by 
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the populist and nationalist groups and parties in Poland, feeding the old fears, 
and troubling already uneasy relations between the two countries (Puhl 2006; 
Crossland 2009; Donahue and Andrusz 2009; Deutsche Welle 2009).  
 The speech continues, and the second example of an "EU hazard" is given. 
In the frame we see Kaczynski again in a proud posture. The camera begins to 
zoom in as soon as he gives the second example. Again, in a close up and more 
dominant onscreen, the former president warns: 
 
Another article of the Charter, thanks to the lack of clear definition of 
marriage as a relation of man and woman, can threaten [literally: hit] 
Poland's widely accepted moral order, and force our country to 
introduce institutions contradicting the moral attitudes of the vast 
majority of the society.  
 
Interestingly, the words 'gay' or 'homosexuality' are not mentioned, only a vague 
reference to the 'institution' hostile to heteronormatively defined marriage is 
made. Instead, we see a clip presenting two men during their wedding ceremony. 
Images are more telling then words, and it seems that president's officers in the 
studio were very skilful in persuasion and manipulation, showing that verbal 
communication is only the tip of the iceberg, when it comes to effective ways of 
getting a message across.  
 Both examples maintain a certain degree of non-specificity and vagueness 
in the vocal narration of the president, in contrast with the chosen visual 
background, which is much more graphic or, as is said colloquially, "in your 
face". Both are explicitly framed as a "threat", perilous activities and stances not 
only passively undermining the "moral order" by presenting an alternative, but 
pro-actively destroying it, forcing itself upon society. There is a slight swing from 
the possible dormant threat signalled by the use of 'may' in the first case of 
"Germans partitioning Poland", to the more vigorous and forceful aggression 
suggested by the use of 'can', 'force', and 'hit' (in Polish) in the case of gay 
marriages. Such a swing in the passivity/activity of the agency of the Others 
should perhaps be connected to the opening words about "unpredictable ruling of 
the European Court of Justice". In May 2007 the Court ruled that the 2005 ban on 
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the Pride March in Warsaw (issued by Kaczynski himself, then Mayor of Warsaw) 
was illegal on three different grounds. The verdict was widely discussed in media, 
and most politicians read it along the same lines as the 2006 European 
Parliament's resolutions about homophobia - contesting it as an attack on Polish 
independence. Thus, the rather scornful remarks about "unpredictable ruling", "so-
called" Charter of Fundamental Rights from the president's speech are not empty 
adjectives, but echo the political disdain of EP resolutions, the Court's verdict, 
and discussions about the Lisbon Treaty, which span the period between 2006 
and 2008. 
 Both "dangers" (Germans and homosexuals) are of a radical Otherness, one 
totally incomprehensible within the national framework of "Polishness". They are 
external to the notion of Poland (spatially and culturally), and aggressively attack 
boundaries, forcing themselves on the (yet again victimised) Poland. Moreover, 
they are not only a representation of Otherness, but actually inhabit a place of 
annihilating negativity - a total opposition, anti-Poland. The figure of the "Anti-
Christ" that comes to mind is not totally out of place here, either. The 
martyrological thread in the national narrative, 19th century's "Poland as a Christ 
of Nations", or less blatantly formulated in the 2006 Sejm's resolution, "Judeo-
Christian tradition" as the rudiment of Polishness - open up the space to conceive 
of Germans and homosexuals as "Anti-Christ". Such an association is strengthened 
even more by the still strongly persistent association of "Germany" with "Nazism", 
and "homosexuals" with "death" (due to the assumed lack of the ability to 
procreate), and the strong position of the Catholic Church and its values in the 
Polish public-political sphere (and pope Jean Paul II's "civilisation of death" 
expression). References like this illustrate what Chantal Mouffe observes in 
contemporary politics in more general terms - a shift towards the register of 
"morality", "moralisation of politics". She writes: "[w]hat I want to indicate is that, 
instead of being constructed in political terms, the 'we'/'they' opposition 
constitutive of politics is now constructed according to moral categories of 'good' 
versus 'evil' (Mouffe 2005, 75). The negativity, nothingness of the 
'evil'/'Them'/Others is also an effect (and perhaps condition) of the strategy of 
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equivalence. Laclau and Mouffe conclude: “certain discursive forms, through 
equivalence, annul all positivity of the object and give a real existence to 
negativity as such. This impossibility of the real - negativity - has attained a form 
of presence" (2001, 128-129). In other words, it can be said that what unites 
elements under the equivalential umbrella of Otherness, is their 
negation/opposition to the discursive instance deploying the strategy of 
equivalence. There is nothing that the oppositional elements share among them, 
and the Nothing is the only "(some)thing" that they share (Torfing 1999, 124). 
 However, although it seems that in the dialectics of Self and Otherness, 
negativity is the feature of the latter, we should bear in mind that the Other is also 
an inevitable part of the Self. Indeed, it is argued that there would be no self 
without the Other (cf. Chapter 2). Hence negativity haunts the Self. In the case 
being analysed here, negativity troubles Polishness in its incarnations as “people”, 
as “nation”, as “state”. When Kaczynski invokes Germans and homosexuals as 
the aggressors and radical Other(ness) of the Polish nationhood, he also 
establishes the domain of sovereignty as the fragile point under their attack. Polish 
sovereignty depends upon the negativity of the Otherness, and hence may be read 
itself as the manifestation of Nothingness, or at least that is the conclusion that 
many contemporary philosophers have noticed and elaborated upon. 
 
Sovereignty is never given, as Bodin puts it, because of its ontological status 
– its being theological, and hence unfounded on any social practice or 
discursive justification. In other words, its ontological status is nothing. 
Sovereignty is nothing (Monagle and Vardoulakis 2010).  
 
The notions of sovereignty, and hence state, and nation (for each segment relies 
on the other and is partially defined by it), are performative and discursive 
practices, not "entities", "things", stable constructs as they are usually seen and in 
which form they attempt to present themselves. In this process of performative 
constitution of the national self, of attaining Polishness, Kaczynski is representing 
here one of the discourses of the nation, and uses the figure of the homosexual 
(via "Germany" - "traditional" incarnations of the Other in the Polish national 
narratives). It serves as a nodal point that fixes the national discourse in a 
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momentary and fragile, temporary and never fully sustainable, “flash of fullness”. 
It is attained through the emptying of the “nation” as floating signifier, with all its 
abundance of meanings, back to the status of "empty signifier". Then, it can be 
consigned with traditional references of the oppression and struggle for 
independence - to the "past". What happens (in the present tense) is the re-
enactment of the past for future purpose - the hegemony of nationhood. A 
delusionary process as it is, yet necessary, for all that exists only as long as it 
manifests itself in the processes of becoming and separating itself from the Other. 
 6.2.3 Constitutive outside  
One of the conclusions that the analysis above seems to suggest is that in 
contemporary Poland, national discourse relies (partially, but intensively) on the 
exclusion of the figure of the homosexual. The fourth and last element of the 
second part of the Kaczynski's speech (after warning, firstly of Germany, and then 
of homosexuals) introduces calm and relaxes the tension. Salvation is possible: 
"Thanks to the unequivocal attitude of our delegation, we succeeded in protecting 
[literally: saving] Poland from these dangers". The soothing audio leitmotiv 
appears anew, contributing to the idea of salvation and tranquillity after the 
stormy perspective. The president introduces the "British Protocol", an appendix 
to the Charter of the Fundamental Rights, which makes Poland (and the United 
Kingdom) exempt form the Charter's binding power. This protocol, as Anna 
Fatyga, a colleague of Kaczynski and Foreign Affairs MP who negotiated the 
Lisbon Treaty confirmed, shelters Poland from the menacing German expellees 
and the homosexuals in Kaczynski's speech (rp.pl 2007; Siedlecka 2007).  
 So far, the National Address of the former president is constructed in terms 
of a battle, a war even, between "good", National, Polish, and "evil", European 
forces. Each side is presented as an enemy and the antagonism seems irresolvable, 
since the two instances are polarised to their extremes, and no common ground is 
envisaged. Such discursive moves are perhaps one of the most basic practices 
observable in politics generally, according to Chantal Mouffe. The antagonistic 
conflict cannot be overcome nor addressed as long as it remains in the register of 
'antagonism' and not 'agonism'. She writes: 
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While antagonism is a we/they relation in which the two sides are 
enemies who do not share any common ground, agonism is a we/they 
relation where the conflicting parties, although acknowledging that 
there is no rational solution to their conflict, nevertheless recognize the 
legitimacy of their opponents. They are 'adversaries' not enemies 
(Mouffe 2005, 20). 
 
Germany, the "old" enemy in the "Traditional Polishness" narrative is coupled in 
the early 2000s with homosexuals, a "new" enemy. The representation of the 
social situation and advances onto the European arena are presented as a 
battleground because it helps, in my opinion, to re-constitute the notion of "here 
and now" of the national narrative. Finding known patterns and themes of victim, 
oppression, saviour, and victory in times of "transformation", dislocation and 
instability - helps to make sense of reality. Kaczynski's National Address attempts 
to re-establish (national) identities by unfolding strategies of equivalence: 
discursively re-creating the Other, which would re-constitute the boundaries of 
the nation after the moment of dislocation (1989). Importantly, it is no longer only 
the Other nation (Germany or Russia, or Jews) but the homosexual as the 
"constitutive outside", to use Laclau's terminology (Laclau 1990, 17; Torfing 1999, 
129). Equivalence operates on the basis of metonymical resemblance, by 
association. Wendy Brown (2009) underlines that metonymy is an indispensable 
element of nationalism, so what we observe in the Kaczynski's speech, is that it is 
the homosexual that is crucially contra-posed to the national, and metonymically 
framed as the contemporary Other of the Polish nationhood that emerges at the 
brink of the 21st century. 
 Homosexuality, I conclude, is a "constitutive outside" for the modern 
national imaginary in Poland. Torfing defines "constitutive outside" as "[a] radical 
otherness that, at the same time, constitutes and negates the limits and identity of 
the discursive formation from which it is excluded (…)" (Torfing 1999, 124; see 
also Mouffe 2005, 15). Constitutively outside, homosexuality, becomes an 
instance that can temporarily stabilise the meaning of nationhood (Polishness). 
However, as I have said, this is never a fully accomplished act, and can only be 
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envisaged as the process of fixing, establishing, holding, etc., always expressed in 
the grammatical form of a gerund. This performative aspect of the national and 
the homosexual identity location needs also to be discussed through the lenses of 
gender and spatiality, which have already been called upon, but not yet 
addressed in greater depth. 
 6.2.4 Locating our selves - maps and borders  
Spatial dimensions are often taken for granted, in the sense that geography and 
location are treated as "real" and not problematized as possible discursive 
formations (as are "sovereignty", "state", and "nation"). However, "boundaries", 
"liminality", "enclosure" and "openings", are categories asking for more scrutiny 
and attention. In Kaczynski's speech, the dialectics of we/they, here/there, 
inside/outside prompt us to think about place and location as crucial tropes in his 
presentation. So does the strategic use of maps as a visual prompt. While the first 
"danger" of losing land for the benefit of Germans is introduced, spectators are 
presented with a map of Europe form circa 1939. This not only helps to visualise 
the possible threat, but actually embodies the menace, mapping it out in the form 
of Nazism (for the map represents the Nazi Germany and illustrates its 
geopolitical aspirations). So Kaczynski not only brings flesh to the idea of the 
German threat, but is using it as a metaphorical representation of not only the 
"German threat", but a particular incarnation of it: Nazism. The map then 
becomes a tool in the warfare discourse of Kaczynski, a means of conveying 
messages, as much as forcing a particular political agenda.  
 Such exploitation of maps is not unusual though. In the Chapter 3 I have 
already pointed towards the post-colonial writers analysing the place of the map 
in the politics of nationalism and imperialism. Cartography has a long tradition of 
politically strategic deployment, among other methods of subjugation (e.g. Carter 
1989; Huggan 1989; Crosby 1995). However, mapping should not only be seen 
as compliant with oppression; it may serve as well as the site of opposition. 
Graham Huggan (1989) examines the work of many post-colonial writers to show 
how the map may be re-gained and then deconstructed, becoming a locus of 
resistance to imperial domination. The map from the Kaczynski's speech 
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visualises borders and boundaries, some of which after 2004 quite literally 
disappeared. The so-called "Schengen Agreements" (1985) regulate free 
movement within the most of the EU countries, effectively tearing down national 
borders. In the president's discursive creation, this is not however a fact worthy of 
celebration, but rather a significant reminder that with the EU there is nothing 
separating Germany and Poland. The EU is blurring already porous 
borders/boundaries between the two states even more. Kaczynski's insistence on 
mapped out borders shows how physical borders of fences, walls, check points, 
etc. are dependant on discursive (and thus, perhaps more elusive and harder to 
conceive as real) practises bringing boundaries into life. The discursive erection 
and maintenance of borders between 'good' and 'evil', Poland and Germany, and 
assumed heterosexuals and homosexuals, is an act of political governance 
organising social space according to a particular ideological perspective or 
apparatus, to use an Althusserian expression, which attempts to dominate the 
sphere of the universal signifier - the national. Kaczynski needs maps and 
boundaries to perform effectively the elimination of the "constitutive outside" 
(EU/Germany/homosexual), and finally - to gain some sense of national identity. 
Howeer, Wendy Brown in her recent book (2010) suggests that walls (for she is 
working on "walls" as symbolic and actual expression of states and sovereignty) 
project an image of the nation-state's sovereignty, which does not exist otherwise; 
walls stage sovereignty. She makes clear that this projection is not only performed 
for Others, outside the boundaries. Staging is also, if not at times especially, done 
for the people of the nation within those walls. In this sense, the use of the map 
by the former president in his speech is an act of such internal projection; maps, 
as walls, perform re-closure of the nation from within. 
 6.2.5 The enemy within  
Thinking about the dialectics of inside/outside, us/them - we also have to ponder 
the possibility of the (already) existing threat within the bordered 'us' territory, not 
only the external Others. The figure of the "enemy within" is as "popular" as its 
brotherly equivalent, the "enemy outside" in national discourses. In the history of 
the narration of the Polish nationhood, such an "enemy within" position has often 
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hitherto been occupied by Jews, as I demonstrated in the previous chapter. Since 
the end of WWII and the communist pogroms in 1968, the Jewish minority in 
Poland has existed only as a tiny fraction of the population. What seems to be 
happening at the beginning of the 21st century, is the national imposition of the 
figure of the homosexual (as a modern-day "enemy within". Perhaps because of 
this shared “location” some critics imply that we can draw parallels between 
homophobia and anti-Semitism in Poland (Umińska 2006; Ostolski 2007; Graff 
2008). However, can such parallels be drawn between Jews and sexual minorities 
simply because both are constructed as "enemies within"? There are other possible 
links worth exploring, e.g. xenophobic discourses have often linked "sexual 
deviancy" with Jewishness, and effeminacy with Jewish manhood (Boyarin 1997). 
And still we should be cautious of drawing too easy equations between the two 
related, no doubt, yet surely different, social phenomena. 
 The figure of the "enemy within" is introduced in the Kaczynski's speech as 
the third component. After the soothing information about securing the national 
interests by signing the "British Protocol" (end of the second part), the former 
president returns to his alarmist tone. Although the document would stabilise and 
enforce the position of Poland in Europe, the "current government" (that of Civic 
Platform that came to power after the defeat of Law And Justice) extremely quickly 
("a week later") expressed the will to opt-out of the "British Protocol" and sign the 
Lisbon Treaty unconditionally. This treasonous act of acceding the nation to the 
evil forces of the EU cannot be accepted and easily swallowed by the president. 
As a head of the state, securing its sovereignty and independence, he needs to act, 
to strike back against the act of treason. He implies that giving up on the "British 
Protocol" is an act of yielding on the vital interests of the nation. It is to be 
defeated in this warfare of the Polishness and the EU-ropean. "The current 
government's" decision is a sign of its weakness, but also of the clout and strength 
of the threatening powers. Unintentionally, Kaczynski confirms that the national 
discourse can never be secure of itself, that the Other will always be a menacing 
presence on the national horizon. Moreover, the menace of the EU, coming from 
the outside has already found its accomplices within the body of the nation - the 
  
[Chapter 6 - State discourse] 
 
  
139 
nation is already contaminated, driven by the disease of homosexuality. And it 
must be a powerful one, since it reaches the highest state officials - the 
government. 
 What we see in the third part of the speech is the return to the defensive 
positions in the national narrative, and pluralisation of "dangers" located on the 
both sides of the imagined borders. (In itself, another example of permanent 
permeability of borders, unconsciously and unwillingly slipping over the 
discursive practices that claim otherwise.) Homosexuality, since it is not 
geographically bound (as "Germany" or the "EU") is largely metaphorical, but can 
also be seen as a very real agent operating across the boundaries, one that cannot 
be confined and enclosed by the physical borders; it is the syndrome, cause, and 
effect of the borderlessness in which the nationhood is diluting itself. Hence the 
former president's attempts at recreating and re-establishing boundaries that 
would constitute the identity of the national and the Other selves. However, it 
seems that the very logic of dialectical opposition that polarises and is meant to 
crystallise those identities, is also the very logic of the impossibility of pure 
identity and opposition. The limits of the discursive invocations, physical and 
geographical demarcations are porous and unachievable, yet necessary for they 
form the imaginary object of desire and constant struggle for - a goal that spins the 
perpetual machinery of identifications and locations, of "East" and "West", of 
nationhood, and the construction of homosexuality, Poland and the EU. 
 6.2.6 Gender in the narrative  
Another interesting factor in the relation between the discourse of the national 
and the homosexual in Kaczynski's National Address is gender. I have suggested 
before that the framing of the homosexual threat points slightly more towards an 
aggressive rather than a passive one. The “homosexual agenda” (fully 
apprehended only once the "enemy within" is captured and the full extent of this 
danger realised) is forceful, dominant, and political. Poland, on the other hand, is 
feminised: passive and penetrated, waiting for the third actor in this scene - the 
President embodying the national virtues of strength, free will, decisiveness, 
bravery and assertiveness. A masculine saviour of the feminised dignity comes 
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again towards the end of the speech. After the last threat of the "treacherous 
insider", the President as The Saviour comes again to calm down the national 
anxiety. In a vague remark about the "presidential initiative of a special bill" 
Kaczynski once again will save Poland from the perils and dangers of all evil 
Others. It is almost as if the homosexuality with its foreign and unacceptable ("for 
the vast majority of society") agenda of "institutions" threatening "moral order" was 
forcing itself on Poland. As I have written in Chapter 5, the rape of Poland was a 
popular visual representation of the Polish situation during the 19th and early 
20th centuries. But I have also suggested that the national menagerie was already 
a little queer. Also here, should we ease the harness of our imagination, the 
speech could be said to be rather queer: a straight man's fantasy (the national 
discourse) about gay men (the homosexual subject) raping an innocent woman 
(Poland). The construction of the president's speech flows with meanings, 
symptoms and signifiers that were not intended or anticipated; they abandon their 
creator's intentions and flow into rather unforeseeable (for originators) directions 
(where scholars of gender, sexuality and nationalism welcome them on the shores 
of academia). 
 In this context, reflecting on gender feeds well into the discussion about 
the state and the society between liberal and conservative ideologies. If liberals 
see society as a collective of individuals, conservative and communitarian 
perspectives stress the idea of "organicism" (Heywood 2003). Society and nation 
are perceived as one body, an organism, and not a mere grouping of independent 
parts. Hence perhaps strong opposition to what is deemed a "disease", a malady, 
"evil" - once the disease enters the body, it affects everything, it spreads and 
cannot be easily contained. Thus perhaps the "enemy within" may be seen as 
more dangerous than the danger outside.  
 6.3 Conclusions  
In this chapter, I have focused the analysis on the former president Lech 
Kaczynski's National Address, contextualised in two of the Polish Sejm's 
resolutions. In Kaczynski's speech, a process of re-creating identities emerged as 
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an important discursive practice. The dynamic between the national discourse 
and the constructed homosexual figure is meditated by the set of other categories, 
like state ("Germany", "EU", "Poland"), geography ("Western Europe", "CEE"), 
history and culture ("East" and "West"). I have found an inspiration to my analysis 
in the conceptual framework found in Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe's 
discourse theory (discussed in greater extent in Chapter 2), and in a more indirect 
way, building upon concepts of power and narration found in the writings of 
Michel Foucault and Homi Bhabha, previously referred to in the Chapter 2 and 3. 
 Anne Marie Smith (1994) in her book about New Right discourses of race 
and homosexuality uses Derridean concept of the "supplement" to argue that 
national identity is a relational category of Self and the Other. I concur with 
Smith, and want to use her argumentation as my concluding coda; homosexuality 
in the Polish Sejm's resolutions and Kaczynski's speech, functions as a 
"supplement" to the "norm". Smith writes that  
 
[t]he 'norm' appears to have been there first, as the natural space, and 
homosexuality appears to have come later, as that which essentially 
wants to contaminate the natural space from the outside. It is of course 
only with the invader figure that the 'norm' takes on this appearance. 
The threat of the supplementary outside is re-worked to produce that 
which it could otherwise interrupt, the sense that the 'norm' is an 
absolutely primary, complete and self-contained space (Smith 1994, 
198). 
 
The supplement (the figure of the homosexual from the Kaczynski's speech) is 
what is needed to constitute the desired fullness (the nationhood), and at the same 
time, is what prohibits the fullness (of the nation) from becoming. In the analysed 
discourses of the Polish Sejm and former president Kaczynski, borders and 
boundaries played a significant role, as tools and strategies of securing identities. 
However, such "walling" of inside Self, against the Other outside, functions more 
like a mirror and remainder, rather than an act of disposal. The discourses of 
nation and homosexuality, more than anything else, are inevitable and haunting 
mirror images of each other; the Double. 
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This turns the familiar two-faced god into a figure of prodigious 
doubling that investigates the nation-space in the process of the 
articulation of elements: where meanings may be partial because they 
are in medias res; and history may be half-made because it is in the 
process of being made; and the image of cultural authority may be 
ambivalent because it is caught, certainly, in the act of 'composing' its 
powerful image (Bhabha 1990b, 3). 
 
"Polishness" as a certain set of identity-oriented factors and conditions, may only 
exist as a "process towards" itself (that is "Free Poland"), since the achievement of 
its fullness is the Impossible: aporia, a self-mutilation. Therefore, after 1989, and 
especially after 2004, the relations between Poland and the European Union are 
sites where we can observe the discursive re-formulations of meanings, priorities, 
and signifiers. 
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Chapter 7 
Attachment and belonging 
 
On the 10th of April 2010, on the way to Katyn (Russia), for an official Polish-
Russian state event to commemorate victims of the Stalinist regime, nearly 100 
people died when a Polish government plane carrying the Polish state 
representatives crashed. Amongst the dead - which included current and former 
politicians, army officers, and church officials - was the president of Poland, Lech 
Kaczynski. For the next seven days of proclaimed national mourning, all sporting, 
entertainment, cultural, academic and other types of events and activities were 
suspended. Media outlets only broadcasted information about the tragedy, or 
commemorative programmes about the deceased. Internet sites changed their 
graphics into monochromatic black and white templates. Schools shut down, 
additional church ceremonies were held, and people kneeled and prayed in the 
streets. The circumstances of the tragedy also added to the impact: the plane was 
on its way to memorial ceremonies in Katyn, where, during the Stalinist regime, 
the elite of the Polish army was mass murdered by the USSR's secret service. 
"Katyn" became the symbol of Russian oppression of Poland, and although the 
"old theme" of accusing Russians of evil plans against Poland (so well preserved in 
the discourse of Polish nationhood) was not directly spelled out (at least not yet at 
the time), the national myth of martyrological victimhood was explicitly and 
implicitly present. Additionally, many other issues and problems related to what I 
have called "Traditional Polishness" were mobilised during that time; all of them 
pointing towards concepts of “mourning” and “belonging” (and other related 
notions of "melancholia", "fantasy", and "attachment"). 
 Everyone, willingly or not, one way or another, was affected. In all this, 
something triggered my curiosity: would lesbian and gay people mourn this tragic 
death of the president as well? After all, he was publicly and outspokenly 
homophobic politician. He was the one who, as the Mayor of Warsaw, forbade 
two Pride marches in Warsaw (2004 and 2005); indeed, as we saw he actively 
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played this card in his successful presidential campaign. Later, as the president of 
Poland he made numerous public statements of a homophobic nature (The Irish 
Independent 2007; cf. also Chapter 6). Taking this into account, perhaps one 
would not expect much grief within the lesbian and gay community after the 
death of "their leader". However, what I observed on all major lesbian and gay 
websites, was exactly the opposite - not only active participation in the acts of 
mourning, but also a heated debate about whether "to mourn or not to mourn" 
(with a clear tendency towards mourning). Here, one needs to add and remember 
that the political elite on the plane, although mostly of the conservative 
provenance, still, included representatives of the whole political spectrum, 
including Izabela Jaruga-Nowacka, a former Plenipotentiary For the Equal Status 
of Women and Men, who was well known in the lesbian and gay community for 
her supportive work in the area of anti-discrimination. However, the discussions 
over “strategic mourning” were clearly to do with the political elite in general, 
and president Kaczynski in particular. 
 This presented me with another case for the relations between the discourses 
of nationhood and homosexuality in Poland in the last decade. Therefore, the 
questions around which this chapter revolves are ‘why do homosexual subjects 
mourn a homophobic president?’ and ‘What does it mean to mourn one's 
"enemy"?’ Since these questions relate to, a situation of trauma, memory, 
attachments, forgetfulness, and the work of mourning, I start my analysis by 
discussing the concept of ‘melancholia’.  
 Melancholia as concept has a long and diverse history, and there are 
numerous works on the subject (e.g. Freud 1957; Freud 2006; Benjamin 1974; 
Kristeva 1989; Butler 1995; Kear and Steinberg 1999; Zizek 2000; Derrida 2001; 
Pensky 2001; Eng and Kazanjian 2003; J. M. Jackson 2008). My explorations here 
have been much encouraged by Eng and Kazanjian’s (2003, 5) statement that: 
 
while the twentieth century resounds with catastrophic losses of bodies, 
spaces, and ideals, psychic and material practices of loss and its remains are 
productive for history and for politics. Avowals of and attachments to loss 
can produce a world of remains as a world of new representations and 
alternative meanings.  
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One of the most significant theories came from Freud in his seminal essay of 
1917, “Mourning and Melancholia” (2006), wehre he looks at two interrelated 
psychic conditions of mourning and melancholia. He defines the former as “the 
reaction to the loss of a beloved person or an abstraction taking the place of the 
person, such as fatherland, freedom, an ideal and so on” (2006, 712). Due to the 
loss in normal mourning, Freud suggests that there is a constant, if slow and 
prolonged, withdrawal of the libidinal investment of the ego in the lost object. 
When the work of mourning is done, the ego is free and invests its desire in 
another object. Melancholia, on the other hand, could be said to be “mourning 
without an end”, when the issue of loss remains unresolved. Freud writes: 
 
[In case of melancholia], it may be possible to recognize that the loss is 
more notional in nature. The object may not really have died, for example, 
but may instead have been lost as a love-object (as, for example, in the case 
of an abandoned bride). In yet other cases we think that we should cling to 
our assumption of such a loss, but it is difficult to see what has been lost, so 
we may rather assume that the patient cannot consciously grasp what he has 
lost. Indeed, this might also be the case when the loss that is the cause of the 
melancholia is known to the subject, when he knows who it is, but not what 
it is about that person that he has lost (Freud 2006, 715). 
 
In the melancholic case, the withdrawal is suspended, and the free libido is 
transposed into the ego itself,  
 
But it did not find any application there, but served to produce an 
identification of the ego with the abandoned object. In this way the shadow 
of the object fell upon the ego, which could now be condemned by a 
particular agency as an object, as the abandoned object. Thus the loss of 
object had been transformed into a loss of ego, and the conflict between the 
ego and the beloved person into a dichotomy between ego-criticism and the 
ego as modified by identification (Freud 2006, 725). 
 
However, Freud would later shift his view a little, suggesting in 1923’s “The Ego 
and the Id” essay on the formation of the ego that the ego always has its roots in 
loss, and melancholic identification. Ego is built on the scattered elemetns of the 
object-cathexes of the previous investemetns, now abandonded. In a way, the ego 
is thus a carrier of the losses accreted over the lifetime of the subject. This is 
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influential framing that has impacted e.g. wrtings of Eng and Kazanjian (2003) and 
Judiht Butler in e.g. “The Psychic Life of Power” (1997), and thus wider field of 
critical studies and also this research. Ineed, Butler goes as far as to claim that the 
melancholia not only contributes to the formation of ego, as Freud wants it, but is 
the very condition of ego and the related topography of mind. So we see in Freud 
the melancholic subject develops an ambivalent love-hate relationship between 
the self and the loved object. 
 Freud’s coneptualisaiton of mourning and melancholia, of detachment and 
ever lasting atachemnt has proved incredibly nourishing for generations of 
psychoteraputists and psychoanlitical theorists. As an important essay on the 
subject and the object relations and the fomation of the identity, “Mourning and 
Melancholia” is thus one of the constitutive essays in the history of 
psychoanalysis. Although crucial for the development of clinical and 
psychothearputetic practices, the essay has also inspired many critical thinkers 
who productively transpose the psychonalitical thoeries of Freud onto the realm 
of culturl studies. Here, I find main inspiration coming from the work of Eng 
(1999; 2000), Gilroy (2004), Akcan (2005), and Khanna (2006), who 
operationalise the for-mentioned categories as cultural interpretative codes, or 
interdisciplinary tools of cultural analysis, rather than relying upon strictly 
psychoanalytical or psychotherapeutic understandings. 
 How to reconfigure the individual-focused pshcyhoalitical theory of Freud, 
to fit the purpose of group and society-based analysis? For me, it is possible to do 
so thanks to the structures of subject-object idenitifications underlying both 
processes of mourning and melancholia; structures that are not only typical for 
the individual, but also group identity constitution. In particular I see this in the 
melancholic nature of ego’s attachment to the one that is lost - a relation that 
resembles the relation between the Self and the Other, always foregrounding 
issues of identification (formation of identity) (cf. Chapter 2). In Freueds theory of 
melancholia the libido is withdrawn from the love-object, but since the object is 
not proclaimed dead, the ego does not recognise the loss - the libido is being 
transposed onto the ego. It seems worth noticing for my purpose and argument 
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that the love-object (that was in actuality lost) which is ultimately the Other, and 
ego (the Self) are therefore equalised in this libidinal economy of melancholic 
non-recognition of the loss. They are mapped out one on the another. 
 Let me rephrase for a better understanding of the process. Otherness 
(libidinal investment) is withdrawn from the Other (the love-object) and 
incorporated by/into the Self (ego). There, it will eventually create ambiguity and 
lead to a schism of ego’s self-depreciation, self-criticism, perhaps even self-
hatered. This hate is directed at the Other (love-object) that is no more, but which 
is now inside the Self (ego) itself. Thus, the melancholic “never letting go” is 
indeed not only a condition of ego formation, as Freud and others afater him 
would have it; but I would argue that perhaps we could even eliberate that it is an 
act of constituting the-Self-as-the-Other. Ambivalent and troublesome as it may 
be, the relation is not recognised by the Self (ego) (melancholic refusal to let go 
and invest its own libidinal energy elsewhere). My point is that the Other is being 
framed as the one from without, not within. And it is in this dynamic between the 
Self and the Other - or rather Self-as-the-Other - that is intertwined with the 
melancholic attachment, where identification/identity formation takes place (cf. 
Chapter 2, and the analysis in the previous chapter). Could this be one of the 
possible bases for the homoerotic and homophobic tensions discussed in the case 
of nationhood and homosociality (Chapter 4) and here in the section 7.2.4? 
! *** 
From here on in as the chapter unfolds, I draw on the work already touched on 
whilst also engaging with more recent cultural explorations of ‘mourning’ and 
‘melancholia’, to argue that the homosexual subject’s practices of mourning are 
more complexly subversive than regressive, becoming sites of "reconciliation" 
where the two supposedly exclusive identity positions of "gayness" and 
"Polishness" are expressed simultaneously. I further argue for the use of 
identification rather than identity in the explorations of the discourses of 
nationhood and homosexuality since it helps avoiding the trap of exclusionary 
subject positioning. And finally, I also want to suggest that melancholic 
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attachment to the idea of a "Free Poland", as an element of the "Polish 
melancholic nationalism" (Ziarek 2007), may also be one of the driving forces 
behind LGBT activism in Poland. In this, I remain inspired by the work of Diana 
Taylor (1999) who analysed the ethnic minority responses and participation in the 
UK national (indeed, supra-national and globalised) bereavement after the tragic 
death of Diana, former Princess of Wales, in 1997: 
 
Is it so strange that we may want to act in a dream that we know full well is 
not our own? If we must engage, as it seems we must, these muralists show 
that people will establish the terms of conversation. Rather than constitute 
one more space for a downloading of the global, it opens one more strategic 
site for the negotiation of the local (Taylor 1999, 206). 
  
  
[Chapter 7 - Attachment and belonging] 
 
  
149 
7.1 Polish Melancholic Nationalism  
Ewa Plonowska Ziarek, in her interesting article "Melancholic Nationalism and the 
Pathologies of Commemorating the Holocaust in Poland" (2007), undertook the 
task of analysing Polish - Jewish relations through the prism of Polish nationhood, 
which, in turn, she analyses through melancholia. She tries to apprehend the 
obsession with national suffering in narratives of Polish nationhood, especially in 
light of the post-1989 regained independence. This, she insists, is a key element 
to understand Polish inability to come to terms with its own dark history of anti-
Semitism. She writes:  
 
Ultimately, to explain and to challenge this deeply entrenched national ideal 
of innocent suffering, we have to account for the transformation of the 
traumatic events of Polish history into an unconscious collective fantasy and 
for the enjoyment this fantasy provides. And such an analysis of the 
political/historical role of collective fantasy indeed calls for psychoanalysis 
(…) (Ziarek 2007, 314). 
 
The author then goes on to develop and expound her argument about 
melancholic nationalism in Poland. I concur with her reasoning and take as the 
base line of my further argument that Polish attachment to the idea of "Free 
Poland", and the historical partition and political non-existence throughout the 
19th century (followed by periods of WWII and communism) enable us to see 
Polish nationhood as a form of melancholic "never letting go" attachment. She 
insists on the pathological nature of melancholia, and in the unresolved issues of 
melancholic attachment she sees the roots of Polish anti-Semitism and deeply 
troubled relations with the Jewish minority. Therefore, in sombre, yet strikingly 
accurate words, Plonowska Ziarek summarises Polish melancholic nationalism as 
follows: 
 
In its darkest manifestations, the narcissistic regression of national 
melancholia obliterates the rights and the suffering of the Other; its 
religious alibi of innocence makes it impossible to acknowledge any 
wrongdoing and this protects it from any internal and external criticism; 
its sadism makes it prone to explosions of violence; and finally its alibi 
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of existence reinforces time and again passionate attachments to the 
sacrificial fantasy despite all critical attempts to dispel it (Ziarek 2007, 
318). 
 
Building upon her argument, together with the previous observation about the 
necessity of melancholia for the foundation of the ego (and Self-as-the-Other), I 
will suggest that not only is Polish nationhood melancholic (with all the baggage 
of unresolved problems Plonowska shows), but also that it is precisely in this 
sense of loss and its transformation into identification that Polish nationhood is 
born. David Eng (1999) wrote about Hong Kong:  
 
[P]ostcolonial Hong Kong subjectivity might be said to emerge 
precisely at the moment - 1997 - that the colony is lost. (…) [If] Hong 
Kong appears as an object at the moment of its forfeiture then it is a 
melancholic object par excellence - one that is produced only through 
this framing of loss (Eng 1999, 142).  
 
Using Eng’s line of argumentation may be useful and inspirational in thinking 
through the Polish case. We could say that Polish national subjectivity could 
emerge only when “Poland” was lost in 1795 in its final partition between 
Russian, Prussian, and Austrian empires (that continued for the next 123 years) (cf. 
Chapter 5). In the situation where a people's relation with their country or state is 
interrupted by a neighbouring country's partitioning and colonisation, the object-
relation of the people with that country or state is transformed into an attachment 
to the idea of the lost community. This is the moment when state, country, 
“Poland” becomes a community, “imagined community” to use the Anderson’s 
term. This is also where and when “People” come to occupy more significant 
roles in the formation of the “national” – something that is particularly important 
for contemporary narrations of nationhood (cf. Chapter 3, especially Bhabha). The 
lost object ("Free Poland") is incorporated into the group self with which the 
subject (the people) begins to identify as a "community" (multiply individual 
identifications with one object): "Polish Nation". In other words lost statehood and 
sovereignty gave rise to the national subjectivity. And we can say that this 
transformation of loss into subjectivity is melancholic, because it is fixed on the 
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idea of “Free Poland” as something, as an object that can (arguably) exist 
“objectively” beyond the imagination of a community. In the same time, it 
becomes a pure fantasy, an image of something that we are not ready to let go. 
And indeed, the image of something (the memory of a “Free Poland”) that is being 
kept alive as the signifier of some supposed “objective reality”, turns out to be a 
mere anything that is just an image, a projection of the imagination. This 
resonates with Ernest Gellner’s claim that nationalisms came before the nations 
(cf. Chapter 3). The national invocation is what calls a nation into being/existence 
and, necessarily fixed on the idea of “Free Poland”, cannot let it go. Nationalism 
becomes a form of melancholic attachment, because it cannot detach itself from 
this idea, since in doing so there would be a disavowal of constitutive grounds for 
the emerging national identity (nationhood). This is much along the lines of Freud, 
Butler, and Eng & Kazanjian that were discussed in the previous section, all 
arguing that melancholic attachment was a significant constitutive element of ego 
formation. Building on their arguments, I suggest (and this is further explored 
throughout the capter) that the process of Polish nationhood’s formation is 
eventually also the process of creating the subjectivity of the Other (also as in the 
Self-as-the-Other). Ultimately, in each of these Others can be found debris of the 
national self since the Other is reflection (albeit altered) of the self. 
 Fast forward to 1989, when the situation has completely changed and 
Poland has "regained" its "freedom" from the overpowering Soviet Union. Here is 
the situation when those constitutive elements (lost statehood) for the emergence 
and sustainability of national subjectivity as an (imagined) community, cease. In 
the epiphany of the sovereign Polish state, paradoxically, is the end of the Polish 
national identity. It is so, because when “Free Poland” as an object of 
melancholic attachment is not even proclaimed dead in the accomplishment of 
the work of mourning, but is instead reincarnated anew as an independent state, 
there is no more attachment, no more longing, and no more loss; can Polishness 
exist without the loss? 
 Referring back to the previous chapter where I made observations about the 
relations between the discourses of nationhood and homosexuality, I suggest that 
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what happened in Poland after 1989 can be understood with the help of writers 
working in the area of post-colonial theory. Here I find Paul Gilroy especially 
useful. In “After Empire: Melancholia or Convivial Culture?” (2004) he argues that 
the British Empire served as a rudimental matrix for the modern Britishness. The 
collapse, “loss of empire”, effectively meant loss of certainty about what 
constitutes British national and racial boundaries, previously provided by the 
colonial discursive framework. As a reaction to this “loss”, Gilroy suggests, there 
is a process where melancholic attachment builds.; the attachment is not to the 
empire per se, but to the very idea of the lost empire (Gilroy 2004, 116).  
 In the case of post-1989 Poland, I similarly suggest that there is a shift in the 
form and object of the melancholic attachment, form the actuality of “oppression” 
and “fight for Freedom” (before 1989), to the idea of Poland not being sovereign 
(after 1989). In response to the actuality of the Polish state regaining its 
independence, a re-conceptualisation of “oppression” has occurred in the 
discourse of nationhood. Therefore I argue that post-1989 attachment is not 
located in the “sovereign Polish state”, but in the “Free Poland” re-conceptualised 
as tradition, customs, social order, culture, and so on - that is the “imagined 
community” of Polish people. In other words, it is the past to which the national 
discourse clings in order to find a sense of security and stability in the new post-
communist reality. I highlighted this in the previous chapter by analysing Sejm’s 
resolution and president Kaczynski’s National Address speech. There, the figure of 
the homosexual is meticulously framed as the Other from without nation-state’s 
borders, threatening the “moral order accepted by the majority of society” (to use 
his words) within the confines of Polish nationhood. So Polish nationhood, rather 
than dispersing itself in the epiphany of the free Polish state, “redefined” its 
melancholic attachment; it still is about the fight for “Free Poland”, but this is now 
realised not in the actuality of the lost sovereignty of the state, but in the idea of 
cultural oppression of the nation. As we saw in Chapter 6, the oppressive Other is 
framed as the “European Union” and “homosexuals” (with a traditionally 
“special” place reserved for “Germans”… as usually).  
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 At the end of this section, I suggest another twist in the post-1989 
melancholic identification, now on the side of the homosexual subject. Due to 
generational differences and the experiences of people and social institutions 
shaping discourses of nation and homosexuality, the homosexual subject 
sustained the attachment to the idea of "Free Poland" yet with another referent. 
Rather than seeing Poland as enslaved by Others (the older generation's point of 
reference in the struggle for freedom before 1989), or how it reworked into 
attachment to the idea of Poland being threatened by the new Others (after 1989), 
for the homosexual subject it is nationhood that is seen as oppressive. If the 
traditional and more recent national rhetoric of nationhood remains fixed on the 
"negative" idea of a Poland free from domineering Others, then for the gay and 
lesbian community (younger people brought up under the post-1989 reality of 
capitalist liberal democracy)xiv the "positive" idea of a Poland in which one is free 
to practice self-expression is pursued instead. 
7.2 Homo-grief after the enemy:  When gays and 
lesbians mourn President Kaczynski…  
If, as Tom Boellstroff writes…  
 
[t]he question of belonging is central to the experience of being gay or lesbi, 
[then] [t]hese concepts are self-evidently not from tradition, family, or 
ethnolocality; yet they are experienced as both intimate aspects of selfhood 
and national phenomena (Boellstroff 2005, 202).  
 
…then belonging, thus, is a more fundamental issue in the relations between the 
nation and homosexuality. The main argument I want to pursue in this chapter is 
that when the Polish lesbian and gay community actively participated in (and 
advocated for) the national rituals of mourning after the death of the political elite 
and (homophobic) President Kaczynski, they were performing an act of 
(self)inclusion into the national community, from which they are normally 
discursively excluded as Others. This, however, suggests the possibility of certain 
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ambivalences as the consequence of this melancholic identification, tensions 
within the Self-as-the-Other. 
 And it is perhaps the ambivalence of all relations that should become a focal 
point in this paragraph about belonging. Even more so, if we are considering the 
uneasy (and truly "love/hate") relationship between homosexual subject and 
Polishness. As mentioned above, the homosexual subjects’ attachment to the idea 
of "Free Poland" remains within the framework of the Polish national melancholic 
attachment (but is not limited to it, as I will show below). The ambivalences 
arising in the Self (ego) as a consequence of identification with the Other (love-
object) due to the relocation of the libidinal desire, produce self-depreciation and 
hate, but also masochistic pleasure. This tension of the Self-as-the-Other may be 
exemplified by the troubled relations with the "West" and the "East" in the Polish 
nationhood’s history. The psychic process of an ego impoverishment resulting in 
self-deprecation is transformed into attitudes towards the "West" and the "East" - 
two constitutive element of Polishness (cf. Chapter 5). The "West" is idealised, and 
thus a sense of inferiority is developed; yet, conversely, as a counter affect, a 
sense of the Polish superiority towards the "East" is established (Szrett 1990; 
Walicki 1994a). These perceptions do not, however, need to correspond with 
how Poland is perceived by/in the Orient and the Occident; as a consequence, 
ambivalences in the identity formation may arise. This dialectic is also deployed, 
for example, by LGBT activist discourses in which the "West/Europe/EU" is 
presented as the desired state (Krzemiński 2009, 92); and "traditional Polishness" 
is seen as backward obstacle and source of discrimination (Jozko 2009, 107–111). 
However, in the case of LGBT discourses, the ambivalence of "in-betweens" is not 
an affect of the appropriation of the lost object by the emerging (melancholic) 
national self. It has to do with a troubled and troublesome relation of the 
homosexual subjects to their nation. This is due to the history of "injury" and 
exclusion, paving the way to resentment as the condition of (identity) politics 
(Brown 1993; 1995). I will return to this idea below. Additionally, in the above 
example of Polish discourses of homosexuality using and calling upon a 
nationalistic rhetoric of the split between the "East" and "West", it is also the use of 
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victimhood and oppression rhetoric that links the gay and lesbian community's 
identity in the ambivalent position in-between "us" and "them", "victims and 
"predators", "good" and "evil", the Self-as-the-Other.  
 In the relations between nationhood and homosexuality, the homosexual 
subject needs to "betray" traditional Polishness in order to establish a new, more 
inclusive framework of national identification and diversity. We see this when, for 
example, this "homosexual orientation towards the West" is picked up by 
conservative nationalistic discourses, where it is interpreted as a type of treason 
against national sovereignty (cf. Chapter 6); this paradoxically “confirms” 
conservative national discourse of homosexuality as the “non-Polish” foreign 
import. Such dialectical scaffolding of warfare-like relations between nationhood 
and homosexuality is not the only way these relations might unfold, although it is 
very popular.  
 First the death of pope John Paul II in 2005, and the cancellation of 
Krakow's Marsz Dla Tolerancji (March For Tolerance); and then the lesbian and 
gay community mourning president Kaczynski in April 2010, are two examples 
where we should look for alternatives. I suggest that at times of such great 
significance to the national narration of self (as the death of the head of the state), 
what occurs is not the renunciation of Polishness but an active participation, and 
perhaps even "over-performance" in the national rituals of mourning; and this was 
the way in which Polish homosexual subjects performed their "communion within 
the nation". Perhaps this is what Agnieszka Graff (2008) wanted, when she called 
on feminist and lesbian and gay activists to not give up on patriotism and to not 
abandon it just because of nationalist abuse; lesbians and gay men should not 
give up on their "love for the country". And as time has shown, they have not. 
 
 7.2.1 Identity and identification  
The work of mourning performed by the Polish gay and lesbian community 
highlights, firstly, that the work of memory is a work of enactment and 
participation; and secondly, that "identities" are not unitary and fixed, and it is the 
process of identification rather than identity which seems a more useful category 
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of analysis. What we can conclude so far, following the writings introduced in 
Chapter 2, is that no identity category can be privileged over another, and 
certainly such selectiveness is not fixed, if possible at all. In "Precarious Life" 
(2006b) Judith Butler writes that  
 
[p]erhaps, rather, one mourns when one accepts that by the loss one 
undergoes one will be changed, possibly for ever. Perhaps mourning 
has to do with agreeing to undergo a transmutation (perhaps one 
should say submitting to a transformation) the full result of which one 
cannot know in advance (Butler 2006b, 21).  
 
The "submitting to a transformation" is an act of openness, and lack of foreclosure 
to the possibility of becoming/being. The idea of foreclosure and forgetting are 
useful concepts to further the analysis of my case. It is nothing new to write that 
remembrance is the foundation of collectivity (e.g. Connerton 1989; Halbwachs 
1992; Zelizer 1998; Bal, Crewe, and Spitzer 1999; Huyssen 2003; cf. also 
Chapter 3). However, forgetting also accompanies this process of collective 
identification, as a consequence of selecting out exactly what must be 
remembered, and what not remembered. Moreover, the forgetting in which I am 
interested here, is not the simple opposite of remembering, but a more profound 
process of forgetting as denial, as elaborated in the recent works of Judith Butler 
(2006b; 2009). Butler shows how the forgetting/denying of the humanity of the 
Other is the fundamental act of collectivity (see also Durrant 2004, 5–6), which 
makes it an act which we should seek to abandon. 
 In the Polish context, we could observe the foreclosure of gays and lesbians 
as "proper humans" and thus denied "a place at the national table", to be called 
"Poles". There are numerous examples, beginning with conservative nationalist 
discourse, portraying homosexuality as alien, foreign, through politicians 
comparing homosexual people to necrophiliacs (Rewinski 2006; Przybylska 
2006), to cartoonists scornfully ridiculing same-sex partnerships as equivalent to 
human - goat marriage (Krauze 2009; Lisicki 2009; Karpieszuk 2009). So when 
the president and other political elite died and gay and lesbian people mourned, 
when the forgotten knocks on the nation's door, some un-homely and uncanny 
  
[Chapter 7 - Attachment and belonging] 
 
  
157 
spectre begins to haunt the very identity of Polishness and gayness. Remembrance 
consolidates and disturbs the simple "either/or" dialectic of the national and the 
homosexual belonging. So when on the Internet's LGBT portals discussions 
appeared about whether "to mourn or not to mourn" Kaczynski, it was the call of 
"let's not forget that he was a human" that seemed one of the most pervasive and 
often repeated arguments. Let me quote a few: 
 
Toudeusz: "[w]e are one in our nature, in humanity. It doesn't matter 
what you think, what you believe, what you see as good and bad - 
death doesn't differentiate" (homiki.pl 2010). 
 
KaFor: "Let's build unity in respect of human life - every life" (homiki.pl 
2010). 
 
Prometeusz: "No words to describe the dimension of this tragedy. I feel 
a deep sadness, despite the differences between me and President 
Kaczynski. Almost 100 people died, most of them well known. Despair 
after each life taken away form us again by Katyn. May they rest in 
peace" (innastrona.pl 2010). 
 
zwyczajny: "I think a great tragedy has happened, even though I 
disagreed with some politicians who died. It's not important anymore 
which [political] options they represented, which party they were from. 
They all deserve respect, because first of all, they were people, wives, 
husbands, parents… I join in pain the families of the dead, and give 
true condolences. To the dead - may god remember your souls"  
(gejowo.pl 2010).  
  
In this very call for remembrance, we hear the call of the gay and lesbian 
community to itself: let us not foreclose the humanity of Kaczynski, let us not 
render him as the permanent figure of the enemy/Other. This call is a gesture 
towards the Other that is different from foreclosure/expulsion as a way of 
constituting ourselves/community; not as "gays and lesbians" against the nation as 
enemy, but in a more inclusive and accommodating process. This may be a 
greater revalorisation of identifications rather than fixed identities of neatly 
demarcated boundaries and supposedly sharp distinctions of what one is/is not. 
As the homosexual subjects mourn their "enemy" in the body of the homophobic 
president Kaczynski, they are reminded of their own wounds. User "Stryj" has 
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expressed this explicitly: "Nobody's just good or just bad. Everyone is worth 
respect. Shouldn't homosexual people, often denied such human respect, be 
more empathic in a situation like this?" Stryj directly calls upon the homosexual 
subject’s memory of its own wounds: exclusion, verbal and physical abuse that 
many experience, in order to not perpetuate the same polarising discourse of 
"friend or enemy", but to overcome this harmful dialectics.  
 In calling upon the humanity of the supposed “enemy", and foregrounding 
his humanity rather than political affiliation or past denigration of homosexuality, 
the homosexual subject once again wants to look beyond the fixation on 
identities and to underline the commonality - humanity, grief, loss - as the shared 
features to all of us; features in which "friend /enemy" identitarian politics can be 
overcome in the gesture of building inclusive sociality and national collectivity.  
 
[']: "It's not about whether you miss somebody or not, it is about 
human tragedy! That's the difference. Kaczynski was as he was, but he 
was a president of Your country, and that's why [we should] respect 
[him]" (homiki.pl 2010). 
 
The death of the head of the state also necessarily reminds us of the nation's own 
fragility and its possibility of being wounded: his dead body is the spectre of non-
existence in the tormented history of the Polish state. Thus, not surprisingly, the 
patriotic tone is not uncommon in the commemorative inscriptions. 
 
wolny: "Tragedy in life may happen to everyone. It happened to the 
presidential couple and the [political and cultural] elite. (…) They have 
died in the service to the nation. I respect and mourn after them, even 
though I have different political views and opinions" (gejowo.pl 2010). 
 
przemonice: "I am gay, I am a sensitive person. I cried all day when I 
have learned that the flower of the Polish political elite, Polish right, 
president with wife, president Kaczorowski - the last president of our 
country in exile, they all have died" (gejowo.pl 2010). 
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 7.2.2 Attachment as the condition of sexual politics 
As we have seen above, the loss of the president and political elite becomes a 
wound, and also a memory of the wound - it signifies the impossibility of 
forgetting about the nation and its history, and their necessary imprint on 
everyone's life (irrespective of their sexual identity). It is also reworked as a 
human tragedy, a pain to which everyone is subjected in his or her life (regardless 
of their political identity). "Wound" and "injury", real and symbolic, as conditions 
of attachment are the starting point for Wendy Brown’s reflections upon identity 
politics in the “States of Injury” (1995). For her, modern politics based on claims 
of "politicized" identities (gender, sexuality, ethnicity) are the result of liberalism's 
failure in fulfilling its promise of justice and equality for all. It also means, 
according to Brown, claims based on identities are futile in their aimed 
transformative attempt. Because identity politics relate to and rely upon our own 
history of injury, in order to sustain its claim, it must necessarily scratch its own 
wounds to make claims and draw legitimisation upon them. As a consequence, in 
the words of Doezema:  
 
[in] seeking protection from the same structures that cause injury, this 
politics risks reaffirming, rather than subverting, structures of 
domination, and risks reinscribing injured identity in law and policy 
through its demands for state protection against injury (Doezema 2001, 
20). 
 
One of my claims in this chapter is that the homosexual subject's (somewhat 
ambivalent) melancholic attachment to the Polish national community and LGBT 
activism to the idea of "Free Poland" ("free to be yourself") is not a disarming 
affectation or a pathological state, which comes with melancholia (Freud 1957, 
243). In fact, what I see to be at the heart of Polish sexual politics is the already 
mentioned "wounded attachment" (Brown 1993; 1995). However, the 
melancholic "never–let–go" attachment/the national identification is also 
important; these two attachments fuel sexual politics in Poland. "Wound" and 
"melancholia" make homosexual subject fight back for their rights (some call it 
"sexual citizenship"), and create the vision of "Free Poland" that would recognise 
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and accommodate a diversity of subject positions, and that would not foreclose 
itself to the (sexual) Other.  
 The situation of mourning after the death of president Kaczynski (and five 
years earlier after the Pope died) was a moment when discussions about pride 
marches ignited. In 2005 Adam Ostolski published an article "Zaloba po 
odwolanym marszu (Grief after the cancelled march)" (2005), in which he argued 
against the decision by Krakow's "March For Tolerance" organisers to cancel the 
march. He believes that "[the] decision to cancel the march seems to be not only 
a symptom of disturbing submissiveness towards homophobes' expectations, but, 
worse, it is based on few erroneous arguments" (2005). Ostolski then moves to 
listing arguments for organising the march just after the official mourning period 
after the death of pope John Paul II. One of the main issues to pursue in these 
strategic discussions (on organising public events) is the idea of freedom, precisely 
"Free Poland" (although it is not explicitly named), where the rights of gay and 
lesbian people are seen as universal human rights in struggles towards which no 
event/situation can or should be an obstacle.  
 In 2010, another discussion about the shape of sexual politics and strategies 
took place. This is visible in numerous posts under already mentioned articles 
(homiki.pl 2010; gejowo.pl 2010; innastrona.pl 2010) on gay websites, posted 
after the death of President Kaczynski. In particular, the discussion sparked 
questions about the organisation or cancellation of the Europride march 2010, 
which eventually took place in Warsaw in July 2010 (i.e. six months after the 
president's death). Other examples include a cancelled film festival as part of the 
"LGBT pride cultural week" held in Lodz in April (Dzień Milczenia 2010); and a 
postponed and rescheduled Day of Silence Against Homophobia (organised by 
Amnesty International on the April 17th). 
 The second thread in these discussions concerns the form of LGBT 
activism/behaviour: what to do in this crisis situation? And how/what should be 
done by "homo/sexual citizens" in order not to disrupt the national grief. But also 
importantly: how to capitalise on the appropriate behaviour? In a way, the whole 
discussion whether "to mourn or not to mourn" is about survivability as Polish 
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sexual citizens, thus it bears marks of strategic thinking about the future (even if 
not formulated in such praxis-oriented terms). Also, the fact that all the lesbian 
and gay websites (commercial and NGOs) changed their graphic look to 
monochromatic black and white, and went into a one week "coma" is an example 
of "strategic" practice that has further-reaching consequences than in the case of 
other, nation-wide, media outlets. It is well summarised in the words of 
QUASIMODO: 
 
"I think (my suggestion is) that it would be a sign of good manners to 
call off this year's Parade. Why would we want to aggravate conflicts in 
a society marked by such great tragedy. For sure, such a move would 
not have damaged us, actually, to the contrary" (homiki.pl 2010).  
 
In the gesture towards the bereavement of the past, rooting itself in the present, 
but looking towards the future, we necessarily evoke time. So to see how 
attachment translates into social activism, we should look again at temporality 
and its implications in the discourses of the nation and homosexuality. 
 In this discussion about the homosexual subject’s "wounded attachment" to 
their own injury, (giving rise to identity-based political claims and thus, as Brown 
claims, perpetuating the history of harm), we should constantly filter this process 
through the cultural and national context of post-1989/post-2004 Poland. Brown's 
"wounded attachment" is completed in my case with the melancholic national 
narrative. As a consequence, "Free Poland" stands as the object of both, 
supposedly contradictory, attachments. Social activism stemming from these two 
forms of attachments is possible because melancholia may be understood as a sort 
of becoming (Min 2003; Butler 2003). David Eng and David Kazanjian, in their 
introduction to “Loss: The Politics of Mourning” (2003), argue that  
 
[f]or instance, we might observe that in Freud's initial conception of 
melancholia, the past is neither fixed nor complete. Unlike mourning, 
in which the past is declared resolved, finished, and dead, in 
melancholia the past remains steadfastly alive in the present (Eng and 
Kazanjian 2003, 3-4).  
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This continuous engagement with the loss thus, "generates sites for memory and 
history, for the rewriting of the past as well as the reimaging of the future" (2003, 
4). Ranjana Khanna makes a similar point when she writes that  
 
[m]elancholia, however, is not simply a crippling attachment to a past 
that acts like a drain of energy on the present (…). Rather, the 
melancholic's critical agency, and the peculiar temporality that drags it 
back and forth at the same time, acts toward the future (Khanna 2006, 
3). 
  
By way of summary for this part of my chapter about sexual politics, I would like 
to quote Wendy Brown from "Wounded Attachments" (1993). Towards the end of 
the essay, she asks: 
 
[w]hat if "wanting to be" or "wanting to have" were taken up as modes 
of political speech that could destabilize the formulation of identity as 
fixed position, as entrenchment by history, and as having necessary 
moral entailments, even as they affirm "position" and "history" as that 
which makes the speaking subject intelligible and locatable, as that 
which contributes to a hermeneutics for adjudicating desires? (Brown 
1993, 407) 
 
What I wanted to do above was to show that homosexual subjects mourning their 
"enemy" President Kaczynski may be read as an example of the alternative Brown 
is looking for. Although we remain within an identity politics framework (gay, 
lesbian, national), and although wound is at the heart of sexual politics, there is 
something subversive in this process. What is different then, and goes beyond the 
"revengeful" politics of injured subjectivities, is the multiplication of attachments 
stimulating politics and discourses of homosexuality in Poland. The death of 
president Kaczynski creates the space for the reconciliation of the two seemingly 
oppositional discursive positions of the national and the homosexual. It thus 
opens up the prospect of thinking/doing identifications outside of the dialectical 
identitarian discourse of nationality vs. homoseuxality, each rendering the other 
as their constitutive Other. The memory of injury/wound, attaching itself to the 
"Free Poland" object, somehow self-subverts it because of the unstable and 
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multiple referents to which "Free Poland" redirects. These two referents are pre-set 
as incompatible, if not carefully orchestrated to work against each other ("homo 
as threat", "nation as burden"). Through the identification in the affect of hurt 
(characteristic for both, the national and the homosexual subject positions) the 
negative side of identity politics is overcome, since it cannot be attributed to any 
one particular "history of injury". Therefore, lesbians and gays mourning their 
"enemy" offer perhaps such an example of Brown's "wanting to be" diluting rigid 
identity into never fully possible to contain, desire. Could this be one definition of 
social activism? I do not want to make claims here that all social activism is 
melancholic; but only suggest that sexual activism in Poland has one of its roots 
there. 
 7.2.3 Regression or subversion?  
Diana Taylor (1999, 206) observed that when Princess Diana died in 1997, ethnic 
minorities in the UK and all other groups of people around the world were put in 
a position of "passive recipients" of (UK) national grief. She elaborates on this 
phenomenon, moving beyond the simple conclusion that it worked solely as a 
modern extension of the former British colonial hegemony. In all the 
ambivalence, Taylor (1999, 202) proposes to see ethnic minority mourners as 
active agents and not passive observers of the mourning drama. In the Polish case, 
one could say that grief over the outspokenly homophobic president Kaczynski 
could not be shared by the lesbian and gay community - it was not theirs. But at 
the same time, I am more interested in acknowledging the homosexual subject 
not only as "submissive receivers", but also as "active performers" in the national 
spectacle of grief. 
 Of course, gay and lesbian participation in the rituals of nationhood may 
also be interpreted as a "failure" of its activism: a regressive step backwards and 
giving up in the struggle (as argued by e.g. already mentioned Ostolski 2005). 
Without completely rejecting this argument, I want to favour the alternative 
viewpoint, according to which the situation may be read in terms of subversion of 
the national logic. When lesbians and gay men joined millions of other Poles in 
the public expression of their grief, they mourned not only as Poles after their 
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president, but also as homosexuals mourning their own "enemy" in the body of 
Lech Kaczynski. As such they took part in the process of consolidation of the 
imaginary community of the nation - a process which is denied them as Others. 
By pro-actively grieving, without waiting for anyone to accept and confirm them 
as "legal" members of the national community, Polish homosexual subject, by 
doing what is precluded and forbade to them, usurped the right to self-
constitution in their own belonging.xv 
 Plonowska Ziarek uses the term "redemptive suffering" (2007, 311) to 
describe another feature of the Polish melancholic nationalism, which ideally fits 
the relations between the discourses of the nation and homosexuality. Mourning 
President Kaczynski - an act of suffering after the loss - becomes an act of 
redemption from Otherness into Polishness. Paul Gilroy (2004, 110) also observes 
a similar process of a minority buying itself into nationhood in the post-colonial 
UK. This is possible because 'mourning' denotes (1) performance and (2) the 
affect of grief.xvi But what would be the performance of grief in this odd context of 
lesbians and gays mourning homophobic president? Using Taylor words again: 
 
performance makes visible (for an instant, “live”, “now”) that which is 
always already there - the ghosts, the tropes, the scenarios that structure our 
individual and collective life. These spectres, made manifest through 
performance, alter future phantoms, future fantasies” (Taylor 1999, 195).   
 
So in the performative aspect of mourning after the deceased, in the act of crying, 
the transformation of identity occurs. In tears the national and the homosexual are 
no longer exclusive identity positions; in tears of identification with fellow 
nationals, the performative aspect of being what one socially is perceived to be 
("Perverted Homo") dissolves into "simple" "being as if" somebody/something else 
("Homo the Pole"). Rather than rejection, we observe a transformation of the role 
of the nation for the homosexual subjectivity. 
 This brings to mind Sara Ahmed's concept of an "affect alien", that is "to be 
out of line with the public mood, not to feel the way others feel in response to an 
event" (S. Ahmed 2010, 157). Because homosexuals do not want to remain on the 
outskirts of the national community as "affect aliens" they mourn and, in the same 
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act, do not really "put aside" their gay identity, but rather are/perform as "gay" and 
as "Poles" in their identification with nationhood. Performing in this sad event has 
something, paradoxically, of a "happiness promise" and is a "hopeful 
performative" (Ahmed 2010, 200). As we repeat the word happiness believing that 
by repetitive recitation happiness occurs/will be, so when the homosexual subject 
performs Polishness (by taking part in the national rituals of mourning), they also 
hope that it makes them/will make them Poles. Being "Homosexual the Pole" will 
thereby be achieved: the subjectivity of the Polish/national and the 
Other/homosexual will be reconciled as One. 
 7.2.4 Mourning and the homosociality  
In Chapter 4, overviewing the literature about nationhood and sexuality, I recalled 
the issue of homosociality, the homophobic rejection of homosexuality, and 
homo-eroticism. I would like to ponder that triangulation in the context of the 
dead body of the head of the national polity. Among other functions, homophobia 
is the negative referent of LGBT politics and the gay and lesbian community 
(rendering nation-as-Other). It is also the expression of national resentment 
towards the homosexual-as-Other. But in the homosocial cultures of dominant 
masculinity this resentment adds up to homo-eroticism (discharge of 
homosexuality and compulsive heterosexual fantasy performed by men for the 
pleasure of other men) of the national collective. As Plonowska Ziarek comments, 
with reference to Freud’s “Totem and Taboo”: 
 
Freud demonstrates how the sons' murder of the primal father was 
transformed into collective identifications with the empty place of 
lawful symbolic authority. (…) [P]erhaps we can also hear in this story 
traces of the archaic and ambivalent homosexual object relation 
(brother's hatred and erotic love of the father), the loss of which, as in 
the case of melancholia, is also replaced by identification with the 
dead object (Ziarek 2007, 315). 
 
In the national (male-identified) adoration of the leader (another male) we observe 
an expression of desire for manliness (state politics as the rule of the "firm hand" 
against the Other/homosexual), so eagerly performed by Kaczynski himself as the 
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president/father of the national family (cf. Chapter 6). We see that homo-eroticism 
is inscribed into the process of the national identification/identification with the 
nation. The death of the head of state (an object of national desire) turns the world 
upside-down. While the gates are not guarded, Otherness, traditionally assigned 
to "femininity", enters the sphere of the national (masculine) through such 
"female" characteristics as grief, emotionality, mellowness, and compassion. To 
understand better the specificity of this "world turned upside-down" we may look 
into anthropological literature, especially the writings of Victor Turner. In “The 
ritual process: structure and anti-structure” (1995), he links death to, among other 
phenomena, the state of liminality, i.e. of "in-betweenness". He writes: 
 
the attributes of liminality or of liminal personae ("threshold people") are 
necessarily ambiguous, since this condition and these persons elude or slip 
through the network of classification that normally locate states and 
positions in cultural space" (Turner 1995, 95).  
 
I wonder if we could argue that the homosexual subject as the Other mourning 
the nation's (homophobic) leader locates itself in the position of such "threshold 
people"? "Liminal entities are neither here nor there; they are betwixt and between 
the position assigned and arrayed by law, custom, convention, and ceremonial" 
(Turner 1995, 95). Excluded as Other, the homosexual subject does not belong to 
the socially and politically sanctioned space of sociality/nationhood. And yet, s/he 
dares to act against their assigned role/place in the hierarchy of 
inclusion/exclusion, thus bridging the boundaries of collectivity, somehow 
opening/forcing its displacement. It is this "betwixt and between" that becomes 
the accommodating ground for something new to happen. But this is only 
possible because of the extraordinary time of mourning, when all the normative 
routines get (partially) suspended. The homosexual Other, which in the 
nationhood's heteronormative (and masculinised) discourse is ostracised as weak, 
mellow, soft, emotional - i.e. "feminine" - uses precisely those qualities to invert 
his/her own position. At a time when the usual performances of the "normal" and 
"masculine" of the nationhood is suspended in bereavement, it is precisely the 
("abnormal" of) "feminine" that is embraced. Death of the president reminds us of 
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the fragility and vulnerability of the human body/being. It also helps to revaluate 
and appreciate (if only temporally) the "female" emotional care we give each 
other. The national collectivity of paternal law and order softens into a sociality of 
precarious lives. In the moment of grief, when the "feminine" qualities of 
emotional care take precedence over the "masculine" rigid law, the homosexual 
Other finds his/her gateway into the heart of the nationhood. Death opens the 
gate and allows the (feminised) Other to use this temporal aberration in the life 
cycle of the nation and to enter the sacredness of the (masculine) national 
temporality. Perhaps the status of the Otherness, existing somewhere in what 
could be designated as "the threshold of the norm", is also what facilitates its 
"communion within the collectivity" of the nation at the moment of the 
extraordinary.xvii Significantly, this process is mediated and facilitated through 
gender/gendered categories. The negotiation (and reconciliation) of sociality anew 
occurs in the womb of culturally designated "femininity" of emotional care, 
respectability and recognition of the precariousness of life.  
 After Freud we could say, then, that the death of the father (here president, 
"the father of the national family") enables his "bastard children" to identify 
symbolically with the empty place of paternal authority - to identify with 
Polishness. When the body is dead, it is death that tears the veil of the national 
down to reveal it as nothing more than the space of empty universality, to be 
constantly replenished anew (Laclau 1996). Yet once again the whole situation 
appears to be a little queer: feminised Otherness penetrating the masculine 
nationhood only to become part of this (female) body of Polonia. 
7.3 Conclusions: mutual desire 
In this chapter I have used the notion of attachment as a point of departure in the 
analysis of the homosexual subject’s mourning after the tragic death of (the 
infamously homophobic) president Lech Kaczynski in April 2010. I have tried to 
show that this concept may be useful because it is possible to argue that the 
whole notion of Polish nationhood is built upon melancholic attachment 
("melancholic nationalism"). Although my case may be seen as "regressive", the 
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postponing of ("radical"?) events by the gay and lesbian community to respect the 
pressures of the nation, I propose more an optimistic reading of it as "subversion". 
In my analysis, it became clear that "identification" rather than "identity" is a more 
useful category in understanding the relations between the discourses of the 
nation and homosexuality; a category that allows us to see beyond the binary and 
exclusive identitarian system. Identification - a process of relating subjectivities 
and objects - seems to be a better way of understanding and describing 
undercurrents of sociality and collectivity. "Identity" - understood as a sort of 
given or acquired, but in either case, stable "position label" - proves rather an 
inefficient and insufficient tool for understanding a "crisis situation" such as death 
and rituals of bereavement. My analysis shows that we need to go beyond 
"sexuality" and "nationality" as fixed (opposing) positions/identities, because only 
then are we able to grasp the innate instability of sociality, something which 
Laclau and Mouffe refer to as "social" (2001, 111). Such an approach, in turn, 
enabled me to argue that one of the driving forces of sexual activism in Poland 
after 1989 stems from this "wounded attachment", but also bears traces of the 
Polish melancholic nationalism and its attachments. The combination of the two 
effectively disturbs them, easing their attachment bonds with their object(s), thus 
opening the possibilities for new forms of politics. 
 However, in the above discussion about the gay and lesbian community 
"overcoming" supposedly mutually exclusive identity positions ("gay" vs. "Pole") in 
the process of identification with (the national) we need to recognise something 
that could be called the "paradox of transgression". In order to transgress a liminal 
point, we firstly need to concede to what we hope to overcome (see also the 
introduction to Fuss 1991). Similarly here, we need to acknowledge that in the 
above interpretation the nation stands as the figure of Other, against which 
lesbian and gay identity emerges. The mourning voices try to overcome this dyad 
by calling upon Kaczynski’s humanity yet this very call reminds and confirms to 
us that nationhood (especially when appropriated or represented by the 
conservatives) stands for some sort of Otherness. So too the homosexual subject 
needs the nation as its opposite (which is already within). The situation resembles 
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what Seiji M. Lippit's (2003) writes about Japan's national identification 
with/against the "West", and also describes well the relation of the homosexual 
subject to the nationhood in Poland:  
 
Yashiro discovers that his rejection of the West can never be absolute, 
for there is always a residue, a remainder that cannot be eradicated. 
(…) In this sense, Yashiro's encounter with Europe is not only a 
confrontation with the other, but, more importantly, a revelation of the 
other existing within (Lippit 2003, 238).  
 
The consequence of this internally dis/junctive process is, after all, that of the 
intended bridging the two. The Polish homosexual subject needs (to varying 
degrees, of course) the nation as their referent, therefore they are "Polish 
homosexual people" rather than just "homoseuxal people in Poland". This perhaps 
obvious conclusion about the homosexual subject being always already the 
national is worth pairing up with the one made in the previous chapter about the 
presidential speech: that the national is always already (a little) queer. 
 As the coda to this chapter, I can think of no better words than those of Tom 
Boellstroff in the book "Gay Archipelago" (2005), describing the relations of 
homosexual Indonesians to their state: 
 
Gay and lesbi Indonesians show their fellow citizens that it is possible 
to imagine a new kind of national belonging where difference stands no 
longer as raw "diversity" to be ground into national "unity," but 
glittering islands of possibility in an archipelago of tolerance and 
justice (Boellstorff 2005, 229).
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Chapter 8 
 The quest for “ordinary” 
In Chapter 6, I analysed how national discourse became/is attached to the figure 
of the homosexual as the Other/abject. In this relation, homosexuality plays the 
role of the supplement, unsettling the national discourse performed by the 
(nation-)state. In Chapter 7, I looked at the somewhat reverse process of 
homosexual subjects being attached to the idea of the nationhood. I have shown 
how manifold and unstable this relation(ship) is, and how it manifests itself in 
extraordinary times of great national crisis, such as the death of the president. In 
this chapter, I am seeking to further explore the relation between the discourses of 
nationhood and homosexuality, with attention given to problems introduced in 
Chapter 7. That is, I want to study the role the nationhood plays in the discourse 
of homosexuality, and since the previous chapter was about “extraordinary”, the 
current one engages with the “everyday” and “ordinary” times.  
 To do so, I am presenting two case studies. The first is the “Niech Nas 
Zobacza/Let Them See Us” (2003) campaign, organised by the Campaign Against 
Homophobia (CAH) and photographed by Karolina Bregula. The second one is 
the “Chcesz Tolerancji? To sobie wybierz!/Want Tolerance? So choose one!” 
(2006) campaign, organised by the Lambda Warszawa Association. The former 
one was staged “for society” nation-wide, with a highly surprising and heated 
media coverage. The latter campaign, conversely, was organised on a much 
smaller scale, presenting us with what could be called “LGBT discourse”. It was 
concerned with gays and lesbians, structured by them, and organized for 
themselves. The goals were self-mobilisation and consciousness raising before the 
election times. These two campaigns will help me to scrutinise the hypothesis that 
Polish LGBT organisations, in constructing the discourse of homosexuality, at 
times embrace and deploy national (and perhaps even nationalistic) discursive 
elements and strategies. Building upon Chapter 3’s “banal nationalism”/”everyday 
nationalism”, I want to suggest here that the two campaigns can serve as 
examples (to varying degrees and aspects) of what is theorised as “everyday 
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nationalism”. Furthermore, I will ask how the relation(ship) between 
homosexuality and the nationhood is constructed in LGBT organisations’ 
discourse? I will also consider the possible effects of this relation(ship) for the gay 
and lesbian community. 
 Firstly, however, I want to contextualise the two campaigns, historically. 
Poland A.D. 2002/2003 was a time of finalising “transformation adjustments” 
requested by the European Union from Poland as the so called candidate country. 
These adjustments - which officially began in 1997, and five years later were 
heading towards the end – set the accession year for 2004. This was welcomed 
within the gay and lesbian community and organisations, and among all other 
pro-European groups. In 2002/2003, that is when the “Let Them See Us” 
campaign was unfolding, and when the Sejm has passed the resolution about 
“Polish sovereignty in culture” (cf. Chapter 6), the excitement of the EU accession 
was perhaps one of the most inspirational and motivating drives for Polish LGBT 
organisations. The promise of the EU was, dare I say, as alluring to the 
imagination, and motivating peoples of Central Europe to stand up against the 
communist regimes, as the “West” was before 1989. (More insights on some 
aspects of the relationship between Polish LGBT activism and the EU can be 
found in: Krzeminski 2009, 92-4; or (Lambda Warszawa and KPH 2007). Indeed, 
the EU was a new incarnation of that “dream of freedom and liberty” that was 
behind the Solidarity movement in the 1980s; two decades later, it was behind 
the trust LGBT organisations paid to the EU as a solution, a trust that also help to 
reinvigorate the idea o solidarity/solidarity (cf. Gruszczynska 2009a; 2009b; 
2009c; Binnie and Klesse 2011). 
 It is also important to recall once again that the setting for this whole thesis 
is the time of the so-called “post-communist transformations” (cf. my discussion of 
“modernity” in the Chapter 4). The post-1989 period recalls in many ways the 
industrial evolution in Western Europe during the 19th century in the intense 
processes of economic change of modes of production and their impact on 
society and social relations. Post-WWII period in Poland saw the rise of the state 
communist politics based on the premise of heavy industrialisation, and in the 
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post-1989 period we are witnessing an intensive processes of adaptation to the 
“Western” models of already post-industrial, service-based neoliberal market 
capitalism. But what I mean by metaphorically comparing post-1989 in Poland 
with the industrial revolution in the “West”, is more to do with the consequences 
of the rapid, intensive and extensive changing modes of production and growth 
generation, than with anything else. The post-1989 period in CEE/Polish history is 
a time of great social unrest, instability and uncertainty about the future in the 
face of the unknown of the new. The population are facing new problems of 
unemployment, homelessness, rapid devaluation of goods and money leading to 
significant pauperisation of society (among others: Wnuk-Lipinski 1995; Staniszkis 
2001; Jakubowska 2002; Domański, Ostrowska, and Rychard 2004; Galasińska 
and Galasiński 2010; Kozłowski and Domański 2010). These new political and 
economic conditions of everyday life have impacted (although of course, to 
varying degrees that are yet to be measured) on social and cultural norms. For 
instance, we can imagine one of the consequences would be the dissolution of 
old forms of social stratification, and emerging new ones, brought about with the 
“new” neoliberal market economy and “Western” liberal models of democratic 
political regime (among others: Szacki 1995; Domanski 2002; Jasinska-Kania and 
Marody 2004; Domanski 2009; Marciniak 2009). It is this background that I want 
reader to keep in mind while following my analysis and argumentation in the 
following paragraphs. 
 8.1 “Let Them See Us” (2003) 
Let me begin with a quotation from the campaign’s website: 
 
Authenticity was important for us - we deliberately wanted true 
homosexuals, and real couples. (…) All the photographs are in one 
style: people are shown on the backdrop of winter’s urban scenery; 
couples hold hands and look into the camera’s lenses. Colours are 
toned and quiet. Photographed people are likeable. In the 
photographer’s concept of Karolina Bregula, all photographs are alike, 
even monotonous - to make the viewer who sees all 30 pictures get 
bored, and to make them think that they pass hundreds of such people 
in the street. [Everything is done to make them think that] lesbians and 
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gays are not sensational. If lesbian and gay people look so normal and 
ordinary, they are as normal as the viewer themselvesxviii. 
 
 
Figure 7: "Niech Nas Zobacza" / "Let Them See Us" (2002) 
 
 
Figure 8: "Niech Nas Zobacza" / "Let Them See Us" (2002) 
  
[Chapter 8 - The quest for “ordinary”] 
 
  
174 
 
Another quotation from one of the organisers: “Our campaign presents delicate 
photos, without kissing and nudity. Just couples holding hands. Nothing 
outrageous. They [gay and lesbian people] are normal people, not some 
stereotypical sissy queens” (wyborcza.pl 2003a). And finally, a fragment from the 
influential weekly magazine Polityka:  
 
Why did they agree to be photographed? - A sense of duty - says Jacek, 
Arek’s partner. - To be truthful - says Daria, Dominika’s partner. - Let 
them see that a lesbian is not a butch dyke, but a normal girl. (…) They 
take part in the “Let Them See Us” campaign to show homosexuals as 
ordinary people. Just couples holding hands. Not sinners, not perverts, 
nor tyrannized martyrs. Not from gay parades, not in frocks, not bull 
dykes, as people imagine them. But normal and ordinary, as the 
neighbour from the next door, a shop assistant from a corner shop. Like 
everybody. So in photos they appear a bit out of shape, a little shy, 
without striking poses and stylisation (Pietkiewicz 2003). 
 
There is no doubt that the crux of the message sent by organisers to the society is 
that of “normality” and “ordinariness”; it presents gay and lesbian people as being 
like and the same as everyone else. What is interesting here is how this 
“normality” is achieved, and what it actually means, “to be the same as everyone 
else”. One straightforward aspect of being the same/like is a kind of invisibility: it 
is about being indistinguishable for the rest. Paradoxically then, in “Let Them See 
Us” lesbian and gay people are made visible, in order to become invisible. The 
visual campaign putting images of gay and lesbian people in the media and 
advertising places across cities in Poland, is singling them out for the straight 
gaze; at the same time, it is organised to “hide” them (gays and lesbians). Hiding 
in this case means to take lesbian and gay people away from the abject position 
of the Otherness, and bring them into the socially acceptable realm of universality 
(thus invisibility). I will suggest that this place of universality, normality, and the 
ordinary is precluded and coded in a concept and ideas of nationhood. But since 
these categories are heavily invested in the dialectical dynamic of inclusion and 
exclusion, the performed desire of being the same/the one is already somehow 
crippled by the organisers’ themselves, in the choice of a title. “Let Them See Us” 
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relies on division between us lesbian and gay people, and them, the straight 
society. If a little unfortunate, from the campaign’s point of view, it is a rather 
counter-productive label, working against the explicit and implicit goals and 
purposes of the campaign. 
 Below, I will show that the “normality” (nationality) evoked so blatantly in 
the campaign, is performed through at least two means. The first is the gender 
normative prescriptions (“not bulldykes or sissies”), and the second striving for the 
social “respectability” (Mosse 1985) of an aspirational petit bourgeois positionality 
(“like a shop assistant from a corner shop”). 
 In an article in a popular women’s magazine “NAJ”, one of the lesbian 
couples is introduced as follows: 
 
Daria is DIFFERENT. She loves a woman not a man. And she speaks 
about it publicly. (…) From the enormous poster two young women are 
looking at passers-by. Attractive, smiling, fit. And ordinary. Just like 
those whom we pass by everyday in the street. Dressed up in jeans and 
jackets, like their peers. They walk holding hands. As if returning from 
a walk (Uszynska 2003). 
 
When we look at the posters we see an intended dull and unexciting portrayal of 
homosexual couples. Young men are “not cross-dressers from a gay parade” 
(wyborcza.pl 2003b), and young women are rather conventionally feminine. 
Neither are particularly ideal in their representation of femininity and masculinity: 
a little obese, not perfectly in shape, some women with short hair, some men with 
long hair, etc. In other words, ordinary rather than representing ideal types of 
gender.  This, as I will show, is exactly what is most desired as the campaign’s 
signal to the general population. Such insistence on the positive image of lesbian 
and gay people is not surprising, if we account for all the stereotypes and scornful 
representations of homosexuality produced and in circulation across many 
cultures. Visibility, according to Eric Clarke (2000), is one of the main areas of 
interest for LGBT politics. Usually grounded in the conviction about 
negative/wrong stereotypes of gay and lesbian people as deviant, dysfunctional, 
gender disordered and so on, the focus was/is on the creation and dissemination 
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of the reverse, showing gay and lesbian people as “normal” and “ordinary” (E. 
Jackson 1995; Dyer 2002; Benshoff 2004). In this light, “Let Them See Us” 
resembles the 1980s “positive images” campaigns organised in the UK, or the 
homophile organizations in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s, which 
suggested that their members should observe gender-normative rules (look like 
women/men, act in a masculine/feminine way), in order to be perceived as proper 
and good members of the society (Blasius and Phelan 1997, 239).  
 However, what if the insistence on normality becomes almost obsessive and 
constantly, time and again, invoked as the mantra of a “hopeful performative” 
(Ahmed 2010, 200) that is meant to make it happen? Description becomes 
prescription, an indicator of the normative quality. The open call to society 
provides as well a goal for the gay and lesbian community. Photographs and a 
constant pledge seem to sub-code the following message for the gay and lesbian 
community: if we fight disdainful stereotyping, we should back it up with our own 
exemplars. If we claim to be the same, we have to prove to them that we are the 
same. We need to be those feminine lesbians and masculine gays; if we claim 
normality, we need to be normal. The campaign, then, seems to have two faces: 
one of the pledge and the other of the instruction. In all this, organizers do not 
seem to recognize the instability of the very category of normality, its inner 
incongruities, and instead take it for granted, unscrutinized. Furthermore, Anna 
Gruszczynska (2009a), in her excellent analysis of Polish LGBT parades, has also 
noticed strong normalising ideals behind activists’ discourse of what the “ay 
parade should be. She writes: 
 
At the same time, the efforts of the research participants to produce 
“normal”, desexualised citizens through the public encounters 
discussed in this thesis, relied to a large extent on an unproblematic 
understanding of heterosexuality and heteronormative assumptions of 
what is defined as (not) “normal” in the public sphere. After all, as 
discussed previously, the ideal of a “normal” Polish citizen was rather 
restrictive, where perhaps the most striking example was the 
“Normality Parade” organised by the All-Polish Youth a week after the 
banned Warsaw Pride in 2005 (see also Chapter 2). The event was 
mainly attended by young men chanting homophobic slogans such as 
“stop the gay propaganda”, “streets are ours, hospitals are yours” and 
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“paedophiles and pederasts, they are the real supporters of the EU” 
(Grochal 2005). In this context, heterosexuality remains based upon 
homophobia and xenophobia. (Gruszczynska 2009a, 203) 
 
According to Gruszczynska, unreflective re-deployment of “normality” by LGBT 
activists necessarily repeats (although unintentionally) the homophobic 
framework of the heteronormative social organization. Also, in terms of gender 
politics this discourse is dubious, as bargaining gender conformity for sexual 
acceptance must be short-lived. As Anne Fausto-Sterling (1992) notices, social 
rejection (and fear) of same-sex desire inevitably works against gender equality 
(and vice versa). Also Anne Marie Smith (1994) shows to us that by examining the 
interplay of contradictions in the Thatcherite discourse about “promotion of 
homosexuality” we come to the conclusion about the unstable and impossible 
consistency of what is denoted as “normal”. “With the play of contamination and 
dependency between the two terms, the distinction between the ‘normal’ and 
‘not-normal’ ultimately fails and so on” (1994, 202). 
 8.1.1 Nationhood, respectability and homosexuality 
Another inspiration for the interpretation of the “Let Them See Us” campaign 
comes from the already introduced work of George Mosse (1985) about middle 
class, nationalism and homosexuality. Here I would like to develop a thread 
around his concept of “respectability”, characteristic of the emerging new social 
class (bourgeoisie), being in the Polish case the consequence of adopting the 
neoliberal capitalist economic system and Western European style of liberal 
democratic state organisation, and the qualities of self-determination, 
independence, resourcefulness, commitment, and, last but not least, normality. 
Lesbian and gay people are the same not only because they fulfil their socially 
prescribed gender normative expressions correctly, but also because they perform 
well the new ideals of a “good life” in the new, capitalist and democratic Poland. 
Kosc (2003) recalls Andrzej Oseka, a well-known journalist and commentator in 
Poland:  
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Some liberal commentators indicated that local authorities' reactions 
were a result of intolerance. Andrzej Oseka wrote in Gazeta Wyborcza 
that homosexuals "are not followers of some caprice or fashion; they 
are living people next to us. They work, study, love, and are loved. We 
usually know nothing about them. But this time, quite a number of 
these people came out toward passers-by in Polish cities. No 
provocative poses here. 
 
Further in his article, Kosc quotes one of the participants saying: "We agreed to 
take part in this project in order to show that we are a part of society. We don't 
want to be a bad part of it. We're normal." The two accounts are fairly 
uncharacteristic one could say, it is as if they were not descriptions at all. But this 
is exactly what they are meant to be, I argue: suggesting the indistinguishable 
quality of the subjects portrayed. As a visibility campaign meant to hide lesbian 
and gay people into the invisibility of normality, so did the recurring 
uncharacteristic descriptions mean to render them into the usual of invisible 
normality. In another article we read: 
 
Photographs are positive, gentle. Young, smiling and happy people. Is 
this a true depiction of Polish homosexuals? - We’ve chosen simplicity 
for a purpose. We want to gently introduce ourselves to passers-by - 
says Robert Biedron from the Campaign Against Homophobia, which 
organised the action. - We show normal people in ordinary situations, 
as if they’ve just popped in to the corner shop to buy bread. 
(wyborcza.pl 2003b) 
 
It has been already noted that all portraits were shot in metropolitan centres, with 
young professional looking people, confident, assertive but not pushy, 
determined, committed and motivated (to take courage and do what they did). In 
the two following fragments taken from interviews given by organisers and 
campaign participants, we learn more about these qualities. 
 
I don’t feel guilty or worse than others because of my sexual difference 
- Daria says assertively. - Perhaps I’m even better in a sense, because 
I’m doing quite well in life. Daria is 24 years old, and is studying 
psychology. She wants to work as a negotiator in the future, as she likes 
challenges and high risk. - And then perhaps even more qualifications. 
Maybe a doctorate? - she considers. Her partner is finishing the same 
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programme. At the moment she is at home, in Przemysl. - But we’re in 
touch everyday - confesses Daria. - We text each other and send e-
mails. We talk over the phone every few days as well. Daria is studying 
and working as a waitress. For the past four years she has had no 
financial support from anyone. - I’m getting by - she shrugs off. - I even 
have some pocket money left for small expenditures. (Uszynska 2003)  
 
Daria emerges in this article as a young independent woman, getting by in life, 
which is not easy, but she does not complain. Lesbian and gay people can be, 
and are in this discourse, “professionals”. “An assistant at the post office can be a 
lesbian (…) - a mate from work, or a neighbour can be gay. It is at least one 
million Poles!” (se.pl 2003). Daria’s “professional” attitude is also tightly 
connected to her commitment to a monogamous, stable relationship, seen in the 
practice of staying in touch with her girlfriend. It should be explained to the 
English reader, who most likely assumes telephone services to be cheap, available 
in any household, and normal in their insignificance. In Poland, conversely, the 
significance is slightly different. At the time, in the 2003, mobile phones were still 
a novelty, a rather expensive one, and not affordable for everyone. Likewise, the 
poor telecommunication infrastructure inherited after communism, made the 
telephone something to be used when needed rather than a means of sustaining a 
social relationship via e.g. long conversations. Similarly, Internet access was 
scarce and restricted to public services (e.g. universities or slowly emerging 
internet cafes) and certainly not something that was present in every household. 
Therefore, Daria’s remark about committed exchange of text messages, emails 
and less frequent but regular phone calls should be understood as a sign of effort, 
commitment and investment put into the (monogamous) relationship with her 
girlfriend. 
 What rises to our attention here is the role of partnership/relationshipxix itself 
in the image of a socially respectable person - monogamous, serious, and 
dedicated. Normal, one almost wants to say. “[Aska and Julia] have monogamous 
hearts, as do Jacek and Arek. They hate jumping from one arm to another. They 
want to be together. They are responsible. They get photographed to show others 
that here are two regular, normal, happy young women, even if life is not easy for 
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them” (Pietkiewicz 2003). Surely, “monogamous hearts” is yet another example of 
what is conceived here as normality. The heteronormative scaffolding of Daria’s 
(and that of her interviewer) thinking about herself is further exemplified across 
the text by the use of the term partner not girlfriend; a name that cautiously 
(although to a limited degree, since nouns in Polish are not gender-neutral, as in 
English) downplays a more obvious same-sex referent of girlfriend. In Polish, as 
perhaps also in English, partner denotes greater stability and respectability that 
goes beyond youthful emotional instability and short-lived erotic fascination that 
may be characteristic for what dating (rather than living with) and girlfriend 
(rather than partner) denote. It also hints towards same-sex partnerships, which 
similarly to marriage, would be in this universe the ultimate sign of commitment, 
respect, and maturity. And as in marriage, partnership is also meant to signify the 
longevity of the relationship, as much as it downplays the sexual dimension of it. 
This is again explicit in the following passage: 
 
“We love each other normally”. So our homos are ordinary, in love, 
monogamous, live together in flats they own, have cats, write poems 
for each other. Arek to Jacek: “But I have a brother/ since recently/ 
came, hugged, caressed/ and just like that, grew to love/ my difference/ 
I know, he doesn’t mind/ Now we fight together/ I feel it/ enormous 
wonderful strength/ You don’t have a chance/ it’s love”. And Jacek 
gives a photo to Arek: “Believe in me, and then our moments will 
become eternal. Be such a moment for me”. They were in many 
different relationships, which didn’t last. Now, they believe, they will 
succeed. Arek is monogamous in the depth of his heart. He always 
wanted a stable and long-lasting relationship/partnership. So did Jacek. 
They are not interested in sex without feelings. (Pietkiewicz 2003) 
 
The clearest message about the “respectable homosexual subject” came from 
Izabela Jaruga-Nowacka, at the time a Plenipotentiary for Equal Rights in the 
government. She said: 
 
If we are dealing with people of the same sex who have spent a huge 
part of their lives together, own a house together, then why should we 
refuse them, e.g. the right to information about a partner in hospital, or 
inheritance after death. There are no objections to a homosexual 
person working as a surgeon, teacher, or pedagogue. (…) In labour and 
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unemployment law it is forbidden to discriminate against anyone 
because of their “sexual orientation”. That’s some progress. (se.pl 2003) 
 
For Jaruga-Nowacka, lesbians and gays are valued for their dutiful performance of 
bourgeois ideals of “good life” and “respectability”. For that, they have been 
recognised under labour code regulations and offered protection against 
discrimination… in the work place. This initiative from the only EU directive 
(2000/78/EC) (Council of Europe 2000) forcing protection for homosexuals, but 
only in the work place, is a rather bold example of how homosexual subjects are 
being increasingly recognised under neoliberal capitalism as perhaps worthy, that 
is productive,  contributors to the economy (“pink money” and “human capital”). 
Similar observations about “Let Them See Us” are made by Blazej Warkocki, who 
offers the following explanation of the strong reactions of many conservative 
commentators (e.g. Marszewsky 2003; se.pl 2003; Hennelowa 2003; Kwiecinski 
2003) to the campaign. With a satirical wit he writes: 
 
Lesbian and gay people from Karolina Bregula’s photographs try to 
appropriate middle-class bourgeois aesthetics, while the society with 
the help of its conservative commentators replies: never, over our dead 
bodies! The bourgeois aesthetic belongs to us and we’ll never give up 
on it! You have your own aesthetics, and that’s why - until the end of 
the world - we will publish in “Wprost” [conservative weekly] photos 
from Berlin’s “Love Parade” after the Polish Equality March. And there 
will be loads of pink plastic dildos, ballroom gowns, leather and other 
fetish stuff. We shall never see you in suits, never ever! (Warkocki 
2006) 
 
The intrinsic connection between citizenship claims, implanted capitalist social 
divisions and the rise of a “new middle class” in Poland, and LGBT organisations 
deployment of “respectability” as a major strategy, is quite striking.  There is a 
developing current in queer studies, undertaking the critique of neoliberalism and 
sexual normativity in the long established capitalist countries of the “West” (e.g. 
D. Evans 1993; Chasin 2000; Hennessy 2000; Puar 2002; Duggan 2004; 
Richardson 2005; Woltersdorff 2007; Binnie 2008). Different authors emphasize 
issues that foster each other reflections. D’Emilio (1993), for instance, built an 
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interesting genealogy arguing that it was the developing capitalism (shifting 
conditions of labour, and reconfiguration of familial bonds) in “Western” 
countries that enabled the constitution of the homosexual as subject. Evans 
offered a Marxist critique of “sexual citizenship”, under which he understood 
homosexual subject’s participation and recognition by the state institutions. For 
him, “sexual citizenship” is in the buying power of “pink money”: one is a citizen 
as long as one is able to participate in a capitalist/consumerist culture (Evans 
1993, 64). Hennessy (2000), on the other hand, notices how the politics of 
visibility, so important a strategy for LGBT politics, seem to go hand in hand with 
capitalist insistence on consumption. Also, Chasin (2000) and Duggan (2004) are 
preoccupied with the “gay lifestyle” as another commodity product available on 
the market, perhaps diminishing a little the differences between the “gay” and the 
“straight” subject (as long as they buy!), but ameliorating divisions in the register 
of richness and poverty, access to services and goods, racialised positionality, etc.  
 Volker Woltersdorff (2007) draws an interesting observation regarding 
nationalism, sexuality and the neoliberal discourse of the EU:  
 
While religious fundamentalists, nationalists and racists unanimously 
reject both homosexuality and neoliberalism, official neoliberal 
discourse in the European Union includes tolerance of homosexuality 
within its list of allegedly European values (Woltersdorff 2007, 1). 
 
And later on argues: 
 
On a global scale sexual emancipation is frequently linked to the 
profusion of neoliberalism, for example in Latin America, India and 
Southeast Asia. Very often queer people prefer neoliberal working 
conditions to more traditional ones because they enable them to live 
untraditional lives even if they don’t earn more money they therefore, 
even unwillingly, often represent indeed a kind of vanguard of 
neoliberal transformation (Woltersdorff 2007, 3; see also Hennessy 
2000).  
 
Although I would be a little more cautious here then Woltersdorff regarding the 
scale of described processes, certainly there is a point in place that resonates well 
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with my observations. It is important, however, to not overestimate neoliberalism 
and capitalism. Reflecting upon Evans work, Angelia Wilson (2009) agrees that 
capitalism may regulate homosexuality in various ways, but as a single force, the 
market cannot fully determine it. She is speaking then with those who stress the 
importance of a deep intersectional approach to the study of sexuality (and I 
would add, nationhood) as the most productive approach towards greater 
understanding of the complexity of relations between social forces. Wilson’s 
voice also reminds us that capitalist over-determination is a trap into which Evans 
(and perhaps others as well) may fall, and is one that too easily denies agency to 
gay and lesbian people, making them passive objects of economic forces (Wilson 
2009, 8). In the “Let Them See Us” case, I would suggest that however the range 
of choices may be predetermined by various social, cultural and economic 
conditions - gay and lesbian people are not solely docile bodies, puppets in the 
neoliberal theatre. Rather, they show pro-active wilfulness to harness the 
mechanisms of a new regime; rather than spend (for which they may still be too 
poor, if we consider the massive pauperisation of society as the outcome of the 
“post-communist transformation”) they are surely counting on some “earnings” as 
well. 
 To summarise this section, the set of discussed problems brings to mind 
once again the work of George Mosse (1985). In Chapter 4, while acknowledging 
his importance, I have also proposed a more critical reading of his work in the 
Central and Eastern European setting. However, in the particular context of the 
“Let Them See Us” campaign and in light of what I have written so far, it seems 
that Mosse’s work on the rise of the middle class and nationalism, and its disdain 
for homosexuality, may be very relevant. For the author, respectability and 
nationalism are intertwined through normative gender ideals (predominantly 
manliness), as visible especially in the set of rules accepted and performed by 
“insiders”, with their abnormal Double projected on those outside of the national 
community. Mosse notices that although standards of behaviour are common, 
one particular convention - respectability - even if present in earlier periods, 
became the sign particular to the 19th century. It is for him an effect of shifting 
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economic modes of production, resulting in rapid industrialisation of “Western” 
societies, and in consequence, shifting social stratification. Particularly the rise of 
the middle class as the new formation is important, as “respectability”, aside from 
economic characteristic, became, according to Mosse, the most significant 
element distinguishing the newly emerged social class form the working class and 
aristocracy. Moreover, “respectability” was a middle class response to the very 
conditions that gave birth to it; amid rapid changes after the 1989 and general 
insecurity of the unknown and unpredictable conditions of social and economic 
organisation, it was “respectability” which, according to Mosse, was meant to 
provide a sense of stability and rootedness (Mosse 1985, 4-9). We find similar 
traits in the above analysis, which suggest that “Let Them See Us” deploys an 
intense and rather narrow understanding of the gender norm, through 
redeployment of which it tries to re-inscribe homosexual subjects, taking them out 
from the domain of the outsider/abject into the familiar and acceptable subject 
position of insiders. As I wrote at the beginning of this chapter, it can be argued 
that the social and cultural unrest in Poland after 1989 bears similarities with the 
social and cultural turmoil as the outcome of the hasty industrialisation in 
Western Europe in the 19th century. A feeling of volatility and of the unfamiliar 
was not uncommon for people across generations. In this sense, extending and 
inscribing LGBT strategies into the discourse of respectability was/is a means of 
tapping into the socially recognised and cherished national characteristic, to 
secure themselves a place at the table of the nascent new Poland. As Mosse 
argues for nationalism, being the force embracing middle class ideals of gender 
and respectability, eventually helping to spread them across the range of other 
social classes, so I am arguing that we should read “Let Them See Us” as a 
campaign that at a very deep level performs, uses, and subsumes itself into the 
national discourse of Polishness.  
 Mosse extends his argument further to indicate how sexuality was 
downplayed in this process, “stripped of sensuousness”, in place of which 
marriage and family life as practice of virtue were established.  In his words:  
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Nationalism helped control sexuality, yet also provided the means 
through which changing sexual attitudes could be absorbed and tamed 
into respectability. In addition, it assumed a sexual dimension of its 
own, coming to advocate a stereotype of supposedly “passionless” 
beauty for both men and women (Mosse 1985, 10). 
 
In the light of Mosse’s words, we need to understand the stress on monogamous 
and stable relationship created in the discourse of the campaign as an implicit 
way of becoming the national through the particular performance of the (good) 
homosexual. Because, as Mosse writes, normality does not only exist as an 
independent category, but is fixed as the “quality of the national” (1985, 13).  
 8.1.2 Reading “Let Them See Us” otherwise 
So far in my reading of the “Let Them See Us” campaign, I have critically assessed 
its working and possible side effects it could bring about. But I do not want to 
leave the reader with the sole impression that it cannot be read otherwise. As in 
the previous chapter I have argued that homosexual subjects’ mourning after the 
death of Poland’s homophobic president could be seen as regressive practice, but 
nonetheless I have offered its opposite, subversive understanding, in this chapter 
this seems to be other way round. Being critical so far, I now want to suggest that 
my case study can, and indeed, should also be valorised positively.  
 Looking back at the decade that has passed since 2002 I wonder if the “Let 
Them See Us” brought about changes that perhaps were not/could not be 
foreseen at the moment of its conception. Indeed, I believe that in consequence, it 
brought about some important changes to the discourse of homosexuality in 
Poland. My first observation is that it cracked the culturally sanctioned discourse 
of silence surrounding sexuality in Poland (Ritz 2002). The campaign, although 
initially intended for outdoor billboards, has actually never happened in this form, 
and became a media campaign through its extensive coverage across a range of 
outlets. What is more important, it was not just a scornful acknowledgement as 
e.g. gay prides had been so far, but a discourse consisting of full articles and 
interviews, giving voice and opportunity to the spokespersons of the campaign to 
get their message across. 
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 I would also suggest that being the first campaign of such seize, it 
accelerated the process of cultural reworking of social attitudes towards 
homosexuality in Poland. For example, in 2002/2003 “Gazeta Wyborcza” the 
biggest and main daily newspaper (self-proclaimed central-left) was still 
publishing outspokenly homophobic and derogatory articles alongside those 
calling for tolerance and e.g. same-sex partnerships, all in the twisted name of 
objectivity and balanced discussion (although it would never publish anti-Semitic 
or racist texts) (Sypniewski and Warkocki 2004). Towards the end of the decade, 
not only was homophobia sidelined along with anti-Semitism and racism as an 
absolute “no go” discourse; but the newspaper actually embraced pro-active 
stances, actively campaigning for equality for gays and lesbians (e.g. coming out 
campaigns co-organised with Campaign Against Homophobia and Lambda) 
(Pacewicz 2008). Similarly, when in 2005 Lech Kaczynski (then still Mayor of 
Warsaw) banned for the second time Pride Parade, the protesters with many 
prominent politicians form left and centre sides of the political scene, marched 
against the mayoral ruling, committing acts of civil disobedience in the name of 
freedom and democracy, and against the ideological and religiously motivated 
decisions. These would not have happened if the public debate about the place of 
homosexual people in society was not already well under way. Of course, to 
assign such social change just to one campaign would be erroneous, and surely 
they are the outcome of the steady, everyday labour of LGBT organisations and 
gay and lesbian people themselves, in forging new frontiers of their presence in 
the public space. However, as I have said, I believe the “Let Them See Us” 
campaign has significantly contributed to this process, hence it deserves its 
positive recognition and not only critical assessment (and stressing that one does 
not cancel out the other and that both assessments are of equal value). 
 When thinking about different ways of looking at the LGBT movement in 
Poland and the possibilities of its assessment, I am reminded of Jeffrey Weeks’ 
argument about two moments in the “Western” history of the LGBT movement 
(Weeks 1998). Weeks argues “that the new sexual movements of the past 
generation, particularly feminism and the lesbian and gay movement, have had 
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two characteristic elements: a moment of transgression, and a moment of 
citizenship” (Weeks 1998, 36). If the former was more “revolutionary” and about 
difference, the latter marks a return to claims of sameness. When looking at my 
case study, the opposite can be said: the Polish LGBT movement started from this 
latter “moment of citizenship” (as in the predominant mainstream framework of 
sexual politics in the 1990, the so called gay rights approach). However, it was 
indeed a “moment of transgression” and an initial one in the Polish 
circumstances, rather than the “development” as in Weeks’ account of the 
“Western” model. This is therefore an interesting example of “temporal 
disjunction” that impacts on the sexual politics in Central and Eastern Europe, and 
is very much at the roots of discourses of advancement and backwardness as, 
respectively, assigned to the “West” and the “CEE” (Kulpa and Mizielinska 2011a; 
Kulpa 2012b). This case of possible contradictory, yet simultaneous, moments, 
shapes the vision of sexual politics in Poland, and is exemplified precisely by the 
“Let Them See Us” campaign, as an object of further analysis in the Joanna 
Mizielinska’s article (2011, 89–91).  
 *** 
In summary, I would like to offer the reader the following thought. If we agree 
with Michel Billig (1995) and others that nation and nationalism are performative, 
discursive practices constantly bringing nation to life in the smallest and least 
significant practices - would it be right to suggest that “Let Them See Us” is an 
example of such “everyday nationalism” in its insistence on culturally sanctioned 
“normality” (acted through the embodiment of normative ideals of gender and 
respectability)? A similar argument is made by Tom Boellstroff (2005) in a different 
context. Writing about Indonesia, he observes that homosexual subjects’ 
enactment of socially normative lives centred around family and familial gender 
roles means that they are becoming building blocks of that very society. They are 
becoming “authentic citizens who will be recognized by the nation”. This is so 
because, as he further explains, sexuality and gender are crucial and rather 
immutable characteristics of any national identity (Boellstorff 2005, 199).  
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 It is also worth recalling Anne Marie Smith’s writing on the New Right 
discourse about race and homosexuality in Great Britain, offering again important 
conclusions, which seem to correspond to my case. She makes the important 
point about the “positive images” strategy, which we saw deployed in the “Let 
Them See Us” campaign. Smith argues, and I would like to concur with her, that 
engagements based on such a strategy are always only partially effective. 
Moreover, they are also always partially counter-effective towards the 
campaigner’s set goals. “Positive images”, to put it metaphorically, soothe the 
symptoms, but do not treat the illness and that which caused its development. 
They work on the effects of systematic exclusion, but do not tackle the cause and 
mechanisms of inequality. As Smith puts it:  
 
‘Positive images’ offer an interpretation of homophobic discourse, and 
construct a counter-discourse, but they do not interrupt the entire 
process whereby the coherence of a political project is established 
through the construction of demon figures, the investment in that 
process remains unchallenged (Smith 1994, 191). 
 
The counter-discourse gets caught in what Smith calls “evidence games”: 
“[a]lthough we may think that we are resisting the original truth claiming by 
providing counter-evidence, we may actually be reinforcing the game itself” 
(Smith 1994, 192). This process of the reiterative politics of claims echoes Sara 
Ahmed’s concept of the “hopeful performative” (2010, 200) that is, the 
performative power of repetition that renders the desired idea into a “state of 
reality”. In the previous chapter, I have shown how in “extraordinary times” (the 
catastrophic death of the President) this was used by the homoseusal subjects to 
re-inscribe themselves into the discourse of Polishness. In this chapter, I want to 
strengthen the previous point by showing how similar processes could be 
observed already a few years before. It seems that the need to belong to the 
imagined community of the nation not as outcasts but as “proper citizens” may be 
one of the underpinning desires and psychosocial driving forces within the gay 
and lesbian community and behind LGBT activism in Poland. So, as Mosse claims 
the industrialisation of Western European societies brought about the rise of the 
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middle class, characterised by a “respectability” that became inextricably linked 
to nationalism, here I have presented a reverse process. National discourse 
establishes norms of “respectability”, which are espoused by LGBT campaigners, 
in order to integrate homosexual subject into the “Polish national family”. This 
ambitious goal is sought through performing respectability and establishing 
homosexual abjects as middle class subjects in times of rapid transformations in 
Poland post-1989. And the circle is closed. 
 8.2 “Want Tolerance? So Choose One!” (2006) 
With the previous campaign, we were in the historical time of pre-accession, 
before the EU enlargement in 2004. Two years later, in 2006, when “Want 
Tolerance? So Choose One!” was rolled out, the trust invested in the EU was still 
in place, and it was perhaps even more fuelled up by the coming to power of the 
conservative, populist, religiously motivated political parties of the far right. In 
2005 the Law And Justice Party (the Kaczynski twins, one of whom became a 
president, and the other one was soon to become a Prime Minister) had won 
parliamentary elections, forming a coalitional government with the League of 
Polish Families and Self-Defence. This was a tense moment for the lesbian and 
gay communities in Poland, adding to the already intensified atmosphere of 
homophobia. As I have mentioned earlier, Lech Kaczynski - as Mayor of Warsaw 
- had made homophobic discourse a part of his political strategy, one that 
successfully contributed to his victorious electoral campaign to the seat of the 
President of Poland. So when his party, Law And Justice, won parliamentary 
elections and formed a collation government with two other far right parties, the 
prospects for the lesbian and gay communities seemed rather gloomy. As Ireneusz 
Krzeminski summarises it in his book: 
 
there is no doubt that the political atmosphere [of that time] had a 
significant influence on the experiences of LGBT people. Hateful and 
depreciative political language had significantly influenced the hostile 
and aggressive behaviours against the sexual minorities (Krzemiński 
2009, 70). 
 
  
[Chapter 8 - The quest for “ordinary”] 
 
  
190 
In a situation like this, where internal politics turns ugly, it is easy to imagine that 
LGBT groups would turn towards the EU even more as the perceived last refuge 
from outspokenly homophobic national government. 
 So when local elections were approaching in November 2006, it is perhaps 
not a surprise that LGBT organisations got engaged. The object of my second 
analysis is the campaign “Want Tolerance? So choose one!” prepared by Lambda 
Warszawa Association. In the words of its organisers: 
 
the project is addressed to LGBT people. Its goal is to encourage gays, 
lesbians, bisexuals and transsexuals to take part in local elections and 
vote wisely. It is the beginning of the greater Lambda’s initiative to 
build among us, LGBT people, consciousness of civil society” 
(homiki.pl 2006).  
 
It was an outreach activity with posters put in places frequented by gay and 
lesbian people (bars, clubs, coffee bars, “gay friendly” venues). 
 
 
Figure 9: "Want Tolerance? So Choose One" 
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The poster reads:  “Want Tolerance? So Choose One/Leave”. In smaller font 
under “choose” we read: “Make wise [lit. conscious] choices”. How does this 
speak to traditional Polishness? 
 In this second case I want to make three points and suggestions. Firstly, I 
want to suggest that the action in a striking way habituates the “Traditional 
Polishness” framework of reference discussed in Chapter 5. The case redeploys 
the “Stay, Fight, and Sacrifice!” discourse coupled with the “Shame And 
Indignity!” discourse to those who reject this collectivist call over individual 
choice. This traditional discourse of Polishness is used to mobilise the Polish gay 
and lesbian communities to embrace their civic duty/privilege of voting. 
Secondly, I propose that the organisers seem to accept the neoliberal politics 
proposed by the Civic Platform (the neoconservative contender for Law And 
Justice to power). In doing so, they create the (yet) uncharted fields of possible 
further marginalisation of “other” sexualities. Finally, as in the previous case, I 
also offer this case study as a possible instance of “banal nationalism”/”everyday 
nationalism”.  
 8.2.1 Poland Needs You! 
In Chapter 5 I wrote about the historical and cultural formations of Polish 
nationhood. I pointed out a few characteristic tropes threading through the ever-
changing discourses of the nation across the years. One of the most important is 
without doubt the obligation to fight what is seen as the oppressor (Germans, 
Russians, communists…), a never-ending quest for freedom and sovereignty. A 
true Pole must be ready to sacrifice individual happiness if necessary, and always 
bravely face the challenge. The shame of treason, that is not responding to the 
homeland’s call to arms, is worse than death, and so the fight should not be 
feared (cf. Chapter 5). 
 I would argue that such Romantic ideas of narcissistic martyrology (Janion 
2000; Zieliński 2002; Ziarek 2007) - are the main trope of the “Want Tolerance?” 
campaign. The choice of wording, graphics, and theme - contrasting two 
supposed possibilities of action offered to gay and lesbian communities - re-
deploys the traditional Polish rhetoric of fight with the oppressor (LGBT vs. 
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homophobic government), self-sacrifice for the greater cause (LGBT for future 
generations of LGBT and lofty ideas) and shameful treason (shameless emigrants 
to UK). The campaign helps us to understand how nationhood may be woven into 
the narrative of homosexuality in Poland. When we read in the accompanying 
article that “forthcoming elections appear to be more important then ever”, 
organisers set the event beyond the usual significance of elections. The potential 
reader, an ordinary homosexual person, is encouraged to vote through positive 
arguments about the importance of voting, as much as s/he is discouraged from 
not doing so through a discourse of shame, bravery, and duty. “So if you are 
unsatisfied, complain to politicians about the situation in the country, vote! There 
is no other solution. Of course, you can always leave, but is that a solution, and 
why should I/we leave?” (homiki.pl 2006). 
 The graphic representation of the supposed options, in its simplicity, 
disqualifies and shames one of them (notably: leaving the country), leaving (!) the 
homosexual subject with no choice but to vote. Three elements of the poster 
seem to indicate this: greyed out graphics, slightly smaller font, and the depiction 
of a person with a suitcase, incomplete, as if cut through, hence partially out of 
sight. This stylistic manoeuvre, in comparison to strong robust outlines and 
colours of choosing, “help” the reader not to choose leaving as an option (which 
appears as less appealing, thus less significant and less important), by directing 
the viewer’s attention to the more robust and eye-catching option (voting). 
Indeed, the organisers accuse those who think about leaving Poland, or have 
already done so, or who simply did not vote in previous elections, when stating 
directly: “So those who did not vote in 2005 actively contributed to the victory of 
Law And Justice, League of Polish Families and Self-Defence” (which of course is 
true to a certain degree). So the trope of national survival and the struggle for 
freedom, for national sovereignty and dignity, is translated into the current 
situation of lesbian and gay people in 2006, as struggling for survival in a 
homophobic culture, for freedom of self-expression, individual sovereignty and 
personal dignity. Thus, what was typical for the national discourse became 
characteristic for the homosexual one, making the two alike. 
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 What I have shown so far is the persistence of the national in the LGBT 
organisation’s discourse. As in the previous chapter I want to indicate that the two 
discourses are not necessarily mutually exclusive (although this is often the case). 
Indeed, I want to insist not only on the complexity of the underlying 
relation(ship)s between the nationhood and the homosexuality, but also I want to 
suggest that often they rely on each other. As in the “Want Tolerance?” campaign, 
which puts its confidence in a concept of “Traditional Polishness” to mobilize gay 
and lesbian community for greater engagement in the democratic processes (to 
eventually overcome the obstacle of the nationalistic discourse rejecting 
homosexuality as Other). 
 Some major questions emerge here. Does this reliance on the national 
framework in this campaign mean it is necessarily nationalistic (in the negative 
sense of the word)? I suppose it all depends on our own, personal perspective and 
moral evaluation of nationalism, hence I leave it to the reader. Moreover, we 
should also ask a more fundamental question here: is it possible to envisage any 
social action as not always already pre-defined/pre-coded as national? This is a 
problem that tightly adheres to the taken-for-granted in queer studies, the framing 
of locality through the boundaries and borders of a nation-state (Kulpa 2011). For 
instance, the recently published book “Queer in Europe” (Downing and Gillett 
2011) aims to queer what is invoked by the name of Europe. Consequently one 
would wish to see more attention given by its editors and authors to such 
concepts as Europe, region, nation, state, (nation-)state, and not only queer. In this 
context, the representation of European diversity conceived as the collection of 
nation-state case studies of sexuality, counterposed to “America” (which is 
implicitly framed as not only hegemonic and homogenising, but also a 
homogeneous country/region) is problematic. Would this suggest that we 
replicate sometimes the mechanisms of domination and subordination, when 
perhaps too easily and too quickly counter the globalization and American 
hegemony with the national as an alternative? Can we think about a cultural, 
geographical, political, etc. “diversity in locality” outside the over-determined 
category of a nation-state as an organizing principle? (cf. also Kulpa 2011) 
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 8.2.2 “Lesser evil”?: Exclusions and dangers of “banality” 
Continuing on a more self-reflexive note from the previous section, let me begin 
here by acknowledging that the following critical analysis is not motivated by 
(rather tame) presumption that nation(hood)alism is bad. Instead, my criticism 
stems rather from a caring personal investment in scrutinised issues. As someone 
who was left behind as an unworthy (gay) citizen (after all, I decided to leave and 
not to stay and fight) I understand now better than ever before what dangers, traps 
and their sometimes painful consequence redeployment of the national 
framework in the LGBT discourse may bring about. When I was a Lambda 
volunteer (2002-2004) co-organising many events and projects, contributing 
myself to that which I analyse now (although not directly to this campaign), I was 
not as conscious of various workings of power and exclusion as I am now. 
Therefore I want to use my current possibility of reflexive re-assessment of 
organisational LGBT politics, and give back to the communities, which 
contributed to my shaping as a person, and as a researcher. The criticism I offer is 
thus an alarm call, bringing attention to issues, which I believe are not widely 
discussed among gay and lesbian communities and in the Polish LGBT activism. 
To change this, I hope to translate this work, and publish it in Poland, sharing my 
insights with others, and hopefully stimulating a discussion around the raised 
issues. 
 Above, I discussed the possible negative effects of neoliberal market 
capitalism on the lives of many people who do not “make it to the top”. I want to 
continue this thread below, showing how age and generational belonging, as well 
as the metropolitan location of organisers influence and narrow the angle of the 
“Want Tolerance?” campaign. The campaign urges gay and lesbian people not 
only to vote, but also to “choose wisely”. What is the wise choice that the 
organisers suggest we make? After all, we are not explicitly told who to vote for. 
However, as I will show, there is a very specific voting option implied in this 
supposedly insignificant encouragement. In the accompanying article we read: 
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It is well worth, more! - it is necessary to vote - because it is the only 
way to change the matrix around us. (…) We need to realise a 
fundamental truth. When we are not voting, in truth, we vote for the 
opponent. In my opinion, even if one does not know exactly who to 
vote for, but knows that they do not want certain parties [to win], one 
should choose a lesser evil, and vote for a party or a person that is 
otherwise most suitable for us (homiki.pl 2006, my italics).  
 
Since there is nothing wrong with encouraging people to vote, one interpretation 
of what ”making wise choices” could mean is to do with the major choice: 
staying in the country and voting (striking back against homophobic government) 
or leaving (cowardly). In this case, we can see an emerging space of more harmful 
discourse arising; one that divides gay and lesbian people into “good and voting” 
and “bad and leaving”. It is only a possibility here, an allusion rather than an 
active pursuit of such a rift; yet still, the fact that an opportunity for such negative 
discourse could arise, is unsettling. And such segregation can arise because it 
relies on the traditional national discourse, which in all its queerness and internal 
instability (perhaps even inconsistency), is nonetheless, a discourse of the 
Sameness and Otherness, inclusion and exclusion. So to bring back some 
thoughts from the concluding paragraphs to the previous section, redeployment of 
the national discourse in the LGBT campaign, even if organised to put off the 
homophobic far right government, is nonetheless reinstalling the very discourse 
that enabled those parties to come to power in the first instance. Thus, the 
campaign plays high stakes in this game; and I am just not sure if it is worth a risk. 
 But there is another possibility of understanding the call to “choose wisely”, 
one that is only hinted at in the quoted article, but perhaps of equal importance. 
The Polish sentence “wybieraj swiadomie”, literally meaning “choose 
consciously”, points towards the choice that is conscious of the future 
consequences of the act. Reminding ourselves about the cultural and political 
context of that time, of the stuffy and tense atmosphere of publicly sanctioned 
homophobia, the sentence “wybieraj swiadomie” should rather be translated as 
“make wise choices” - choices that are useful and strategic. Although neither the 
poster nor the article directly indicates who to vote for, they are actually pointing 
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out whom not to vote for (homophobic Law And Justice); thus ”wise” means 
being effective in not allowing Law And Justice to win once again. Consequently, 
this implicitly indicates the choice of the major (and effectively the only possible) 
contender to governmental power - Civic Platform. Why is that? 
 In the 2005 elections, when the Social Democratic government collapsed, 
the two major opposition (right wing) parties were the populist and nationalist 
Law And Justice and the neoliberal and pro-capitalist, but morally just as 
conservative, Civic Platform. In 2006, with Law And Justice already in power, the 
Left, mainly represented in Polish politics by Social Democrats, was significantly 
marginalised (losing support from 41% in 2001 to 11,3% in 2005 elections),xx 
proving itself to be only a weak third contender, after the Civic Platform. It should 
now become a little more clear that the “Want Tolerance?” campaign has, after 
all, a particular political agenda (against Law And Justice, in favour of the major 
contender, Civic Platform), even if it is not explicitly expressed. 
 Perhaps now is the time to ask why the vote in favour of the Civic Platform 
is perhaps a tricky and a dangerous alliance for the LGBT organisers. What is 
wrong with strategic/”wise” voting for the “lesser evil” and against the party that is 
opposed to LGBT specific interests, even to their existence? The short answer is: 
Civic Platform’s neoliberal economic agenda (that has negative consequences on 
many gay and lesbian communities), and moral conservatism (which do not 
ameliorate outspoken homophobic discourse, however, gives silent permission for 
its existence). 
 As already mentioned, Civic Platform is a party favouring the neoliberal 
capitalist market economy, while retaining conservative values at heart. The most 
straightforward comparison would be Tories under Thatcher’s leadership. So why 
was Civic Platform, although as morally conservative as Law And Justice, 
perceived as the “lesser evil”? One of the issues that plays a significant role is 
ageism and the generational divide. I have already shown in Chapter 7 that 
between “younger activists” and “older politicians” there is a generational divide 
making it difficult to find a common language between the LGBT organisations 
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and their addressees, politicians (and society at large). In this case, ageism of the 
LGBT organisations is a factor worth considering once again. 
 As noted, LGBT activists are mainly in their twenties and thirties, students, 
young professionals, in major urban agglomerations of Poland. They occupy a 
rather privileged social and cultural position, but also economic one. They are the 
first generation of Poles brought up under the new regime of a capitalist economy, 
hence possibly finding it easier (than older generations of Poles, also homosexual 
ones but not activists or from outside of the described position of privilege) to 
navigate their lives in the maze of demands, rules and regulations of market 
economy and liberal democracy. Being already socialised into neoliberal 
capitalism, it becomes a fairly invisible that’s-how-things-are backdrop of LGBT 
activists’ practices. What is problematic here is the LGBT activists’ lack of 
consideration of inequality as an intersectional and multi-faceted social problem, 
one that always interweaves sexuality with other identity positions (like gender, 
access to education and hence career prospects thus ability to live a fulfilling life, 
religious beliefs, and rootedness in other communities/identities/identifications, 
etc.). Since the “Want Tolerance?” campaign is meant to mobilise lesbian and gay 
communities into voting, to cease the overwhelming political homophobia and 
ultimately bring about social change and diminish inequality - “wise” deployment 
of strategies that implicitly support neoliberal party (and its politics characteristic 
of, and based on economic inequalities and increased divisions), is problematic. It 
may lead to a situation where certain gay and lesbian people will feel abandoned 
or left on their own (by activists who claim to work in their name), precisely 
because they do not occupy a similar, fairly privileged subject position to that of 
an “activist”. Indeed, this is not only a possibility but also the case. In the 2008 
report from the extensive and nation-wide sociological research into lives of gay 
and lesbian communities in Poland, the division between the older and younger 
generation of homosexual people (Krzeminski 2009, 81 and 85–86), between 
those living in rural and provincial, and metropolitan areas (Krzeminski 2009, 69), 
are clear. Krzeminski’s research confirms my anxieties that LGBT politics in the 
form of the campaign analysed here, is dangerously close to re-inscribing social 
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divisions within own group, even if it seeks to abolish those divisions between 
themselves and the whole society. So it is necessary to think across identity 
positions rather than focus activities only on one factor (homosexuality) in the 
struggle for equality. Following Diane Richardson, we should not forget about the 
hidden politics of the equal rights pledge. Equal to whom, she asks; with whom 
do LGBT activists want to be equal? Straight women with the double burden of a 
“professional career” and household chores? Ageing and unemployed populations 
of small villages and provincial towns? Straight men, but from lower working 
milieus, struggling to support their families in the ever-changing and harsh 
conditions of neoliberal market capitalism? The list could go on and on… By 
asking this simple question, we draw our attention to the implicit gender, ethnic, 
ageist, metropolitan (and possibly many others) underpinnings of the pledge, 
confirming again the need for cautious framings of sexual politics (Richardson 
2000, 82). Otherwise, we will be observing (as the process is already in place) a 
growing detachment and alienation between activists and “ordinary people” in 
gay and lesbian communities (Glowania 2009, 258–265). 
 So the open question, to which there is no easy answer, remains: taking the 
above into consideration is it worth choosing the “lesser evil” of the neoliberal 
Civic Platform? Likely sacrificing other spheres of our lives in the name of sexual 
identity? It is also very clear here why even the strategic essentialism of LGBT 
politics is troublesome. The non-reflexive (in terms of acknowledging economic 
and other factors, not only sexuality) case of “Want Tolerance?” is then an 
opportunity for me to reflect on the precarious conditions of sexual politics in 
Poland. And in a critical, but supportive manner, I offer its analysis for a 
thoughtful consideration about the role of economic market conditioning in post-
1989 Poland, the emerging LGBT movement, and sexual politics on the 
crossroads of the discourses of the nationhood and homosexuality. 
 Apart from the missing intersectional consideration of economic factors, I 
think it was also a misinterpretation of Civic Platform’s silence (well, 
comparatively to Law And Justice and its coalition, League of Polish Families) 
regarding homosexuality that led campaigners to straightforwardly accept the 
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“lesser evil” of Civic Platform. Two things could contribute to this silence. First, 
Civic Platform’s pro-European stance; where the discourse of the EU is officially 
concerned with all forms of discrimination, including one based on sexual 
orientation, the party would risk alienation (that the Law And Justice government 
suffered) on the European scene, which is ultimately against its goals. Thus, this 
could stimulate the second reason: to embrace political correctness and not voice 
the moral or ethical stances too much in the public, refraining from the highly 
controversial issues (not only homosexuality, but also abortion, religion in 
schools, etc.). Additionally, in the discursive space where Law And Justice is 
framed as the ultimate evil, hence all other political powers must be by 
implication perceived if not as better, then at least as a lesser evil (such is the 
power of the better/worse, more/less, greater/lesser dialectics). Finally, Civic 
Platform’s pro-EU politics must have resonated rather positively with the 
organisers of the “Want Tolerance?” campaign. As I have mentioned, the trust 
LGBT activists placed in the European Union as the guardian of minorities and 
tolerance could also create the impression that Civic Platform is like a proverbial 
devil, not so black as he’s painted. But is it? 
 The trust in Civic Platform, which we are encouraged to feel by the “Want 
Tolerance?” campaign, its unproblematized acceptance of the “lesser evil” as the 
only solution, without pondering deeper-rooted possibilities, consequences and 
dangers of such politics, turned out to be a rather bitter lesson. Soon after Civic 
Platform’s victorious local and then national elections, Janusz Kochanowski was 
appointed as the Human Rights Ombudsman, and Elzbieta Radziszewska as the 
government’s Plenipotentiary for Equal Rights. Although holding two of the 
highest positions and obliged to work for tolerance and equality, and against 
discrimination and exclusion, both officials made numerous comments of a 
homophobic nature (Szulc 2011, 165; Mizielinska 2011, 88).  
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 8.3 States of belonging: The question of “sexual 
citizenship” 
When looking at my case studies, one observation is that both campaigns do not 
seem to pay much attention to what impact they may have on the gay and lesbian 
communities. In 2003 we saw the struggle for national inclusion via the discourse 
of a good life based on some sort of normality, economic and cultural self-
reliance, and building up the new middle class. In 2006, this discourse seemed to 
be also well under the skin of the organisers. As examples show, they use a 
regulatory and normalising discourse that may (and should) be seen in relation to 
a more broadly defined “post-communist transformation” in Poland and CEE. 
What emerged in the analysis are the tropes that indicate neoliberalism and its 
economic, political and cultural politics (Duggan 2002, 177) to be a considerable 
backdrop of the LGBT activism in Poland. It should, however, be contextualised 
in the particular national history, otherwise the critique we hope to perform may 
miss the point. Should we not account for the geo-temporal, cultural, national, 
regional… specificity, we risk running generalising arguments that may not hold 
their validity, thus even fail in their purpose (cf. my discussion of “modernity” in 
Chapter 4). In the former case of the “Let Them See Us” campaign, we observe a 
form of self-governance to fit the bill of a “good citizen” as redefined according to 
the new neoliberal agenda introduced in Poland after 1989. In the latter case of 
“Want Tolerance?”, neoliberal politics is also taken for granted in the 
unquestioned acceptance of Civic Platform as a “lesser evil”. What I find 
problematic is the lack of acknowledgement from the LGBT organisations that 
inequality of lesbian and gay people in society is an effect of not only prejudices 
against homosexuality, but is a manifold social problem encompassing many 
other factors of social positioning (age, place of living, education, employment 
status, etc.). The taken-for-grantedness of neoliberal economic and cultural 
politics is symptomatic here. As Richardson (2005) rightfully notes:  
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this is further compounded by the fact that the “politics of citizenship” 
is the dominant discourse in sexual politics. In this respect, 
contemporary lesbian and gay movements rely implicitly on neoliberal 
language/concepts, which may also help to explain why neoliberalism 
tends to be ignored or is hidden from view (Richardson 2005, 517). 
 
The stress put by both campaigns on the issue of the respectability of homosexual 
subjects also remains highly problematic from many viewpoints. In the pursuit of 
proving their worth to the society and to themselves, the two campaigns 
irrevocably create a model of the normal gay person that would fit the “good 
citizen” bill. It is striking how well the words of Steven Seidman (2002) describe 
what the two case studies implicitly evoke. He writes:  
 
A normal gay is expected to be gender-conventional, link sex to love 
and marriage-like relationship, defend family values, personify 
economic individualism, and display national pride. Although 
normalisation makes it possible for individuals to conduct lives of 
integrity, it also establishes a moral and social division among gays. 
Only normal gays who conform to dominant social norms deserve 
respect and integration. (...) And, as we'll see, the normal gay implies a 
political logic of tolerance and minority rights that does not challenge 
heterosexual dominance (Seidman 2002, 133). 
 
In a similar vein and also noticing the lack of a challenge to heteronormativity, 
Bell and Binnie characterise good sexual citizenship as, “privatized, de-
radicalized, de-eroticized and confined in all senses of the word: kept in place, 
policed, limited” (Bell and Binnie 2000, 3; see also Warner 1999; Richardson 
2004). This self-restricting (in certain respects, of course) discourse of 
respectability (well rooted in the nationhood) opens a dangerous place in the 
LGBT discourse, a rupture where another division within the gay and lesbian 
communities may occur. For, as Carl Stychin (1998) argues, it is this very idea of 
respect that perpetuates the division between “good and bad gays”, facilitating 
further exclusions. And indeed, as Anna Gruszczynska shows in her work (2009a, 
203), such divisions into “wanted good gays” and “unwanted bad queers” were 
the case during pride marches organised around the same time or later in Poland. 
It is a sad lesson (but perhaps not surprising if we take into consideration what I 
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said earlier about the dialectical process of identity construction) that for every 
“good gay” there will always be at least one “bad queer” (Smith 1994, 204-216). 
And this cautiously recalls Jeffrey Weeks’ very optimistic article about the 
emerging “sexual citizens” (1998). There, he proclaimed that: “this new 
personage is a harbinger of a new politics of intimacy and everyday life” (Weeks 
1998, 36). I certainly agree with Weeks in that lesbian and gay people (in my 
Polish cases) do embody some form of a new politics of intimacy and everyday 
life after 1989. However, now I would not be as optimistic as he is in this 
proclamation. And in thinking towards possible alternatives in the domain of 
sexual politics, in Poland or elsewhere, I would concur with Lisa Duggan (1994) 
who proposes a new type of sexual politics, as an alternative to gay rights/sexual 
citizenship politics of neoliberalism and nationhood. Such politics would not 
assert similarity and normality, but rather de-naturalize heteronormativity. The 
task would be to stop proving the normality of homosexuality; in Anne Marie 
Smith’s terminology that would be to break the circle of “evidence games”. 
Instead, Duggan insists on the need to engage sexual politics in the process of 
showing the non-normality of heteronormativity. 
 When we recall “sexual citizenship”, we inevitably enter the arena of state 
and nationhood, and how the three contribute and constitute each other. This 
now leads me to my earlier suggestion that both case studies can serve as 
instances of “everyday nationalism”/”banal nationalism”. If we share the 
sceptic/negative opinion about this ideology, this shift to the micro level in 
nationalism studies may provide an argument for the gloomy vision of nationalism 
as an all-encompassing discourse. Michael Billig (1995) argues that the opinion 
that nationalism is an external force relegated only to the peripheries of the 
political mainstream, and visible only during the spectacular and grand events is 
misleading. Nationalism continues to be so powerful because it remains at the 
very heart of politics, as hidden and unnoticed in obvious and banal acts of 
everyday life (Billig 1995, 5). But we should not be too quick in deprecating it 
only on the grounds of its supposed inevitability. For it may also be a platform to 
elevate some marginalised groups to (at least partially) another, perhaps better 
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(but not free from constrains) social status. I have tried to show how homosexual 
subjects in Poland - by means of the two LGBT campaigns - redeployed the 
discourse of the national, harnessing it (as much as they could) to their own 
purposes. Purposes that do not necessarily correspond to those that we usually 
(and after conservative appropriation) see as nationalistic. Therefore I would like 
to suggest that both campaigns do perform certain type of discourse that is derived 
from a wider national backdrop, a sort of “banal nationalism”.  
 In “Let Them See Us” we saw a deployment of the “positive images” 
strategy.  These “good images” were aimed at reconfiguring lesbian and gay men 
not as abjects but as subjects through the insistence on their normality. They 
could appear as good lesbians and gays only due to their particular representation 
as good citizens in the emerging new neoliberal economic and political regime in 
Poland. This chain of equivalences and assumptions as to what is good (and 
implicitly bad) that ends up in the notion of a good citizen, is in my opinion a 
mechanism of assumption linked to the performance of “banal/everyday 
nationalism”. In the “Want Tolerance?” campaign this banality of nationalism was 
present on two levels. Firstly, there was the utilization of “Traditional Polishness” 
about national fight, sacrifice and shame in the LGBT self-mobilisation campaign. 
Secondly, the unanimous acceptance of Civic Platform (even, or perhaps 
especially, as “lesser evil”) as a political party that performs (and hence creates 
and sustains) the “post-1989” national discourse of new Poland as a neoliberal 
capitalist democracy. Billig is right then, when he writes: 
 
National identity embraces all these forgotten reminders. Consequently, 
an identity is to be found in the embodied habits of social life. (…) 
Because the concept of nationalism has been restricted to exotic and 
passionate exemplars, the routine and familiar forms of nationalism 
have been overlooked. In this case, ‘our’ daily nationalism slips from 
attention. (…) Nationhood is still being reproduced: it can still call for 
ultimate sacrifices; and, daily, its symbols and assumptions are flagged 
(Billig 1995, 8–9). 
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Chapter 9  
Conclusions 
 
 In the opening paragraphs to his book about South Africa, William Spurlin 
writes (2006, 2): 
 
The transition from apartheid to democracy has also opened up new spaces 
of “queer” visibility, identity politics, cultural production, and social critique 
both in South Africa and in the neighboring region. Though there is now a 
seriousness about lesbian and gay issues in South Africa in ways that were 
previously not possible (…), one must nonetheless concede that material 
conditions still mitigate against the fullest realization of ANC-initiated 
democratic imperatives and that the status of homosexuality in the region 
remains a highly complex and contradictory question. 
 
His words could not better resonate with my own case of the Polish “post-
communist transformation”. Political, economic, and cultural changes continue to 
impact on the notion of nationhood, and what it means to be Polish. Integral to 
the formation of the new Polish democracy was Solidarity - the workers’ 
movement for liberty and dignity that contributed to the collapse of the state 
communism in Poland and across CEE (Castle and Taras 2002). It soon became 
clear that the vision of a “new Poland” upheld by the new political elite was not 
shared by the masses. The religious uprooting of the governing elites (cf. Chapter 
5) became both divisive and oppressive. This reminds of Partha Chatterjee’s 
(1993)  observation national struggles for freedom often equated with oppression 
of some ‘other’ groups. As Spurlin further observes, it is very likely that these other 
groups will be women and homosexual people (2006, 11). This resonates with the 
Polish case, when anti-feminist and homophobic discourse and policies quickly 
found their speakers among political elites (Mizielinska 2001). It seemed that 
Polish nationhood and homosexuality were unconceivable together in any other 
way than as “deadly enemies” (Graff 2010). And this is where my story begins. 
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 Much inspired by writing about transnational sexual politics, globalisation 
and localisation processes and by queer post-colonial studies (cf. discussions in 
Chapter 4), I was convinced that the relation between the discourses of 
nationhood and homosexuality in post-1989 Poland must be more complex and 
nuanced than e.g. Graff (2010) suggests. Therefore, without denying the “deadly 
enemies” as one form of a relation(ship) (indeed, it is a focus of my analysis in 
Chapter 6), I set myself the task of looking at and finding what other forms of 
relating  can be found, when we study instances of the discourses of nationhood 
and homosexuality and the ways that they relate to one another. Therefore across 
the thesis, I have paid attention to the undercurrents and internal dynamics, 
constantly negotiating and re-working mutual dependencies between the two 
discourses. In this context, I was particularly keen on exploring the “unforeseen” 
(or possible), the “wilful”, “unintended” (or hoped for) in the two discourses. To 
do so, I organised the thesis around three major research questions: (1) How is 
homosexuality framed by national discourse (when performed by the nation-
state)? (2) How do discourses of homosexuality relate to nationhood (in times of 
national distress)? (3) How might national/ist rhetoric be present in discourses of 
LGBT organisations? Methodologically, the thesis is grounded in a case study 
approach and utilises discourse analysis. Overall, I argue that we may map out 
the relations between nationhood and homosexuality through discourses of 
“rejection” as well as “dependency”, oscillating on a continuum between 
“sameness” and “otherness”. These relations are best described via the concepts 
of “dislocation”, “belonging”, “attachment”, “narrating”, “forgetting”, 
“remembering”, and “disidentification”. 
 In this project, I deployed the notion of discourses as the practices of 
creating and sustaining meanings; practices of language, but also, and by no 
means less importantly, of material, economic, symbolic, visual and so on, 
characteristics. Discourses are practices and structures relating to and shaping the 
multiplicity of subjectivities we live in, and fixing them in temporary, if elusive 
(yet still, not less real or “true”) subject (and object, and abject) positions 
(“identity”). This stress on “identification” rather than on “identity” (cf. debates in 
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Chapter 2), on the mutuality of relations between the two discourses, rather than 
on the fixed matrix of domination/subordination, helped me to explore some of 
the complexities that could otherwise remain “hidden”/unrecognised. Of course I 
do not want to insinuate that the relation between the national and homosexual is 
value free, such a claim is simply unsustainable. However, in this thesis I found 
that there exists a space of flexibility and consequently of subversive dislocation 
in terms of the ways that homosexual subjects and LGBT organisations relate to 
nationhood (and vice versa).  
 I am reminded here of the concept of “mimicry”, which is very popular 
amongst post-colonial theorists. In its lay meaning, it denotes an act of copying 
that could be read as establishing an unequal relation between the assumed 
original, and its mimicry/copy. However, the undertaking that circulates within 
academe is much inspired by the writings of Homi Bhabha (2004 [1994]). He 
insists that any act of communication is never “full” or perfect in that the 
“original” message is always subject to the audience’s interpretation (and thus to 
the audiences modification). This incongruence is a space of slippage and 
potentiality and, as Bhabha argues in cases of relations between colonial masters 
and the colonised, of subversion and rebellion. Bhabha argues that in the process 
of colonialization something is lost (in “translation” of the colonial hegemonic 
authority onto local subdued contexts), and thus opens a space of potential 
rebellion by those who are subjugated. The “original”/dominant is rendered 
“hybrid”/ambivalent. It seems useful and possible for me to conceive the 
relation(ship)s between the discourses of nationhood and homosexuality to be 
similar to that of the relationship between coloniser and colonised described by 
Bhabha. If that unequal relation was a point of departure for my study, I have 
analysed some case studies showing many tensions, incongruences, and 
ambivalences in and among discourses of the nationhood and homosexuality.  
 For example, in Chapter 6 I showed how the Others in relation to which a 
sense of Polish nationhood was defined are changing after 1989. This process 
seems to be continuous, fluctuating, and adapting, rather than based on rejection, 
abandonment, or total reconfiguration (as it was in the case of the change of 
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political and economic systems). I observed how homosexuality becomes one of 
the “new” Others in national discourse, and it seems an especially important 
Other, because of its discursive linking to the “old” Other (and still powerful, as it 
turns out) - Germany. In my analysis it emerged that whilst homosexuality is 
constructed in the nation-state’s discourses as dangerous and threatening, it is 
equally important and inseparable from that discourse, suggesting a form of 
“hybridization” of the national narrative. I use the concept of “supplement” to 
highlight how the national discourse is in fact a discourse of dependency where - 
beyond being the Other - homosexuality implicitly becomes the necessary Other. 
Indeed, homosexuality appears to be the figure/object of the national constitutive 
desire; thus it signifies the impossibility of achieving national identity (understood 
as any complete and stable acquisition). 
 Another case was analysed in Chapter 7, where I suggest that there is a great 
deal of importance given to national belonging by homosexual subjects (one that 
possibly goes beyond wish and need of, for example, legal regulations of same-
sex coupledom). This was demonstrated through an analysis of the ways in which 
gays and lesbians mourned the death of the homophobic President Kaczynski. I 
read this as an act of subversive agency whereby homosexual subjects 
participated in the rituals of national bereavement as a way to seek inclusion into 
the national community. Referring back to debates and literature introduced in 
Chapter 2, I demonstrated how this seemingly paradoxical case, where some 
Polish gay and lesbian people publicly mourned the death of their outspokenly 
homophobic president, may be an example of identification rather than 
“identity”. The case shows that “gay and lesbian” identities, as well as those of 
“Pole” and also “homophobe”, are the effect of constant disidentification rather 
than permanently fixed. Here is a place of potential rift where some form of 
subversivness may arise. “Mimicry” demonstrated by partaking in expressions of 
national bereavement is what constitutes and enables the wilfulness of the 
homosexual subjects. After Bhabha, himself clearly influenced by Foucault’s 
philosophy of power, we notice that it is possible, because:  
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Resistance is not necessarily an oppositional act of political intention, nor is 
it the simple negation or exclusion of the 'content' of another culture, as a 
difference once perceived. It is the effect of an ambivalence produced 
within the rules of recognition of dominating discourses as they articulate 
the signs of cultural difference and reimplicate them within the deferential 
relations of colonial power - hierarchy, normalization, marginalization and 
so forth (Bhabha 2004, 157-8). 
 
Suffice to say here that resistance or wilful subjectivity of homosexual subjects 
was particular here to the formation of a nation-state. Beriss (1996, 189) rightly 
points out that nations are not fixed monolithic actors driven by some ideé fixe. 
Nations, we need to remember, are comprised of people engaged in everyday 
performances of everyday life (cf. debates in Chapter 3). With the insistence on 
relationality, processuality and performativity of identifications, we can 
understand the tie-up of nationhood and homosexuality, to be a wilful subversion 
of culturally and traditionally sanctioned performative recollections of (in this 
case) Polishness. Thus homosexual subjects attaining to the rituals of national 
bereavement (Chapter 7) or LGBT organisations evoking normality (Chapter 8), 
break the chains of interlinked subject positions (who is legitimate) and the 
practices assigned to them (to do/to be what one should do/be, according to their 
social role/position). And even if in doing so, they deploy some traditional (i.e. 
perhaps homophobic) tropes of nationhood, the nation is rendered a “hybrid” 
space of identification for the homosexual subject. This is possible only when 
nationhood is “illegitimately” used/performed by the “abjects” in the act of wilful 
subversion and mimicry (cf. Chapter 8). 
 In highlighting the fluctuating modality of the mutual impacts that discourses 
of nationhood and homosexuality may have on each other, I have also pointed 
out in Chapter 8 the possible dangers posed when LGBT organisations adopt 
national referents in their politics. There is a bleak side of the (national) force, and 
like with fire, it is easy to get burned if one is not careful enough. For example, 
LGBT activists may be denounced for not adequately responding to the needs of 
so called “ordinary lesbian and gay people” (Glowania 2009). Also my case 
studies in Chapter 8 showed LGBT organizers as lacking insight regarding the 
complex intersection of inequalities, where ideas about sexuality were bound up 
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with other social locations/“identities” (for example age, education, rootedness in 
local communities, employment status and so on). My analysis shows that 
campaigns (and possibly LGBT activism in general) focused solely on sexual 
orientation and in redeploying some tropes of national discourse, fail to take the 
complex nature of social divisions into account, and in (not) doing so redraw lines 
of new in-group inequalities (for instance, along the lines of economic status, 
and/or age). In attaining to the possible in-group divisions that may arise if LGBT 
activism embraces neoliberal capitalism and liberal democratic ideologies, as the 
new and unproblematic underpinnings of the new, post-1989 Polishness, speaks 
to the queer critique of neoliberalism (cf. Chapter 4). At the same time, I want to 
stress again that I do not take this critique unanimously, at least not without prior 
contextualisation in the national histories and developments of the liberal 
democratic and neoliberal capitalist regimes. Although they surely bear many 
resemblances, thus influencing similar (negative) impact on societies, I am also 
reminded that it was precisely the economic, political (and cultural) regimes that 
enabled the emerging homosexual subjectivity and the rise of LGBT activism after 
1989 in Poland in the first place. Throughout the thesis, I have highlighted 
relational complexity between nationhood and homosexuality by focusing on the 
tension posed for homosexual subjects in Poland when considering the impacts of 
post-1989 discourses of Polishness. 
 Here a paragraph dedicated to the European Union (EU) is also necessary. 
from the cases analysed in Chapters 6 and 8, one can conclude of the EU as an 
important player, referent, and Other in the relations between Polish nationhood 
and homosexuality. One that takes up much of the national, as well as the 
homosexual, subjects’ imagination. This suggests that there is valuable insight to 
be gained from attending to Polish nationhood in the context of a comparative 
perspective with the “West” which the EU is seen to epitomise. First of all, the EU 
is an outcome of developing economic interests and political ideologies of a few 
Western European countries. In Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), the position of 
the EU is somewhat reversed: it is a driving force (directly or not) behind some of 
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the most significant changes in the structure of nation-states, and in the 
ideological underpinnings of political, economic and cultural regimes.  
 Also the role of the EU in shaping sexual politics in this region is different. 
As much as current LGBT movements in Western European countries profit from 
the EU impact in their national context, the EU is a late(er) addition in the history 
of sexual liberation. We can tentatively say that when the EU was taking its 
current shape, LGBT movements in some of the most influential countries in the 
EU (e.g. the UK, France, Germany or Netherlands) were already developed and 
organized. Conversely, in the CEE context, the shaping of the nation-states, new 
national ideologies, and sexual politics, coincided with one another in a relatively 
short and intense period of time - and alongside the development/under the 
influence of the EU. These two rather different trajectories have led to “temporal 
disjunctions” and narrations of the CEE as “backward/homophobic”, and the 
“West” as “advanced/pro-gay” (Kulpa and Mizielinska 2011). We have yet to see 
what outcomes this triangular dynamic - where CEE nation-states are emerging, 
their respective sexual politics are slowly shaping up, with an important role of 
the third party EU influence - will produce. 
 ***!
From the very beginning, this thesis tells the story not only of the relations 
between national and homosexual discourses, but also of my research journey. 
The position I occupy, an outcome of interlaced choices and events beyond my 
control, the “limbo” of in-between-ness the “West” and the “CEE”, between the 
“privilege of research” and “depravity of immigration”, proved to be a productive 
and beneficial one. Indeed, it was this position that shaped my interests and 
analytical perspectives, and made the reflection on inequalities in the epistemic 
field of knowledge production, a part of this research. Having spent six years as a 
part-time student working on this thesis I have observed (in literature) and 
experienced (in everyday academic life) how the geographical divisions 
(“West”/CEE) respectively translate into categories of “knowledge production” and 
“knowledge consumption”, “theory” and “example/experience”, “universal” and 
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“particular”. I have also learned that there is not some sort of generalized 
academic scholarship practice, as long as it is recognised as such through the 
more and less (and this is: “more and less”) structured channels of ratification. 
These channels of recognition of what “proper” academic scholarship is, do not 
only conform to the rules and regulation of educational and research institutions. 
They are also tightly and inherently related to the particular national cultures, 
with all their norms, customs, and traditions of what constitutes “good” and 
“bad”, “proper” and “lame”, “in/adequate” and “in/correct”, etc. This learning 
experience does not break any new ground, but in the context of this particular 
research project, it is still vital to reflect upon it. How, for example, have 
“Britishness” and British academic culture shaped the knowledge produced so far 
about sexuality, nationhood, and CEE? And how it provided at the outset the 
ground for my research? How did years of schooling and studying in Poland 
shape my sense of what academic scholarship is about, and how it differs to 
British perceptions of what “proper” academic scholarship should be? And finally, 
how these two different academic traditions came to shape my research and this 
thesis? I do not have any ready answers yet, the ideas are still brewing, but I 
certainly concur with Ken Plummer’s words (2001, 206): 
 
The social researcher is not a mere medium through which knowledge is 
discovered; he or she can also be seen as a “constructor” of “knowledge”. 
We need to look at how the researcher's personal and social worlds lead to 
these constructions, and how such constructions are subsequently used in 
the social world. This is not to deny that there may be some independent 
truth content in such research; it is merely to recognize that issues of 
personal experience, social morality and public politics are an ever-present 
feature of research and need to be firmly confronted. 
 
 This reflexive position became helpful in Chapter 4, overviewing literature 
on sexuality and nationalism. Since scholarship produced in and about the 
“West”, in predominantly English speaking countries, must for necessary reasons 
of in/trans/labitlity, have its limits, it became apparent it has (inspiring, yet) limited 
potential for applicability to the Central and Eastern European setting. 
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 This is where I hope to offer an original contribution to the academic fields 
of sexuality and nationhood studies, by focusing on the “non-Western” 
specifically Central and Eastern Europe, and even more precisely Polish cases. 
While working in the British academic setting, yet still being a “foreigner”, I hope 
to contribute to the English-speaking academe, by offering insights from the space 
of inbetweeness, without attesting to any particular location or modes of 
academic scholarship production. (Which, of course, is a little idealistic). In doing 
so, I hope to go beyond the status of an “informant” about “what it is like to be 
gay in Poland?”. (For this is the question I am asked far too often during academic 
events, irrespectively of what is the actual topic of my presentation; and which I 
believe is a manifestation of hegemonic power/knowledge relations in the 
epistemic field). Hence the more personal and self-reflective writing partially 
stems from the desire to overcome this status of a “foreigner”, and play around 
with my roles as the “informant” and/or the “theory producer”. 
 *** 
Finally, at the very end, I would like to highlight some possible directions for 
further research stemming from the findings and implications of this project. 
Firstly, the prospect of using post-colonial studies to consider the post-communist 
CEE context. Although only touched on in this thesis, there is a clear potential for 
further deployment of post-colonial theories in the study of Central and Eastern 
European “post-communist transformations”. There are already attempts being 
made to bring the two together (Todorova 1997; Kelertas 2006; Owczarzak 
2009), but there is more to do in this respect. Secondly, the premise of empirical 
exploration of the relationship between discourses of nationhood and 
homosexuality. Empirical research using a mix of other qualitative and 
quantitative methods could shed more light on some of the issues and threads 
raised in this thesis, and proliferate the picture by possibly locating new issues. 
Thirdly, a broader comparative research is worth considering. Deliberating on 
different geographical locations could further elucidate on the relationship 
between the discourses of nationhood and homosexuality. Future work could 
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consider this relationship in the context of other CEE (or Latin American or 
African, for that matter) countries that share a similar location as “new 
democracies” having to do with the emerging LGBT movements. Lastly, a 
consideration of heteronormativity in Poland could bring interesting results. My 
research suggests that issues of normalisation are important to consider in the 
given research project. The role of heteronormativity could be further explored, 
with a consideration of how and to what extent heteronormativity shapes relations 
between nationhood and homosexuality. 
 My research suggests there are multiple ways for scholars to consider 
nationhood and sexual politics in Poland. Its significance lies in its contribution to 
the relatively scarce but growing body of work concerned with sexualities in 
Central and Eastern Europe (Stulhofer and Sandfort 2004; Kuhar and Takács 2007; 
Kulpa and Mizielinska 2011b). Additionally, we have recently witnessed a rise of 
concern with “homonationalism” in queer studies. Attention to Poland is a 
valuable addition to this scholarship, which so far is only about the “West” and 
“Islam”. Finally, it also contributes to nationalism studies, where sexuality is still 
an under-explored topic (Pryke 1998; Nagel 1998), and it offers new insights for 
scholars interested in Polish nationalism studies. 
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Endnotes 
                                            
i “Nationhood” is used here as a broad term incorporating concepts and ideas about a nation, 
ii  “LGBT” stands for “lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans” and is the label of choice used by the 
organisations and individuals who claim to speak in the name of the wider LGBT community, 
even though they usually do so primarily in the name of gay and lesbian people. The bisexual and 
trans- people are only nominal referents; yet still, this is the label always used by the organisations, 
hence I will use it only in reference to organised forms of sexual political activism. I use “gay and 
lesbian” to be more specific then LGBT and also not to perpetuate the false representation of the 
“B” and “T”, when I speak about these communities. The word order is also important, stressing 
the gender imbalance in the gay and lesbian communities, where generally gay women are less 
visible and overshadowed by gay men. I also use “communities” in the plural to avoid 
homogenisation of diverse groups and subject locations embodied and inhabited by gay and 
lesbian people. “Gay and lesbian” are also the labels of choice of gay and lesbian people to 
describe their (sexual) identity. 
iii “Strong objectivity” is a concept coined by Sandra Harding and denotes "critical reflexivity". 
iv “West” in this thesis is an idea that brings together geographical, political, ideological, historical 
and economic referents. It may point to the very precise entities (e.g. EU), but at the same time will 
always have traces of other geographical locations (e.g. USA, Europe) or ideas (e.g. progress, 
advancement). Thus, inherent to the idea of the “West” is certain vagueness. It is also understood 
in this project as a powerful and hegemonic discourse able to impose meanings, thereby shaping 
the realities. The initial EU appropriation of the “Europe” to define union of some of the Western 
European countries, setting aside the “Central and Eastern Europe”, is an example of such 
hegemonic discourses. In this thesis, the “West” is usually defined more from the CEE, Polish and 
my personal perspective (e.g. “non-Western”), rather than incorporating “Western” self-definitions 
and self-perceptions. I also consequently write the “West” in quotation marks to highlight that I 
refer to a construction or social concept, rather than to any particular referent, entity, or location 
standing behind it. If the tension between the “West” and the more particular location is intended, 
I will write: “West”/EU or “West”/Europe to indicate this. 
v  “Figure of the homosexual” refers to the social construction of what homosexuality and 
homosexual people are. It is mostly used in relation to the national discourses on homosexuality, 
which rarely use “gay and lesbian” labels. 
vi “Homosexual subject” refers to the theoretical conceptualisation of the general cultural position 
of gay and lesbian people (“subjects”), rather than to “concrete”/real people (which are referred to 
as “gay and lesbian”). 
vii I use “minority “West” and the “majority World” after Raewyn Connell’s “Gender: In the world 
Perspective” (2009), highlighting transnational dimension of inequalities. 
viii In 2010, 50% of Poles were against legal abortion (but only 14% is in favour of a total ban), and 
45% were in favour of legal pregnancy termination (CBOS 2010a). In 2011, while 97% of society 
declared themselves as Catholic, only 66% expressed trust to the Catholic Church. In the same 
time, also 66% was critical of the Church’s involvement in the public and political life. According 
to the same study, this is a stable social process of rising distrust to the Catholic Church since 1994 
(wprost.pl 2011). 
ix Until recently, the Polish term “Matka Polka” was translated into English as “Polish Mother”. 
However, “Mother the Pole” in terms of discursive investments in national identity formation is 
semantically closer to the Polish original. Also, in my opinion it better highlights the woman’s role 
as a Mother, only through which she becomes a Pole. 
x It should be noted that the use of images here and later in this chapter is illustrative only; I do not 
aim to provide detailed analysis, for which I suggest the work of Janion (1996), Ostrowska  (2004) 
and Gorska (2005) as good starting points. 
xi http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Curzon_line_en.svg (accessed on 23.04.2010). 
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xii A 2003 CBOS survey showed that: 23% of Poles liked (original expression used in the survey) 
Jews; 23% were indifferent; 46% disliked them; and 8% could not decide (CBOS 2003). However, 
in the January 2010 report (CBOS 2010b), these figures were as follows (respectively): 31%, 35%, 
27%, 7%. Figures show clear improvement of perception, however there is still a long way to go. 
xiii http://europa.eu/abc/eurojargon/index_en.htm (accessed 24.02.2012). 
xiv In this old-national vs. young-homosexual dyad, I want to suggest that there are different 
generations of people behind organisations, parties, media, projects, etc., which in turn influence 
and generate discourses of the National and the Homosexual. This generational divide is very 
clear, with all the politicians being of the "dads and uncles" generation (late forties, and mostly 
fifties and sixties), as opposed to activists mostly in their twenties and early thirties. I base this 
observation on my own four-year experience of voluntary work in Lambda Association (2001-
2005). 
xv It may be worth mentioning the etymological roots of the word 'freedom'/'wolność' in Polish. 
'Wolność' share its stem with 'wola'/'will'; hence 'freedom' means 'to act upon one's will; be in 
agreement (with oneself); choose' (Brückner 1996). In this context, lesbian and gay men's 
mourning is an act of doing freedom, rather than acting upon freedom. In the latter case, acting 
upon it, 'freedom' becomes some sort of abstracted idea, or a state, or a value existing on its own 
or independently of the subject. This would also mean the possibility of creating various 
facilitations or obstructions in accessing such constructed "freedom". If we revive freedom's 
etymological roots in 'will', then freedom can be re-rendered not as something 'external' to the 
subject, but as the subject's activity of acting on their choice/will. In this sense, mourning can be 
seen as a bold example of doing freedom outside the socially and politically 
constructed/constrained framework of law/recognition. This is not to say that there are limitless 
possibilities of agency available to lesbian and gay people, though. (The debate about possibilities 
of agency is far too complicated for such simple claims). 
xvi See: http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/mourn. 
xvii This point, nonetheless, needs to be taken with precaution. Simple equation of the homosexual 
subjects with the liminal would be too quick. For Turner, the liminal is only a transitional period 
of existence, a space/time between two structured and regulated social orders. The Otherness of 
the homosexuality, however, seems more a permanent rather than transitional relegation. 
xviii http://niechnaszobacza.queers.pl/ (accessed 18.07.2011). This and other translations are my 
own, unless coming from the English articles or otherwise acknowledged. 
xix It is important for the further analysis to notice that the Polish word used across cited texts: 
‘związek’, denotes both ‘relationship’ and slightly different in meaning in English, ‘partnership’. 
xx http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_Poland 
